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This thesis addresses the issue of the nature of thought - specifically,
the issue of whether or not it is ever correct to say that people 'think
in images'. It is argued that people do make use of image-type cogni¬
tive representations when they are engaged in certain kinds of spatial
problem solving and that they perform 'mental rotations' with these
image representations. This thesis is developed in six chapters.
Chapter one provides an introduction to the mental imagery research
of psychologist Roger Shepard and his associates. Three experiments
designed to test for the image rotation phenomenon as Shepard defines
it are set out and discussed in detail.
Three distinct theses of interpretation of the results of the
image rotation experiments are to be found in the current literature of
cognitive psychology and philosophy of psychology. They are the 'quan¬
tification thesis', the 'causal thesis' and the 'metaphysical thesis'.
These theses are discussed in Chapter two. It is argued that the quan¬
tification and the causal theses of interpretation are warranted by the
evidence adduced in Shepard's experiments, but the metaphysical thesis
or interpretation is not.
Chapter three provides an account of the metaphysical status of
the phenomenon of image rotation. It is argued that image rotations
are brain states that people experience. A computer model for image
rotation is set out and the methodological implications of conceiving
image rotations as experienced brain states are discussed. In particu¬
lar, it is argued that introspections of image rotations have an
i
observational status and ought, accordingly, to be taken quite literally
and seriously by cognitive investigators.
Chapter four contains a consideration of four linguistic strategies
for spatial problem solving. These strategies have been proposed by
psychologists and by philosopher, Daniel Dennett, in order to discredit
the theory of mental rotation. It is argued that the strategies are,
at best, incapable of producing the linear reaction times exhibited by
Shepard's subjects and, at worst, such that they make impossible the
actual solution of the spatial problem.
In Chapter five, a consideration of the long-standing philosophi¬
cal difficulties with imagistic thought is given. Four basic difficul¬
ties are identified. It is argued that the idea that images are a
special kind of representation that display information in an analogue
form and that image rotation is an analogue process is not patently
ridiculous, and in fact can be developed in a coherent way that vio¬
lates neither philosophical nor empirical considerations.
In the conclusion, Chapter six, there is a discussion of the pos¬
sible role of imagery in a theory of cognition. It is argued that
while it may not be the case that images are the basic elements of
thought, they may still be cognitively significant.
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Introduction: An Old Problem Resurfaces
During the past fifteen years, the topic of mental imagery has cap¬
tured a considerable amount of experimental and theoretical attention.
This has been a period of excitement, of discovery, of bold hypotheses
and of competing theoretical interpretations. The experimental work in
guestion implicates mental imagery not only as an empirical phenomenon
of considerable predictive importance, but also, at the theoretical
level, as a major representational system underlying human cognitive
behaviour. Especially in North America, this research is hailed by some
as reflecting a change in the direction of experimental psychology, and
a reaction against the excesses of the behaviourist tradition.
The most striking of the imagery experiments to date have to do
with visual imagery. These experiments employ a variety of methodolo¬
gies ranging from the straightforward solicitation of verbal reports
from subjects, in a manner reminiscent of the early introspectionists,
to the application of sophisticated technigues of mental chronometry,
involving the measurement of subjects' reaction times when they are
solving spatial problems. The data generated in these experiments have
emboldened psychologists to make a number of very specific claims about
the visual image. It is claimed, for instance, that visual images can
be generated more or less at will, that they can be scanned for new
information; and that the smaller the image is, the harder it is for the
subject to glean details from it. More interesting and more controver¬
sial perhaps, are claims which focus on the possibilities for image
manipulation. Roger Shepard and his colleagues have argued, on the
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basis of a series of experiments conducted at Stanford University, that
people can perform mental rotations with their images and that these
rotations proceed in a manner analogous to the actual physical rotation
of real objects. That is, the rotations are continuous and take place
at a measurable angular velocity.
Of course, few if any of these 'new' findings in psychology will
be surprising to most people. That we have visual imagery and can
manipulate it much as we might manipulate real objects is uncontrover-
sial—a simple fact of our mental lives. Our ordinary conversation is
replete with references to such experience. We talk of a 'mind's eye'
and of 'seeing' or 'visualizing' images, pictures, and objects before
the mind's eye. We claim, as well, to be able to solve problems,
particularly to conduct spatial calculations, by generating and manipu¬
lating these images.
If we want to know how many windows grandmother's house has, we
simply call up an image of the house and count the windows as they are
thereby presented. An engineer engaged in designing a machine component,
an automobile mechanic taking an engine apart, a plastic surgeon plan¬
ning the re-setting of a facial bone, a new homeowner considering various
possible arrangements of livingroom furniture, a student of elementary
geometry, who is told by his teacher to bisect an angle, and a native
New Yorker giving directions from the city centre to the south-bound
freeway—all these people whose thoughts are concerned with the spatial
relation of things, with their shapes and their colours—proceed, so
they think, imagistically. And most of them would claim to be com¬
pletely at a loss in these activities if the power of imaging were
suddenly to leave them.
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Most philosophers, on the other hand, will have no truck with
mental images or their kind, and so they are bound to find the psycholo¬
gists' excitement over the new imagery experiments surprising and even,
perhaps, somewhat annoying. They are likely to remind us that
Wittgenstein and Ryle laid imagery definitively to rest some years ago
and that, in any case, the arguments against imagery are a priori and
as such incontrovertible on empirical ground. So whatever science may
happen to discover in its cognitive investigations, it cannot discover
that people think (even sometimes) in images.
The truth of the matter, philosophers will insist, is that mental
images are nothing but fictions - metaphysical ghosts generated out of
the Cartesian view of the dualistic nature of man. Belief in such
entities was supportable when the reguirements of logic and science
were less stringent than today. But to regard imaging as if it were a
process that could take place somewhere 'in the mind' and to talk of
images as if they had some necessary connection to thought, is to
reaffirm a demonstrably futile model of human conduct. And it is bound
to distract attention from what we are really about. Our business as
thinkers, philosophers argue, is to talk understandingly to ourselves
or to others, in private or in public.
So, to hear the philosophers tell it, there is nothing more to be
said about or done with mental images. Our best bet as professionals
would be to put them behind us—exorcising them altogether from current
thinking. Philosopher Daniel Dennett espouses this policy explicitly:
"To be able to dispose of mental images," writes Dennett, "would be a
A
clear case of good riddance.""''
The measure of the philosophers' conviction in this regard is the
fact that they have remained for the most part silent in the face of
this resurgence of interest in imagery among their colleagues in
psychology. To my knowledge, only three philosophers in the mainstream
of philosophical psychology—Daniel Dennett, Owen Flanagan, and Jerry
Fodor have seen fit to make comment on the imagery experiments and, of
these, only Fodor does this with any degree of seriousness. Dennett,
for instance, purports to 'deal with' Roger Shepard's imagery experi¬
ments in the space of a mere one and three-guarter pages of his most
recent work in the philosophy of psychology. And Flanagan mentions
these experiments in the course of a discussion of methodology in cog¬
nitive science, but forbears any commentary on the possible conseguences
of this work for the philosophical treatment of thought in general or
mental imagery in particular. Apparently, Flanagan thinks there are no
consequences.
It might be supposed that philosophers generally have not had the
opportunity to become acquainted with the extent of the imagery research
phenomenon or with the precise nature of the claims that are thereby
generated. But this is hardly likely. The number of articles report¬
ing new research findings and the number of commentaries (both critical
and laudatory) on these, appearing in reputable journals of psychology,
has increased exponentially over the past ten years. There is even a
new journal, begun in 1980, called the Journal of Mental Imagery. So
"'"Daniel Dennett, Content and Consciousness (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 132.
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it seems entirely reasonable to expect that philosophers—and especially
those who work in the field of philosophical psychology—would have had
more than adequate opportunity to take note of this literature in the
course of their research.
No, the explanation for this silence appears to be that philoso¬
phers do not think that they have need to join the imagery debate once
again. The question is, is this silence acceptable? Does the a priori
character of the philosophical position regarding mental images and
their possible relation to thought, make redundant any further commen¬
tary? Surely it does not. The data generated in the imagery experi¬
ments are compelling. They point rather directly to the cognitive
significance of mental imagery and this stands in stark contrast to the
philosophers' staunch refusal to countenance the possibility of imagis-
tic thought. The philosophers may well be confident that these data
present no threat to their current theories and beliefs about thought
that, indeed, mental images are so far beyond the pale that nothing
could resurrect them, but it is surely incumbent on them to say so, and
to explain just why this is so. fx cathedra statements that imagery
must be one way or another can serve no purpose here; bald assertions
do not constitute arguments or explanations. A successful theory of
thought must be able to provide an account of the 'facts' of thought.
And the data generated in the imagery experiments are now part of these
facts. Somehow philosophers must find a way to explain them and if they
cannot then they must look to the adequacy of their own theories.
Broadly speaking, this thesis may be described as an attempt to
fill in this missing piece in the philosophy of psychology—first and
foremost to draw attention to the imagery research, and secondly, to
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supply the much-needed treatment of it. The focus of attention here
will be quite specific—the mental image rotation experiments of
psychologist, Roger Shepard. These experiments are of considerable
intrinsic interest but, more importantly, they are, in my judgment, the
best and clearest examples of the image research phenomenon to be found
in the experimental literature. Ultimately, I hope to provide a modest
defence of mental imagery on the strength of the evidence adduced in
Shepard's experiments. I shall be arguing that certain kinds of spatial
cognition demand imagistic explanation, and that the philosophers'
refusal to countenance it is nothing less than prejudicial.
CHAPTER I
Tracking Mental Rotations
1.1 The Phenomenon of Mental Rotation
Students of the human mind have long noted its ability to mimic,
internally, the possible motions and transformations of objects in the
external world. In his Enquiries of 1748, philosopher David Hume wrote
that to "join incongruous shapes and appearances costs the imagination
no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects,"
and that "this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the
faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the
material afforded us by the senses and experience.""^ Similarly, a cen¬
tury later, German physicist and sensory physiologist, Hermann von
Helmholtz observed that "memory images of purely sensory impressions ...
may be used as elements of thought combinations without it being neces¬
sary, or even possible, to describe these in words," and further, that
"equipped with the awareness of the physical form of an object, we can
clearly imagine all of the perspective images which we may expect upon
viewing from this or that side, and we are immediately disturbed when
2
such an image does not correspond to our expectations." And Albert
D. Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning
the Principles of Morals, L ."/U Selby-Bigge (Ed.) (Oxford, 1951),
Section II.
2
R.M. Warren and R.P. Warren, Helmholtz on Perception: Its
Physiology and Development (New York: Wiley, 1968), pp. 252-54.
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Einstein stated that he "very rarely" thought in words at all. Indeed,
he maintained that his "particular ability" did not lie in mathematical
calculation, but rather in "visualizing ... effects, consequences and
possibilities." He could not even undertake the difficult business of
finding words and mathematical symbols to communicate his new insights
into the nature of space and time, he said, until he had already worked
out his conceptualization of the physical situation by means of a "more
or less clear image which can be voluntarily reproduced and combined."^
Such observations are intriguing. Indeed, one is inclined to
wonder just how genuine this purported mimicry of operations performed
with objects 'in the mind' of operations performed with objects in the
physical world really is. Can we do mentally what we might do physi¬
cally?
Suppose an individual is asked to compare two objects - a pear,
say, and a tennis ball - and decide which is the larger. Certainly
this is easily done if representatives of these objects are physically
present. The individual simply places them side-by-side and observes
them. But can this comparison take place otherwise? Can the objects
be compared j3 priori - in the mind? Suppose that an individual is
making decisions about possible arrangements of office furniture. There
is a large desk which the individual in question would like to situate
in a corner of the office, but it is not clear that the desk will fit.
Once again, the simple and direct solution would involve a physical
Albert Einstein, Autobiographical Notes, in P.A. Schlipp (Ed.),
Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (Evanston, 111.: Library of
Living Philosophers, 1949).
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intervention of some sort - the desk might be moved into the corner or,
less strenuously, the individual could undertake to make a rapid spatial
calculation with the help of a tape measure or ruler. But is it pos¬
sible that the requisite spatial calculation could be achieved without
physical intervention of any sort? Could the individual move the desk
into the corner in his mind and 'see' whether or not it will fit?
If the Hume-Helmholtz-Einstein introspections are essentially
correct, if memory images can be used as "elements of thought," and if
there is a faculty for "compounding, transposing, augmenting and dimin¬
ishing" these images, then there would seem to be no problem. Images of
a pear and a tennis ball respectively could be called up or generated
from memory and placed into juxtaposition and the desk could be mentally
moved into the corner. But how will we know for sure—casual intro¬
spections in themselves seem only to be suggestive?
The course of research undertaken by Roger Shepard and his asso¬
ciates on the general topic of 'mental images and their transformations'
bears on this question. The research indicates that there may well be
something to this idea of mimicry postulated by Hume, Helmholtz, and
Einstein, at least in respect of one kind of mental operation. This is
the operation which Shepard describes as 'mental rotation'.
What is mental rotation? To get an intuitive feeling for it, and
for the kind of experiments that Shepard and his colleagues have con¬
ducted, consider the three pairs of line drawings of geometric shapes
which are presented in Figure 1 below. Now decide as quickly as pos¬




Figure 1 is taken from Roger Shepard and Lynn Cooper, Mental Images
and Their Transformations (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982), p. 35.
How did you arrive at a solution for the problem presented in A?
Did you perform the calculation descriptively - counting, perhaps, the
number of blocks in each shape and noting the number, location and direc¬
tion of each of the right angle turns? Perhaps you performed the cal¬
culation by a rotation of one or the other of the shapes into a position
of congruence with its counterpart. Or perhaps, for the sake of rigour,
you sought to combine the descriptive and rotational strategies -
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counting the number of blocks and then, when you had concluded that
there was an equivalence (at least of the number of component parts),
rotating one shape in your mind into congruence with the other? Are
the B pair a match? They are a match but how did you discover this?
Did you not find that it was necessary to perform a rotation of one or
the other shape in the third dimension, perpendicular to the page? The
C pair do not match at all. Did you not discover this fact by attempt¬
ing a number of rotations, none of which was successful?
As a first approximation, it might be said that mental rotation is
what one might attempt to perform in the face of a problem situation
(such as that presented above) which requires the assessment of the
shape similarity of figures/objects not manually accessible. There are
two points to be noted about mental rotation so defined.
First and foremost, it appears to be a fairly common and compelling
experience. It has been reported by more than one famous scientist. For
example, the German chemist Friedrich A. Kekule said that many of his
early insights into the nature of chemical bonds and of molecular struc¬
ture arose out of idle reveries in which he spontaneously experienced
kinetic visual images of the dancing atoms hooking up to form chainlike
molecules. (As is well known Kekule's cultivation of this visionary
practice culminated in his celebrated dream in which one of these
snake-like writhing chains suddenly twisted into a closed loop as if
seizing its own tail; thus was Kekule provided with his long-sought
answer to the problem of the structure of benzene."'") And in more
"'a. Findlay, a Hundred Years of Chemistry (London: Duckworth,
1948). _ "
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mundane circumstances, it is a fact that when required in an experimen¬
tal circumstance, to perform an 'in principle' or 'mental' completion
of an already partially constructed jigsaw puzzle, most people report
using the following calculation strategy: They begin by identifying
individual puzzle pieces which seem to have the right combination of
bumps and grooves to be a possible match for a clearly defined space in
the puzzle. Then if a given piece is out of alignment with that space,
they simply rotate an imaginary representation of it in their minds
until they can see whether or not an alignment of the respective bumps
and grooves is possible. Similarly, when asked if frogs have lips and
if they have stubby green tails, most subjects report first looking at
the mouth of an imaginary frog, then mentally rotating the image, and
then 'zooming in' (to use the subjects' own words) on the rear in order
to have a closer look before answering."'" And, finally, Shepard's own
imagery experiments provide further documentation of the generality of
the rotation experience. After the completion of a particular sequence
of experimental trials involving shape assessments of pairs of geometric
figures, Shepard's subjects have been invited to comment on how they
came to solve the problems. The overwhelming majority of them report
performing what they invariably describe as "mental rotation".
"'These two rather unusual experiments have been conducted by
Stephen M. Kosslyn and are reported in his book Image and Mind
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 1 ff.
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There have been a series of such experiments generating these
results. Listed in chronological order they are: R. Shepard and
J. Metzler, "Mental Rotations of three-dimensional Objects," Science,
1971, Vol. 171, pp. 701-703; L. Cooper and R. Shepard, "Chronometric
Studies of the Rotations of Mental Images," in W.G. Chase, ed.,
Visual Information Processing (New York: Academic Press, 1973);
L. Cooper and R. Shepard, "The Time Required to Prepare for a Rotated
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The second point to be noted is that mental rotation appears -
phenomenally - to take place very much in the manner of a rotation
which might have been performed physically/manually with the puzzle
pieces or with models of the geometric shapes arranged on pivots. That
is to say, it has the very property of mimicry that Hume and Helmholtz
describe. Subjects report that when they are solving the test problems,
the process undertaken mentally is an exact replica of the process
which might have been undertaken physically had it been practicable.
They do with their minds what they might have done with their hands.
This suggests one or two interesting possibilities. Most basi¬
cally, it suggests that there may well be some sort of correspondence
to be acknowledged between - very broadly - 'what goes on' when
mental images are undergoing spatial transformations of the rotational
kind and 'what goes on' when the same transformations occur physically.
It may be, in fact, that the processes of image rotation are not
entirely 'free'. They may be governed by certain inherent constraints -
constraints, say, which are roughly analogous to those which govern like
processes in the three-dimensional world. Physical rotations take place
holistically - in a continuous, unbroken sequence. If, for instance,
a given figure is rotated 60°, that figure must cover all the distance
between 0° and 60°. And proportionate to the distance factor are the
factors of speed and effort. The greater the distance covered in the
Stimulus," Memory and Cognition, 1973, Vol. 1, pp. 246-250; and
L. Cooper and R. Shepard, "Mental Transformations in the Identification
of Left and Right Hands," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1975,
Vol. 104, pp. 48-56; L. Cooper and R. Shepard, "Transformations on
Representations of Objects in Space," in E.C. Carterette and M.P.
Friedman, (Eds.), Handbook of Perception (New York: Academic Press, 1978).
14
rotation, the longer it must take to complete the rotation (all things
being equal) and the greater effort must be expended. These rules of
rotation per se may well apply in the case of mental rotations.
At the beginning stages of an empirical science an assumption of
regularity - of governance by certain principles or rules can be a large
step forward. This is particularly so if this assumed regularity is
predicated on something the researcher knows a fair bit about - such as
the rotation of objects in the physical world. Shepard has converted
this assumption into a very specific hypothesis regarding one kind of
mental processing. The hypothesis is this: If the subjects' intro¬
spections are correct, if they perform rotations in order to make the
relevant shape assessments of problematic test figures, then there
ought to be a consistent and systematic correlation between the degree
or distance of the rotation and the length of time taken to solve the
problem. Stated in these terms, the hypothesis would seem to lend
itself quite readily to empirical investigation. All that is required
is a way of measuring the subjects' performance times or reaction times
in relation to the distance factor.
1.2 The Mental Rotation Experiments
Since 1971, Shepard and his colleagues have conducted a consider¬
able number of experiments designed to test the rotation hypothesis.
The three experiments described here are the best and clearest examples
of this research. In order to facilitate identification, I have pro¬
vided names for each of these experiments. In order of their treatment
they are: the Original Rotation Experiment, the Direction of Rotation
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Experiment, and the Controlled Rotation Experiment.
The Original Rotation Experiment
In the original mental rotation experiment conducted by Shepard
and Metzler in 1971, subjects saw pairs of line drawings like those
presented earlier and reproduced here in Eigure 2. They looked at 1600
such pairs, which were constructed according to three different rules,
corresponding to A, B, and C in Eigure 2.
Eigure 2
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A. Here the two drawings are identical except that they have been
pasted on the page at different angles. It would also be correct to
say that the two drawings show the result of a rotation on the plane
defined by the surface of the page.
B. These two drawings are two-dimensional perspective projections of
the same three-dimensional structure, that is, the two drawings show
the result of rotation of the same object in the third dimension.
C. Though the two drawings look similar, they are different. They
cannot be rotated either on the plane of the page or in the third
dimension to be brought into exact congruence.
The subjects' task with each pair of drawings, which appeared on a
screen while their respective heads were kept still,"'' was to indicate,
by pulling left or right hand levers, whether the depicted objects were
the 'same' in the sense of A and B above, or 'different' in the sense
of C. Stimulus pairs of types A and B were presented in pairs differing
by anything from 20° to a maximum of 180°. With a bit of practice, the
subjects averaged more than 95 percent correct responses, even though
they were instructed to respond as rapidly as possible while retaining
That the researchers found it necessary to restrict head movement
is, perhaps, telling in itself. Shepard and Metzler discovered early
on in the experiments that when they did not so restrict the subjects,
a number of them tried to solve the problems by 'rotating' their heads
- to the side so as to see the test objects from the desired reoriented
perspective. It may be that such 'head rotation' counts as an inter¬
mediate strategy between actual physical rotation of the objects them¬
selves and mental rotation. In any case, this behaviour tends to
underscore the natural and spontaneous character of the rotation
strategy.
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accuracy. The main datum of the experiment, however, was the speed of
response, not the accuracy.
When questioned after the fact of the experiments as to the
strategy they employed, the subjects all indicated that they performed
mental rotations in order to solve the test problems. Significantly,
the data would seem to bear them out. If mental rotation really
occurred, we would expect that the larger the distance covered by the
rotation, the longer it would take the subjects to decide that the draw¬
ings are the same or different. Figure 3 shows the average reaction
times in relation to the angle of rotation for types A and B. For both
types, the reaction time rose from about one second to more than four
seconds as the rotation covered the range from 0° to 180° and it will be
noted that the reaction time - angle of rotation data fall along a
straight line.
Such linear dependencies have now been obtained with a variety of
stimuli, including perspective drawings of three-dimensional objects
1 2
composed of cubes, two-dimensional random polygons, and alphanumeric
characters.^ The linearity provides strong evidence for an additive
process in which the time required to go from one orientation, A, to
R. Shepard and J. Metzler, 1971, op. cit., and J. Metzler and
R. Shepard, "Transformational Studies of the Internal Representation of
Three-dimensional Objects," in R.L. Solso, ed., Theories of Cognitive
Psychology (Potomac, Md.: Lawrence Erlbaum Asso.~j 1974).
2
L. Cooper, "Mental Rotation of Random two-dimensional shapes,"
Cognitive Psychology, Vol. 7, 1975, pp. 20-43.
\. Cooper and R. Shepard, "Chronometric Studies of the Rotation
of Mental Images," in W.G. Chase, (Ed.), Visual Information Processing
(New York: Academic Press, 1973).
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Figure 3
Angle of rotation (degrees)
Figure 3 is taken from Shepard and Cooper, 1982, op. cit., p. 30.
another orientation, C, is the sum of the time required to go from A
to an intermediate orientation, B, and the time required to go from
that intermediate orientation, B, to C. It is consistent with the
more specific proposal that the subjects make the determination of
sameness of shape by carrying out some sort of internal analogue of an
external rotation of the one object into congruence with the other,
and, further, can perform this analogue process no faster than some
limiting rate. In point of fact, for the eight subjects participating
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in the experiment, the average rate of mental rotation was about 60°
per second, or a rate of six seconds to complete a 360° rotation. The
subjects said they could not rotate the images any quicker without
losing track of the basic structural integrity of the images.
The other point to be noted here is that the two straight lines
of Figure 3 have approximately the same slope, which means (if we
accept, for the sake of argument, the rotation hypothesis) that the
subjects rotated the mental images at the same rate on the plane of the
page or in the third dimension. In point of fact, rotation in the third
dimension would be far more complex geometrically because it would
involve changes in perspective and relative size, and yet the subjects
appeared to be able to handle both tasks with equal speed and facility.
It is worth emphasizing at this point, that the data would seem to
warrant a spatial interpretation rather than a literally pictorial one.
People blind from birth can solve the identical shape assessment prob¬
lems by analyzing three-dimensional models of the geometric shapes
tactilely. They, too, introspect an abstract process of spatial rota¬
tion, but, clearly, in their case, the mode of representation cannot be
visual or pictorial."'" Thus, there is no need to think that the subjects
This fact has been established through the studies of blind sub¬
jects conducted by P.A. Carpenter and P. Eisenberg (published in
"Mental Rotation and Frames of Reference in Blind and Sighted Indivi¬
duals," Perception and Psychophysics, 1978, Vol. 23, pp. 117-124) and
by G.S. Marmor and L.A. Zaback (published in "Mental Rotation by the
Blind: Does Mental Rotation Require Visual Images," Cognitive
Psychology, 1973, Vol. 7, pp. 548-339). It was found that the reaction
times of these subjects increased linearly with the angular difference
between the orientations of the objects, clearly suggesting that mental
rotation of some kind - very likely a kinaesthetic kind - was used to
make the calculation.
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rotate actual pictures but merely they are doing something more spatial
than linguistic. Why else would the reaction times vary with the
degree of rotation?
The Direction of Rotation Experiment
A further experiment conducted by Metzler and Shepard in 1974"'"
attempts to track the direction of subjects' mental rotations. In this
experiment, subjects were presented with geometric shape pairs in a
seguence designed so that, if the subjects were carrying out a mental
rotation, they might go the long way around the circle. More specifi¬
cally, for all except a few pairs presented in the last half of the
experimental seguence, a particular (i.e., clockwise) rotation would
carry the object on the left into the orientation of the object on the
right by the shortest rotation (i.e., the rotation of no more than 180°).
Then, on a few randomly inserted trials toward the end, the direction
of shortest rotation was unexpectedly reversed so that, if the subjects
were continuing to rotate in the same direction as before (as they
would have been more or less conditioned to do), they would end up
going the long way around. In order to minimize the likelihood of their
discovering that they were going the long way around on these special
trials, the pairs were confined to just the next step beyond 180° which,
in view of the 45° increments used in this experiment, was 225° (as
opposed to 135°, if they happened to reverse direction of rotation on
that trial).
^J. Metzler and R. Shepard, 1974, op. cit.
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These special trials could provide crucial information concerning
the nature of the internal process by means of which the subjects
determined sameness or difference of the two objects on each trial.
For according to the mental rotation hypothesis, the internal process
is in a sense a simulation of an external process of rotation, and, as
such, has a definite trajectory and a definite direction along that
trajectory. Thus, to the extent that subjects always go the long way
around on these special trials, their reaction times should be even
greater than at 180° and, indeed, should coincide with the linear extra¬
polation to 225° of the reaction-time function already obtained for
angular departures from 0° to 180°. Or, to the extent that subjects
sometimes go the long way around and sometimes reverse direction to
take advantage of the 135° shortcut, their reaction times should be
bimodally distributed with an upper mode corresponding to the linear
extrapolation to 225° and a lower mode corresponding to the reaction
time previously found for 133°. In contrast to this, a nonrotational
theory would seem to predict no such directional effect. The control¬
ling variable would then be simply the absolute difference between the
two pictures and, hence, the reaction time should be the same no matter
what the possibilities for direction of rotation may be.
The experiment results confirmed Shepard and Metzler's expectations
- the subjects' reaction times were indeed bimodal. For pairs which
differed either by 225° if the subjects rotated in the previously pre¬
vailing direction or by 135° if the subjects rotated in the opposite
but shorter direction, there were two distinct peaks, one aligned with
the mode for the standard 135° pairs and the other centered on a linear
extrapolation of the reaction-time function past 180° to 225°.
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Apparently, the subjects sometimes carried out their mental rotations
in the usual direction even though that took them the long way around,
and sometimes they noticed the reversal and so went the short way
around. This, in any case, was what the subjects themselves reported
when asked to discuss their particular rotational strategies. In fact,
by explicitly instructing the subjects as to the direction in which the
mental rotation was to be carried out, Lynn Cooper, in a subsequent
experiment, obtained reaction times that increased with remarkable
linearity, all the way out to 300°."'"
The Controlled Rotation Experiment
2
A more complex task was devised by Cooper and Shepard in which
the subjects were required to judge whether common alphanumeric charac¬
ters were presented in their normal form or as mirror image reversals.
During each trial, the subjects sat fixating a blank circular field
projected in a tachistoscope. To start a new trial, the experimenter
orally announced which of two characters, an "R" or a "2" (with which
the subjects had been previously familiarized), was scheduled to appear
as the test stimulus on that trial. Then the experimenter started
playing a tape on which the verbal commands "up," "tip," "tip," "down,"
"tip," "tip" had previously been recorded at a controlled rate of one
command per half second. On the basis of prior instructions and
\. Cooper, 1973, op. cit.
2
L. Cooper and R. Shepard, 1973, op. cit.
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practice trials, the subjects were to imagine the normal version of the
announced character starting in its upright orientation and rotating
clockwise at a rate of 60° per half second, in synchrony with the audi¬
tory commands. (Thus the initial command "up" notified the subjects to
begin rotating the internally generated mental image from its initial
upright orientation and, three commands later, the word "down" indicated
that this image should now be rotated around into its 180° orientation.)
To assist the subjects to keep pace with the auditory commands, there
were six small tick marks visible around the border of the circular




Figure 4 is taken from Shepard and Cooper, 1982, op. cit., p. 77.
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At a random point during this purely mental process, some version
of the imagined character - either in the orientation that the subjects,
in accordance with the verbal instructions, should be imagining at that
particular moment in this rotation, or in some other orientation chosen
at random from among the six possible 60° increments - was displayed.
If the subjects were actually carrying out a mental rotation, Cooper
and Shepard reasoned, then the speed with which they can discriminate
whether the probe stimulus is normal or backward (i.e., mirror reversed)
should be greatest when the probe appears in the orientation momentarily
assumed by their mental image, for only then will they be able to make
an immediate match between their internally rotating image or template
and the externally presented test probe. Equally, it ought to be the
case that the speed of the subjects' discriminations should decrease in
proportion to the degree of the orientation discrepancy between the
anticipated orientation and the actual orientation of the presented
test probe.
However, the theoretically critical point of this experiment
resides not in the proposed linearity itself but in the indication it
can give that the underlying process is composed of parts (corresponding
to rotations through smaller angles) that are necessarily performed in
sequential order and for which, consequently, the performance times are
additive. Thus no matter what the effective rotation times may be
between particular adjacent points separated by 60° around the circle,
if the time required to go from any one point to any other nonadjacent
point is an additive combination of the component times to go between
the intervening adjacent points, then the average time to go between
points in all pairs separated by X 60° steps should increase linearly
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with X. To show that the time to rotate from A to C is an additive com¬
bination of the times to rotate from A to B and from B to C is to fur¬
nish another kind of evidence that the process of rotating from A to C
passes through a point, B, corresponding to an intermediate orientation.
A finding of linearity would thus support further Shepard and Metzler's
original supposition that mental rotation is an analogue process.
The experimentalresults confirmed the expectations of the experi¬
menters. The subjects were able to classify a test stimulus as normal
(as opposed to backward) in only 500 to 600 msec., as long as the orien¬
tation of that stimulus coincided with the rotating orientation expected.
This tends to support Cooper and Shepard's belief that the subjects
arrived at their classification by matching the presented probe against
a "rotating" mental image. And, as predicted, when the probe appeared
in some orientation other than the (rotating) orientation expected,
reaction time increased markedly with the difference between the expec¬
ted and the actual presented orientations. Indeed as Figure 5 attests,
the overall increase, from 0° to 180° is close to 400 msec., making each
60° increment roughly 130 msec.in time to complete. This second
experimental result appears to make good sense only if we are prepared
to assume that when the orientation of the test probe fails to agree
with the imagined orientation, the subjects undertake an additional
poststimulus rotation in order to achieve a match between that probe and
the internal representation of the corresponding normal character and
that, when this occurs, this poststimulus rotation passes through what¬
ever intervening orientations there may be. As in the case of a physi¬
cal rotation of the character 'R' around a circle, the mental rotation
of an imagined 'R' must pass through the 120° orientation if it is to
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move from 60° - 180°.
Figure 5
0 60 120 wo
ANGULAR OEPARTURE OF PR06E FROM EXPECTEO ORIENTATION
(OEGREES)
Figure 5 is taken from Shepard and Cooper, 1982, op. cit., p. 108.
Once again in accordance with the standard operating practice
undertaken in all of the rotation experiments, Cooper and Shepard
requested the subjects to state how they came to solve the problem.
Cooper and Shepard describe their findings: "Our subjects typically
claim that in preparing for the anticipated presentation of a rotated
stimulus, they did in fact a) form a mental picture of the anticipated
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stimulus and then b) carry out a mental rotation of that picture into
its anticipated orientation.""'"
Taken together, the rotation experiments establish four hitherto
unknown facts about the problem solving behaviour of human beings rela¬
tive to the given set of spatial problems. These facts are as follows:
i) The time required for people to complete the shape assessment process
varies consistently and linearly with the degree of orientation dispar¬
ity displayed by the figures/objects under consideration. In point of
fact, it takes the individuals tested just twice as long to assess
objects displayed at an orientation disparity of 100° as it takes them
to assess objects displayed at an orientation disparity of 50°—just the
kind^temporal proportionality that could be expected if people were
either making their shape assessments on the basis of actually having
to wait out object pairs being physically rotated into a congruence or
'fit' with one another or doing something comparable mentally.
ii) Reaction times are bimodally distributed for angles beyond 180°—in
correspondence with the individual's choice of going the long or the
short way around the 360° circle, iii) The shape assessment process
can be completed in advance of the presentation of a second stimulus—
provided that the individuals tested already know the axis and direction
of the required rotation. And iv) introspections of mental rotation are
consistently correlated with these reaction-time patterns. When ques¬
tioned after their performance in any of the rotation experiments
described above, individuals report mental rotation.
"'Roger Shepard and Lynn Cooper, 1982, ibid., p. 74.
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The principal claim that Roger Shepard has been prepared to make
on the basis of these studies of mental rotation is this: in the course
assessing the global shapes of two similar-appearing objects that differ
appreciably in orientation, the individuals tested necessarily pass
through a series of internal states that bear a one-to-one relation to
the physical states that the object would pass through if it were physi-
cally rotated from^orientation to the other. Shepard writes:
... by measuring reaction times to variously oriented
test stimuli presented during the course of a mental
rotation, we have established that the intermediate
states of the internal process do indeed have a one-to-
one correspondence to intermediate orientations of the
external object. Our results, in fact, show that there
is actually something rotating during the course of a
mental rotation—namely, the orientation in which the
corresponding external stimulus, if it were to be
presented, would be most rapidly discriminated from
other possible stimuli.1
And, commenting on the Controlled Rotation experiment, Shepard and Lynn
Cooper write:
Mental rotation is an analog process with a serial struc¬
ture bearing a one-to-one relationship to the correspond¬
ing physical rotation.... In mentally rotating an object
between any two widely separated orientations, the
internal process passes through the mental image corre¬
sponding to the external object in some intermediate
orientation. Conseguently, the orientation at which the
subject is most prepared for the appearance of that
object at each moment is actually rotating with respect
to the external world.2
"'"Roger Shepard, "The Mental Image," American Psychologist,
February 1978, p. 135.
2
Roger Shepard and Lynn Cooper, 1982, op. cit., p. 118.
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1.3 Theoretical Significance
In the context of the general subject of human cognitive processes,
the study of a particular, apparently nonverbal, non-logical process of
problem solving such as mental rotation of three-dimensional figures or
alphanumeric characters, may seem rather specialized and, perhaps, of
little or no consequence. After all, Shepard and his research teams
have not demonstrated through the rotation experiments that thought in
general is accomplished in images."'" Nor has Shepard demonstrated that
the many familiar objects that people encounter in various positions in
their day-to-day dealings with the world, have to be mentally rotated
into some canonical orientation before they can be recognized. On the
contrary, the truth of the matter is probably that in the case of most
objects and symbols with which people have to deal, there are suffi¬
ciently numerous, redundant, or orientationally invariant distinctive
features that people are well able to achieve recognition directly—
without the need of a preliminary mental transformation.
What can the significance of the rotation experiments be then? Do
they license any inferences about the nature of thinking/problem solving?
Are there lessons for cognitive scientists to learn from them?
Indeed it is important to note that, in the literature, Shepard
has been described as a 'dual-coding' theorist. This simply means that
it is a general assumption of Shepard's theory of cognitive representa¬
tion that the human brain has available to it two distinct symbolic
systems for representing and processing information. Roughly, it can
be said that one system is specialized for dealing with linguistic,
seguentially organized information and for generating speech while the
other system is specialized for representing and processing information
in a direct, analogue fashion. A second assumption of Shepard's theory
is that these two systems can, at times, be functionally interdependent
such that during the course of a given problem solving episode, both
systems may be called into play.
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A demonstration that human subjects are capable of mentally
rotating spatially structured objects even if only occasionally and in
certain rather contrived circumstances, would be of considerable theo¬
retical significance. Most basically, such a demonstration would call
into guestion the advisability of formulating theories of human cogni¬
tion solely in terms of discrete processes of language manipulation and
logical analysis as has been characteristic of nhuch"'rfecenrfc psychology
Ur\cj At some (yet to be specified) stage in its cognitive
operations, the human brain, apparently, displays analogue capabilities
and properties and, at this stage, its activity cannot adeguately
described in terms of the manipulation of language. Accordingly,
philosophers and psychologists would have to acknowledge once and for
all, that people can and, indeed do, do more by way of thinking than
just talk quietly to themselves—describing objects and events and
making inferences on the basis of these descriptions.
Equally, a confirmation of the rotation hypothesis would raise a
question about the advisability of taking too glibly or too literally
any comparison which might be made between the human brain and a digital
computer. A digital computer may calculate the coordinates of a rotated
structure by performing a matrix multiplication. But the intermediate
states of this row-into-column calculation, are nothing like those which
would characterize a mental rotation. The intermediate internal states
of the latter (and, by extension, of any analogue process) would have a
natural one-to-one correspondence to appropriate intermediate states in
the external world. The intermediate states of a logical computation
would not in general display such correspondence. At the very least,
then, if we say that the brain is like a digital computer, we must add
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the qualification that it is like a digital computer with analogue
simulation capabilities.
Moreover, if Shepard is correct in his 'analogue' assessment of the
problem solving activities undertaken by the individuals tested in the
rotation experiments, then it is not unreasonable to expect that the
imagining, understanding, and planning of many other kinds of spatial
operations may also be accomplished in an analogue manner. We may well,
to hark back to the examples cited earlier on, be able to mentally move
the desk into the corner and assess its size relative to the available
space and we may well be able to walk around our respective grandmothers'
houses 'in our minds' and count the number of windows there.
CHAPTER 2
Interpreting the Mental Rotation Experiments
2.1 Introduction
As might be expected, the rotation experiments have not gone
unnoticed by the community of cognitive psychologists. Indeed, the
experiments have generated a good deal of commentary. Much of this com¬
mentary has been very positive. For example, psychologist Alan Paivio
has argued that the rotation experiments provide an 'objective measure¬
ment' of the mental activity of Shepard's subjects—a way of 'tracing'
or 'quantifying' the process they introspect and describe as 'rotation'.
Writes Paivio:
Roger Shepard's recent work on the rotation of mental
images has involved completely objective reaction-time
methods which not only confirm the subjective impres¬
sion that we rotate mental images, but also provide
a means of measuring the speed of such rotation.1
No less positively, Fred Attneave argues that the findings of the
original rotation experiment of 1971, cannot be explained in anything
less than analogue terms. He writes:
Alan Paivio, "Images Propositions and Knowledge," in Images
Perception and Knowledge, J.M. Nicholas (Ed.), (Boston: D. Reidel
Publishing Co., 1974), p. 50.
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... the most compelling evidence I know for the exist¬
ence of a tridimensional modeling medium in the head
comes from the work of Roger Shepard and his students.
Shepard and Metzler's experiments of 1971 ... show
beyond any reasonable doubt that when one rotates a
mental image from one aspect to another the represen¬
tation of the object is in fact going through all of
the intermediate aspects in a continuous manner. I
have no idea how anybody could possibly account for
these results without postulating an analogue represen¬
tational medium.1
And Roger Brown and Richard J. Herrnstein argue that the reaction-
time findings vindicate the common sense belief in a 'mind's eye', with
all, presumably, that this entails in terms of a metaphysics of mind.
Write Brown and Herrnstein:
The upshot was that there is an icon which is somewhat
analogous to the physical stimulus itself. In an
older vocabulary, based on personal experience rather
than experimentation, we might have said that the data
suggest a mental image of the physical stimulus.
Common sense has always believed in a "mind's eye" in
addition to the physical events in our sense organs.
In that respect, the research has just confirmed what
people already know.2
There are, it will be noted, really three distinct theses of inter¬
pretation being proposed here. The thesis in the first instance makes
an assertion about what grounds or evidence might establish the presence
of mental rotation activity and about how it is possible to quantify or
"'"Fred Attneave, "How Do You Know," American Psychologist, 1974,
p. 498.
2
Roger Brown and Richard J. Herrnstein, "Icons and Images," in Ned
Block, (Ed.), Imagery (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1981), p. 29.
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measure this activity. For Paivio, the positive dimension of the dis¬
covery of the linear reaction-time behaviour pattern, is that it makes
possible an empirical investigation of a phenomenon hitherto considered
to be simply out of the reach—beyond the pale for science per se. For
identification purposes, I call this the 'quantification thesis'. The
thesis in the second instance, is straightforwardly causal. Attneave
is asserting that the explanation for the problem solving behaviour of
Shepard's subjects is analogue activity. To put the thesis bluntly, the
subjects could not solve the test problem in the way that they do unless
they undertook some such activity. The thesis in the third instance—
certainly the boldest of the three—is a metaphysical thesis. Brown and
Flerrnstein apparently believe that the reaction-time results have impli¬
cations for the truth of some form of metaphysical dualism. They argue
that the results prove that there is a 'mind's eye' (as plain common
sense has always believed) and that this mind's eye and its activity are
separate and distinct from 'physical' events.
In this chapter, I want to consider each of these theses of inter¬
pretation in turn and to decide whether any or all of them are warranted
by the results of the rotation experiments.
2.2 The Quantification Thesis
Certainly this is the most popular interpretation of the rotation
experiments to be found in the literature. In addition to Alan Paivio,
psychologist Stephen Kosslyn, James P. Pomerantz, Steven Pinker, George
Smith, and Steven P. Shwartz have seen fit to propose versions of it.
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In articles written jointly by Kosslyn and Pomerantz"^ and by Kosslyn,
2
Pinker, Smith and Shwartz, Roger Shepard and his research team are
praised for proving the 'reality' of the reported rotation activity and
for developing, by way of the rotation experiments, a technigue which
facilitates a kind of 'guantification' of this activity. Kosslyn and
Pomerantz exemplify this attitude toward the research when they write,
"The guantification of introspection technigue provides not only more
reliable data than that obtained via simple introspective reports, but
more fine-grained information as well. Thus not only did these sorts
of findings begin to tell us something about imagery, but they seemed
to lend credence to the claim that images are indeed psychologically
real entities, that they are worthy of being studied."^ W.G. Chase
makes very similar comments on the image rotation research. He writes,
"The importance of this research is that it develops an objective way of
measuring one of the mental operations commonly used in visual think-
4
ing." And in the introduction to the volume of essays devoted to the
discussion of current findings in cognitive psychology, W.K. Estes
Stephen Kosslyn and James R. Pomerantz, "Imagery, Propositions
and the Form of Internal Representations," Cognitive Psychology, vol. 9,
1977, pp. 52-76.
2
Stephen Kosslyn, Steven Pinker, George E. Smith, and Steven P.
Shwartz, "On the Demystification of Mental Imagery," The Behavioural and
Brain Sciences, vol. 2, 1979, pp. 535-581.
^Stephen Kosslyn and James Pomerantz, "Imagery, Propositions and
the Form of Internal Representations," op. cit., p. 57.
4
W.G. Chase, "Elements of Information Processing," in Handbook of
Learning and Cognitive Processes, vol. 5 of the series Human Information
Processing, W.K. Estes (Ed.) (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1978), p.78.
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describes the 'timing' technique, used by Shepard and several other
cognitive psychologists in the following terms: "I refer of course to
the use of reaction times to trace mental processes. The idea of
ascertaining the durations of unobservable mental processes by subtract¬
ing reaction times for initiation of earlier from those of later stages
of the task ... has evolved into an extremely sophisticated technique.""'"
Now, clearly, the upshot of each of the commentaries cited above
is that the reaction time constitutes a kind of objective parameter of
what is going on 'inside'—because of it, we can be sure that mental
rotation is, as Kosslyn and Pomerantz say, 'psychologically real' and
we can even, as Estes claims, trace the duration of the rotation
2
activity. Furthermore, the reaction time is to be preferred over the
verbal report as a behavioural indicant of rotation activity as it has,
according to Kosslyn and Pomerantz, the virtue of reliability. There
is always the possibility when a verbal report of image rotation is
made that the reporter in question is telling a deliberate lie or that
he simply does not appreciate the ordinary language conventions for talk
of 'rotations'--either of images or of objects and so, presumably, has
misidentified-misdescribed his problem solving activity. These possi¬
bilities, presumably, do not arise with the reaction time. Reaction
times which increase or decrease in precise proportion to the degree of
""W.K. Estes, Introduction to Handbook of Learning and Cognitive
Processes, Vol. 5, Human Information Processing, ibid., p. 2.
2
Presumably, what Estes has in mind here is that the image
experience begins upon the posing of the experimental test question
and ends when the subject responds to the question. Its duration,
therefore, is whatever period has elapsed between those two
objective performances.
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orientation disparity of the test stimuli could not be faked. Thus the
appeal of substituting the reaction-time pattern as the decisive sign
or 'test' of mental rotation for the verbal report is clear—it makes
possible a proper scientific inguiry into a phenomenon of mind.
I should think that this interpretation of the rotation experiments
would have some fairly considerable appeal within the experimental
psychology community. After all, in science it is common to make
phenomena that allow of precise measurement into the evidence or grounds
which decide the application of a referring expression. A term that was
previously applied on gualitative grounds—on grounds of introspection—
becomes determined by quantitative grounds, once quantitatively measur¬
able correlations are established. The adoption of the 'rapid eye move¬
ment' test for dreams is a striking example of this. In the late 1950's,
psychologists William Dement and Nathaniel Kleitman conducted an experi¬
ment which established a significant correlation between the presence
of the REM (Rapid Eye Movement) and the reporting of dream experience.
The procedure in the Dement and Kleitman experiment was to waken sub¬
jects from sleep during periods of REM and also during periods when
there was no REM, in order to find out whether or not they would report
dreams. The incidence of dream report was high after the REM awakenings
(152 out of 191) and very low after the non-REM awakenings (11 out of
160). Dement and Kleitman drew the following conclusion from their
findings.
It is reasonable to conclude that an objective measure¬
ment of dreaming may be accomplished by recording REM's
during sleep. This stands in marked contrast to the
forgetting, distortion, and other factors that are
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involved in the reliance on the subjective recall of
dreams. It thus becomes possible to objectively study
the effect on dreaming of environmental changes,
psychological stress, drug administration, and a variety
of other factors and influences.1
I do not claim to know whether or not Dement and Kleitman actually
made the decision, based on this experiment, to use eye movements as
their test for the occurrence of dreams. It is clear, however, from the
comments given above that they were strongly drawn to that decision,
and this is quite understandable. After all, they wanted to do
scientific work on dreams, and therefore needed a reliable method of
determining with precision when dreaming occurs and exactly how long it
lasts. And this need, so they thought, is not filled by individual sub¬
jects' 'subjective reports' of dreams. But whether or not Dement and
Kleitman themselves adopted REM as the test for dreaming, it is pretty
clear that over the course of time and of subsequent experiments and
discussions regarding dreams, the scientific community did so embrace
it. We are told, for instance, that whether or not on a given night we
recall having any dream experiences, that we did indeed dream. Statis¬
tics resulting from subsequent REM experiments indicate that during a
normal night's sleep, people exhibit the REM pattern off and on all
night long. And, more strikingly, in the case of individuals who claim
that they never dream or dream (so they say) 'only once in a blue moon',
we are told that they are just wrong about this. They are dreaming—
"''William Dement and Nathaniel Kleitman, "The Relation of Rapid
Eye Movements During Sleep to Dream Activity: An Objective Method for
the Study of Dreaming," Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol. 33,
1957, p. 341.
39
which is to say, they exhibit the REM behaviour, they just do not
remember their dreams.
Indeed the acceptance of the REM as the decisive test for the
occurrence of dreams among psychologists has become so standard and
uncontroversial that it is simply stated as a matter of fact in intro¬
ductory textbooks. Discussing the results of the original Dement and
Kleitman experiments in 1957 and the experiments conducted in 1958 by
Dement and Wolpert in which an attempt was made to time the REM epi¬
sodes, the author of one such text says this:
These findings indicate that the average adult dreams
about 1.5 hours every night—the time spent in REM
sleep. How can we sguare this assertion with the fact
that in everyday life, most people seem to experience
dreams only occasionally and that some deny that they
ever dream? The answer is that dreams are generally
forgotten within minutes after they have occurred.^
Similarly, David Kretch, Richard S. Crutchfield and Norman Livson,
authors of another standard text write:
This objective approach to dream measurement has made
it possible to show that all individuals dream very
freguently, perhaps four or five times a night. Further¬
more, it has been found that most of this dreaming is
not remembered. When subjects are awakened as soon as
ten minutes after REM's stop, very few of the dreams
are reported.2
"'"Henry Gleitman, Psychology (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
1981), p. 354.
2
David Kretch, Richard S. Crutchfield and Norman Livson, Elements
of Psychology (Toronto, Alfred A. Knopf Ltd., 1969), p. 764.
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To throw light on the question of whether those who report fewer
dreams are forgetting them or actually dreaming less, an investigation
was carried out by J.S. Antrobus, W. Dement, and C. fisher."'" These
investigators recruited two groups of subjects—those who recalled very
many dreams and those who recalled almost none. These groupings not
only were based upon a self-report as a 'dreamer' or 'non-dreamer', but
also were further checked by requiring the candidates for those groups
to keep 'dream diaries' in which each morning, any recalled dreams were
recorded. The final groups of eleven subjects each were therefore
quite extreme, representing the two poles of dream recall.
Records of the frequency of REM's were then obtained for each sub¬
ject. The findings were that the 'non-dreamers' spent virtually as much
of their sleep time in REM activity as did the 'dreamers' —19 percent
versus 23 percent. And, significantly, both groups exhibited the same
number of periods of REM activity over the course of the night--the
non-dreamers had an average of four such periods and so did the dreamers.
Apparently, the percentages in dream time differed because the dream
recallers had longer, but not more frequent, dreams. A portion, but
only a small one, of the difference in dream recall between the two
groups may thus have to do with the fact that the dream recallers had
slightly more dream material to recall. "But most of the discrepancy
in dream recall," Antrobus, Dement, and fisher have argued, "must be
attributed to some sort of forgetting mechanism that operates sometime
"'j.S. Antrobus, W. Dement, and C. fisher, "Patterns of Dreaming
and Dream Recall," Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, vol. 69,
1964, pp. 341-44.
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between the occurrence of the dream and the opportunity to report it."^
It is interesting to note that the REM test for dreams has a wider
currency and acceptance than simply within the confines of the scienti¬
fic/professional community per se. Information regarding the REM
research has, over time, filtered down into the ordinary language con¬
text, and it has had quite a dramatic effect on most people, especially
those who routinely keep abreast of the scientific research which finds
its way into the popular press. One finds, in fact, that when ques¬
tioned about their dreams the night before, people will often say—"I
didn't dream at all-to tell the truth, I slept like a baby." And then
with an almost palpable degree of self-consciousness, add the correc¬
tion—"I guess I did dream, I just wasn't aware of it," or "I just
forgot it."^
Now it seems to me that the scientific/professional and, more
recently, lay interpretation of the Dement and Kleitman experiments on
dreams constitutes a kind of paradigm case or model of the interpreta¬
tion of Shepard which is under discussion here. And the analogy to
what might be described as the 'reaction-time case' for mental rotation
activity is strong. In the case of both experiments, the dream
experiment and the mental rotation experiment, a body of 'objective'
"'"Antrobus, Dement, and fisher, ibid., p. 343.
2
for what it is worth, I have engaged in a discussion of dreams
with a class of introductory philosophy students and I have found both
that they are well-aware of the REM research and that they are quite
willing to surrender their 'dream report autonomy' to the received
authorities. In fact, several students volunteered the information that
people dream during sleep even though, upon waking, they cannot recall
having done so. The 'proof' that this is the case, they say, is the
fact that people—all people—exhibit REM activity.
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data has been adduced. Both REM's and reaction times are publicly
observable and scientifically quantifiable—in fact, highly sensitive
instruments of measurement are employed for the purpose of tracking the
REM and the reaction time, respectively. And in the case of both of
these experiments, a significant empirical correlation has been estab¬
lished between the relevant behaviour pattern and the report of the
corresponding experience. According to Dement and Kleitman's findings,
when subjects are awakened during REM sleep, they almost always report
dream experiences. Likewise, (and indeed even more impressively)
Shepard's subjects, when they are questioned after exhibiting the
appropriate reaction-time behaviour, consistently report mental rotation
activity.
So there would seem to be very good reasons—reasons of utility
and reasons of convention, for adopting the quantification interpreta¬
tion of the rotation experiments. Are these reasons decisive then?
Let us put the reaction-time test to work in a concrete setting. Sup¬
pose that we follow the example set by psychologists and physiologists
in their treatment of dreams and make the reaction-time pattern the
test of mental rotation activity. This means, then, that we know when
a person has undertaken mental rotation in relation to a shape assess¬
ment problem by the way that he behaves during the course of an experi¬
mental session. If the subject displays the specified reaction-time
behaviour pattern--if, that is to say, his reaction times are a function
of the degree of angular disparity exhibited by the test objects, then
we know that he has mentally rotated an image of one or the other of
the objects in the presented pairs independently of any claim that he
might make in this regard. And we know for how long he has been engaged
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in this activity. Conversely, if the subject does not display the reac¬
tion-time pattern—if, that is to say, his reaction times are dispro¬
portionate to the angular disparity of the test objects, or the reaction
times are a constant value, then we know that he has not been engaged
in mental rotation activity but has undertaken some other kind of
problem solving strategy—very probably a linguistic/inferential one.
Presumably, then, the application of the reaction-time test would
be as simple and mechanical as that. No longer would we have to rely
on the subjects' truthfulness, or take for granted that their under¬
standing of what a mental image and what mental rotation is, is not
idiosyncratic such that their verbal report while quite possibly
sincere, is just beside the point because they are not using the expres¬
sions 'mental image', 'mental rotation' in accordance with ordinary
language rules for them. And no longer would we have to ask the subject
for his impression of the length of the rotation exercise—whether it
was of long or short duration for instance—we can actually time this
by the use of a mental chronometer.
So far so good, but suppose a different scenario. Suppose that a
given subject displays the appropriate reaction-time pattern, but when
questioned as to his experience, claims that he did not 'see' in his
mind's eye, images rotating into congruence. He says, in fact, "I
don't know what was going on, my mind was a blank. I just solved the
problems, that's all." And when he is primed to report mental rotation
by being asked, "Did you not rotate images in your head?" he says,
"No." Are we entitled to tell him that he is wrong about this—that he
did 'see' images of the test objects rotating, but that, for some
reason, like the dreamer, he does not recall it?
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Clearly, this is precisely what we are committed to if we follow
through our intention to use the reaction-time behaviour pattern in the
manner of the REM—that is as the decisive test for the image rotation
activity. And this, presumably, is what Paivio, Kosslyn and Pomerantz
and the other psychologists who advocate the adoption of the quantifica¬
tion interpretation of Shepard's work must have had in mind all along—
the simple, efficient, even mechanical application of an objective test
for the identification and localization of a subjective state/process.
At first sight, this overruling of the subject's verbal report
may seem unduly authoritarian. But consider the alternative. If we
say that dissenting subject 'X' did not rotate images even though he
exhibits the linear reaction-time pattern—then we are obliged to
explain just why this linearity should come about at all. And why
should it, if not by way of some kind of rotation activity? An alterna¬
tive, non-analogue problem solving strategy based on the generation of
linguistic descriptions of the test objects, would seem to predict
relatively flat reaction times and certainly not the strict linearity
that subject 'X', in this instance, exhibits. In order to explain
this linearity, then, we must deliberately set out to invent a novel
hypothesis. And candidate possibilities for this hypothesis do not
readily present themselves.
Now, let us suppose the reverse situation to be the case. This
time, the subject in question does not display the linear reaction-time
behaviour pattern—but claims at the end of the experimental session,
that he saw images of the test objects rotate into positions of mutual
congruence. Do we tell him that he is mistaken—that his memory, in
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this instance, has simply failed him?
The rotation experiments establish that there is a significant (and
hitherto unchallenged) correlation between subjects' introspections of
mental rotation and reaction-time behaviour of a very particular kind.
If there is an isolated instance where this correlation does not occur,
in particular, where the introspection is not coupled with the appro¬
priate behaviour, then we have a good reason to doubt the accuracy of
the original introspection. Indeed, we may conclude that while the
subject may well be using mental images in some unspecified way, he
cannot have undertaken a mental rotation, strictly speaking, otherwise
his reaction times would vary precisely in accordance with the number
of degrees that one of the test objects in the presented pairs must be
2
rotated in order to achieve a congruence or fit with the other.
As I have already indicated, Shepard's data regarding verbal
reports of calculation strategies, do not provide any empirical support
for either of these suppositions. The fact is that all of Shepard's
subjects display the linear reaction times and none of them have failed
to report mental rotation during the problem solving sequences. This
fact notwithstanding, it is still theoretically possible that some
individual, on some occasion, may make the relevant shape assessments,
exhibit the reaction-time pattern, and yet fail to report mental rota¬
tion, or, vice versa, the subjects may fail to exhibit the reaction-
time pattern, but report mental rotation. Consideration of such possi¬
bilities, however unlikely, are, I believe, instructive.
2
Preliminary results (for only three subjects) of an experiment
carried out at Stanford by psychologist Arthur Thomas provide further
support for this. In the Thomas experiment, subjects were trained to
encode test stimuli (of roughly the type used in Shepard's original
rotation experiments) descriptively, and to judge the sameness or dif¬
ference of the pairs in terms of a match or mismatch of the generated
descriptions. A consequence of this coaching was that the subjects'
reaction-time functions became very nearly flat. Indeed, for one of
the subjects, the reaction time at 180° was only about 150 milliseconds
longer than at 0°, rather than some three to four full seconds longer
as in the original 'uncoached', rotation experiments. That this is so
clearly indicates that the recalcitrant subject's report of mental
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I would suggest, then, that just as people frequently forget
whether and what they have been dreaming, they may well forget whether
and how they solve problems and that all things considered, this 'lapse
of memory' hypothesis best explains the recalcitrant cases in question
here. Normally, of course, when subjects fail to report mental rota¬
tion activity upon questioning, we ought to take it that there has been
no such activity. It is only when these reports are coupled with linear
reaction times that we have reason to overrule them. Equally, it is
reasonable to assume that mental rotation activity is the normal cause
of verbal reports of mental rotation. But if such reports are coupled
with non-linear reaction times, then, once again, we have reason to con¬
clude that despite what a given subject may say, he did not engage in
mental rotation activity. These are simply untypical cases brought
about by a failure of memory. Almost always people remember mental
rotation activity, but sometimes (at least hypothetically) they do not.
It is worthy of note that the 'lapse of memory' hypothesis regard¬
ing problem solving strategy is supported by independent experimental
evidence. When asked to add a series of six numbers scattered at random
about the surface of a page, adult subjects do so very quickly and, most
often, correctly. But when asked to specify in what sequence they
actually performed the addition, most subjects falter and finally come
to admit that they do not know. Clearly the subjects knew at the time
of the actual addition, and, if required, they could have performed the
rotation is mistaken. Flat reaction times appear to be the result of
an alternative, non-rotational strategy. (The results of this experi¬
ment are unpublished. They are reported, however, in R. Shepard and
L. Cooper, 1982, ibid., p. 65.)
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calculation out loud, indicating, thereby, the precise order of the
numbers. But, somehow, in the brief period of time that elapsed between
the actual addition and the question, they have simply forgotten. Such
forgetting seems to be equally possible in the case of mental rotation-
type problem solving."'"
Can we expect, then, that the reaction-time test will be acceptable
to the lay public? Will people be prepared to have their own introspec¬
tive judgments regarding the presence or absence of mental rotation
problem solving, gainsaid on the basis of contradictory reaction-time
evidence? In principle, I see no reason why not. If people can come
to adopt a convention regarding the evidential connection between REM's
and dreams, then they can come to adopt a convention regarding the evi¬
dential connection between reaction times and mental rotation. Specifi¬
cally, the convention to be adopted here is that reaction-time patterns
decisively establish the presence or absence of mental rotation activity
and they establish the temporal duration of this activity.
All that is required for this acceptance to come about is the edu¬
cation of the public to the facts of the rotation experiments over time.
Should such education take place, we might expect to find individuals
asserting, matter-of-factly, that (just as they know they dream several
times every night, even though, more often than not, they do not recall
having done so) they know that they rotate images in order to solve
shape assessment problems involving pairs of objects. And some may
"'"This experiment was conducted by Saul Sternberg in 1966. It is
reported in "High Speed Scanning in Human Memory," Science, 213,
pp. 501-4.
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even say that they know this even though, so far as they can recall,
they have never actually 'seen' images rotating before their mind's
eyes. They will be assuming, of course, that, in this, they are like
everyone else. The scientific evidence indicates that people solve a
particular kind of problem by mental rotation. They infer (quite
reasonably) that they do likewise."'"
So the reaction-time test for mental rotation, could, like the
REM test for dreams, gradually filter down from a strictly scientific
context into the ordinary language context. That there could con¬
ceivably develop a convention around the reaction-time test invites an
intriguing speculation. Could the reaction-time test not become a
criterion (of mental rotation) in Wittgenstein's sense? Frankly, I do
not think so. It is one thing to establish the occurrence of a given
mental process (and this, I take it, the reaction-time test clearly
does) but quite another to actually define that mental process. Accord¬
ing to Wittgenstein, it is the latter task, which a criterion must
perform. Strictly speaking, 'X' is not a criterion for "Y" if people
could learn the meaning of Y without having grasped the connection
between X and Y. And, surely, this can be accomplished in the case of
Practically speaking, of course, though people may talk about
the reaction-time test, they will never be able to use it to identify
instances of the occurrence of mental rotation activity. A linear
reaction time is not, like pain behaviour, observable with the naked
eye. We need special instruments of measurement in order to detect
such minimal gradations in reaction time from one case to another. This
is the one respect in which the analogy between the reaction-time test
for mental rotation and the REM test for dreams breaks down. Apparently,
we could observe REM unaided by special equipment-though in the normal
course of things, we would rarely, if ever, do so.
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mental rotation. The truth of the matter is that even if, as per our
hypothetical scenario, the reaction-time test became an accepted con¬
vention of ordinary language, people could (and arguably, would) still
come to know what mental rotation is, they could (and would) still
develop a considerable facility for mental rotation talk, by hearing
what other people say about mental rotation and observing in what con¬
text they say this."'" In talking about mental rotation, people might
add, of course, that linear reaction times always go along with it, but
this is in no sense crucial, it does not tell us what mental rotation
is. It is simply a helpful extra piece of information about a way that
it is possible to identify mental rotation activity in others.
What it means to engage in mental rotation activity is defined by
what people generally report of such activity. Verbal reports are the
criteria of mental rotation. Linear reaction times are strictly speak¬
ing, effects or, to use the appropriate Wittgensteinian language,
'symptoms' of the process of mental rotation. The evidential value of
linear reaction times relative to mental rotation is taught by experi¬
ence—scientists have come to discover that linear reaction times
1
Mental rotation talk could arise, for instance, in an art gallery
where a particular abstract piece is being considered. Someone might
say, "...imagine what this would look like if it were tilted on one
side, or turned upside down." And the response comes, "... Yes, I can
see it, rotated a little bit, it looks like a such-and-such, rotated
even more, it looks like something else." Or mental rotation talk
might arise in a more straightforward problem solving context where,
as in the formal experiments, spatial guantities, proportionalities are
being assessed.
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coincide with verbal reports of mental rotation.
There is a final, perhaps parenthetical, point that I would like to
make in connection with the discussion of criteria. As is well-known,
in the book Dreaming, Norman Malcolm argues forcefully against the
notion that REM's could possibly count as criteria for dreams. Obviously,
for precisely the same reason that I believe that linear reaction-time
functions cannot be criterial for mental rotation, I would agree with
Malcolm—REM's are not criterial for dreams. Malcolm's justification
for this position is interesting. As far as he is concerned, the verbal
report is the last word on dreaming. It not only establishes the mean¬
ing of dreaming—defines what it is to have a dream—but it also func¬
tions as the decisive test for the occurrence of episodes. According
to Malcolm, we know whether or not an individual has been dreaming by
what he says. If he says he has not been dreaming, then the issue is
I realize, of course, that various—frequently opposing--
interpretations of Wittgensteinian language theory abound in the litera¬
ture and that there has been considerable debate over exactly what
Wittgenstein meant by the notion of 'criterion'. I do not intend to
adjudicate this debate as it is beyond the scope of the present inquiry.
The interpretation of criterion that I have utilized is to be found
in P.M.S. Hacker (Insight and Illusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy
and the Metaphysics of Experience, London: Oxford University Press,
1972) and in Anthony Kenny, (Wittgenstein, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1973). It seems to me that this interpretation accurately reflects
the Wittgenstein position (at least) as it is developed in the
Philosophical Investigations. It is particularly reflective of this
passage: "When I say the A B C to myself what is the criterion of my
doing the same as anyone else who silently repeats it to himself? It
might be found that the same thing took place in my larynx and in his
... But then did we learn the use of the words: "to say such-and-such
to oneself" by someone's pointing to a process in the larynx or the
brain." (L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. London:
Oxford University Press, 1953, Section 376.)
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settled—we must take his word for it. No other empirical evidence is
relevant to the case. Writes Malcolm:
But if someone tells a dream or says he had one he is
not making a 'subjective' report which may or may not
agree with 'objectivity reality'. His waking impres¬
sion is what establishes that he had a dream, and his
account of his dream establishes what the content of
his dream was. If he had a vague impression of his
dream then it was a vague dream. If he is not certain
whether he dreamt then there is uncertainty in reality.
His impression is the criterion of reality and there¬
fore it cannot be characterized as subjective. Subjec¬
tive and objective are one in the case of dreams.l
According to the theory I have been expounding, Malcolm is dead
wrong about this. It is guite true that REM is not criterial for dream¬
ing, it is also true that the verbal report is criterial; even so, the
actual occurrence of dreaming can be and (as it turns out) most often
ought to be established on REM evidence. Clearly, the source of
Malcolm's position is his belief that if something is criterial for
something else, it is also the decisive test for it. This is just not
the case. Verbal reports of dreaming can be a test, but they are not
the only test, nor, more significantly, are they the decisive test. If
subject 'X' says he has not dreamt at all during the night and four
periods of REM activity have been recorded he is wrong. The REM estab¬
lishes this decisively.
^"Norman Malcolm, Dreaming (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1959), p. 80.
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2.3 The Causal Thesis
Simply stated, the causal thesis is this: The problem solving
activity of the subjects participating in the rotation experiments is to
be explained in terms of an analogue process whereby images (or
'analogue representations') of the problematic test objects are gener¬
ated and rotated into positions of mutual congruence or non-congruence,
as the case may be. As compared to the quantification thesis, the
causal thesis makes the stronger claim. For, clearly, it is one thing
to say, (as Paivio, and Kosslyn, Pomerantz and company do) that linear
reaction-time patterns enable us to identify the occurrence of mental
rotation activity, and enable us to measure the duration of that activ¬
ity, but it is quite another to say that the occurrence of such patterns
prove that rotation activity is actually functional—that, as a matter
of fact, people solve spatial problems of the requisite type in this way.
This stronger thesis is favoured by Shepard himself (as the pas¬
sages cited at the end of Chapter 1 indicate), by Fred Attneave (see the
passage on page 33), and by Alan Paivio. In Paivio's case, of course,
the thesis is proffered as a companion to the quantification thesis.
Paivio writes:
Shepard and his collaborators have been able to
measure the speed of such mental rotations using
reaction time methods. (This is the quantification
thesis) ... The significance of these experiments
for the problem of knowledge is that they provide
experimental evidence that we know how things appear
directly, in a visual sense, as well as how they
appear when they have been transformed in some
way. The results tell us that the mental representa¬
tions must contain a dynamic component that functions
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internally much as perceptual-motor processes do when
applied to the concrete world of objects and events.^
Not surprisingly, it is the causal thesis which is singled out as
the primary target of those who are committed to the view (that
thinking - problem-solving must, in the final analysis, be a linguistic
exercise. Psychologist Zenon Pylyshyn, surely the most outspoken critic
of the causal thesis, has this to say:
The extensive experimental investigations of imagery
and imagery phenomena in the last decade, have been
of unguestionable value in breaking through the earlier
oppressive strictures on what phenomena ought to be
studied. The empirical regularities demonstrated are
of high reliability and wide interest, both from a
scientific and practical point of view. None of these
empirical results are questioned. The main question
that is raised is whether the concept of image can be
used as a primitive explanatory construct (i.e., one
not requiring further reduction) in psychological
theories of cognition.2
Similarly, but perhaps more definitively, Pylyshyn writes:
If someone asks me how many windows there are in my
house and then asks me to report how I went about answer¬
ing the question, this report (subject to the usual
methodological precautions) may be taken as an accurate
report of what I experienced doing. The only trouble
is that I must give such a report in the only language
I have available for describing my awarenesses. A
Alan Paivio, op. cit., p. 63. The parenthetical remarks are
mine.
2
Zenon Pylyshyn, "What the Mind's Eye Tells the Mind's Brain:
A Critique of Mental Imagery," Psychological Bulletin, 1973, p. 2.
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description in such a language may be entirely inade¬
quate in meeting what Chomsky (1964) has referred to
as "explanatory adequacy".^
Pylyshyn's view of the causal thesis is echoed with equal clarity
and conviction, by two other of Shepard's critics--John R. Anderson
and Gordon Bower. Commenting on an experiment conducted by G.W. Baylor
in 1971 designed to characterize how people solve puzzles by rotating
visual imagery (an experiment which Anderson and Bower view as of a
piece with Shepard's rotation experiments) they write:
The subjective counterpart of processing these sym¬
bolic descriptions of spatial information is that we
are "seeing images" of successive parts of the puzzle,
much as we would see an actual cube that we are
dicing. There is no denying the validity of such sub¬
jective reports. What is to be cautioned againsbsthe
view that the subjective imagery explains the perform¬
ance in any acceptable sense.2
Clearly, the findings of the rotation experiments demand explana¬
tion. The experiments point to the existence of a hitherto unknown fact
about human behaviour. People who are making judgements about the
shape similarity of two objects which have been rotated out of congru¬
ence with one another, exhibit reaction times which vary linearly with
the degrees of rotation which would be required to bring the objects
into superimposition. And they do this spontaneously and without fail.
1Ibid., p. 3.
2
J.R. Anderson and Gordon Bower, Human Associative Memory
(Washington: V.H. Winston and Sons, 1973), p~] 436.
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The precision of this proportionality between reaction time and degrees
of rotation is remarkable: according to Shepard's data, it takes a
given subject exactly twice as long to react when the object pair dis¬
play a rotational disparity of 100° as it does when the pair display a
rotational disparity of 50°—just as it would if the objects were
actually being physically rotated into positions of congruence. The
regularity of the reaction-time pattern across subjects and its exacti¬
tude relative to degree of rotation, rule out the possibility that it
just comes about—as a matter of coincidence. On the contrary, however
odd, it is a fact—a fact about human behaviour which cannot be set
aside or dismissed.
So the question is, do the findings of the rotation experiments
entitle us to champion, in the manner of Shepard, Paivio, and Attneave,
an analogue explanation for spatial problem solving of the requisite
type? Or is there as Pylyshyn, Anderson and Bower, seem to suggest,
something inherently false—odd perhaps—about this kind of explanation?
It must, I think, be granted in favour of the analogue explanation,
that it has an immediate intuitive appeal. By this I mean that the
correlation of the subjects' reaction times to the orientation dis¬
parity of the test objects can be readily seen to be a natural conse¬
quence of the operation of an analogue system of cognitive representa¬
tion whereas in the case of a non-analogue system, a system in which
the cognitive activity is essentially linguistic, such a correlation
would seem to be decidedly unnatural or contrived."^
"'"In the mental rotation literature, the various commentators have
utilized a number of different expressions to refer to whatever it is
that an analogue or image system of cognitive representation is supposed
56
Consider briefly and in very general terms what it might mean to
say (as Shepard does) that physical objects and physical processes are
given cognitive representation in an analogue system. Two very dis¬
tinctive characteristics of an analogue (as opposed to a non-analogue
or linguistic) system should, I think,spring to mind at once. First
of all, it seems likely that the basic structures or units of such a
system would 'represent' by exhibiting some kind of structural simi¬
larity or isomorphism to the object(s) and/or situation(s) they are
representing. There would be, that is to say, a likeness of pattern
between 'represented' and 'representation'.
In this broad sense, an automobile fuel gauge can be considered to
be an analogue system. The needle is related to the 'full mark' in the
same way that the fuel in the gasoline tank is related to the top of the
to be running in opposition to. For instance, John Anderson and
Zenon Pylyshyn describe themselves as defending the view that thinking-
problem solving must occur within the confines of a propositional
system of cognitive representation, via the formulation of propositional
structures. Alan Paivio, on the other hand, argues that the kind of
system of cognitive representation that the rotation experiments indi¬
cate does not operate during spatial problem solving of the reguisite
type, is a verbal system of cognitive representation. Again, other
psychologists—Paul Kolers and William Smythe, for instance, describe
the 'opposing' system of cognitive representation as a symbolic system
of representation (Kolers and Smythe, "Images, Symbols, and Skills",
Canadian Journal of Psychology, vol. 33, 1979). And Ned Block, editor
of a recent collection of essays on the topic of imagery, describes the
system as a descriptive system—the basic units of which are
descriptions or, descriptive episodes (Ned Block (Ed.), Imagery,
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981). All these expressions are, I take
it, roughly eguivalent to one another and correct as the authors in
guestion use them. It is worthy of note that the generic distinction
that they allude to is between an analogue or image system of cognitive
representation (in which the units of representation mimic or model,
in some sense, what they represent) and a non-analogue or linguistic
system of cognitive representation (in which the units of representation
do not).
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tank. The relation in this particular case is quite literally a spatial
one—as the quantity of the fuel in the tank gradually decreases, it
becomes increasingly spatially distant from the top of the tank; like¬
wise the needle on the gauge becomes spatially distant from the full
mark. But the fuel gauge, it will be noted, is not a 'picture' of a
gasoline tank. Analogue representations need not 'look like' in any
straightforward sense what they represent—resemblance of the picturing
kind is a nicety rather than a necessity in an analogue system.
Now in the particular case of imagistic-type representations in
the brain, likeness of structure could well be taken to mean that each
local portion (set of contiguous points) of the image would correspond
to a portion of the represented object as seen from a particular point
of view, and the interval relations among the portions of the image
would implicitly represent the interval distances among corresponding
portions of the represented object.
The second characteristic of an analogue system is that spatial
problem solving is, strictly speaking, a non-inferential affair. In
the broadest sense, this means that there occurs what might be described
as a 'locating' of objects in space and this may involve the scanning
across distances or the manipulation of structures or, very possibly,
some combination of scanning plus manipulation. And the length of
time it takes to arrive at a solution by way of these spatial techniques,
is, in a very direct sense, a function of the distance involved in the
scanning and/or manipulating. For example, a map of Canada is an
analogue of the Canadian political and geographical reality. Any por¬
tion of the map is a representation of the corresponding part of Canada
and distance on the map represents distance in reality. If we want to
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know, by using the map, whether or not three cities—say Montreal,
Regina, and Vancouver—fall in a straight line, (and, in so doing,
determine the feasibility of visiting Regina on the way to Vancouver by
car) we scan the map from Montreal in the east to Vancouver in the
West or vice versa. And the solution time taken is a function of the
distance covered in the scanning process. To put this as succinctly
as possible, if Montreal and Vancouver were not so far distant on the
map, if there were only three provinces instead of four separating
them, then it would take a shorter time to complete the scanning pro¬
cess. Conversely, if Vancouver was even farther west than it is, the
scanning process would require more time.
In the case of the problem situation stipulated by Shepard in his
experiments, the subjects are required to determine whether or not the
global shapes of two test stimuli are the same. Assuming that an ana¬
logue system of cognitive representation is being used in the solution
process, and assuming that the general description of the nature of an
analogue system given above is roughly correct, image-type representa¬
tions in the brain would be rotated into a position of congruence with
one another. And in this instance, solution time is a function of the
number of degrees or 'distance' involved in the rotation process. The
greater the distance of rotation, the longer the solution time must be.
The point is, then, that if we assume Shepard's analogue explanation,
the proportionality of the reaction times of the subjects participating
in the experiments to the degree of orientation discrepancy of the
stimuli, is not remarkable in the least. On the contrary, it is part
and parcel of the logic of operation of an analogue system of representa¬
tion, that the solution time (or reaction time) and the 'distance factor'
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are in positive correlation.
But what of the alternative non-analogue explanation? What, in
principle, would it mean to solve the shape assessment problem within
the confines of the linguistic system of cognitive representation?
Presumably, a linguistic system would not represent in the manner of
pictures or fuel gauges or analogue computers. This is to say that
the basic representative structures of this system would bear a relation
to the things represented not by likeness (either in the sense of
structural similarity or straightforward resemblance) but by convention.
The sentence, 'The cat is on the mat', represents in this way. It con¬
veys information about a particular state of affairs by its adherence
to certain linguistic conventions—in this case, the conventions of
English semantics, vocabulary and syntax and there is no 'likeness' to
a physical cat positioned on a physical mat. The sentence is a
2
description of that state of affairs.
No doubt there will be some reluctance to accept the possibility
of a 'rotation' taking place 'inside the head'. I think that sense can
be made out of this idea in terms of computer operation, but for the
sake of continuity, I would prefer to forestall discussion of this in
detail until chapter 3. At the moment, I am simply working out the
rough outlines of what analogue versus linguistic spatial problem
solving amount to. I will say in passing, however, that this notion
of the rotation of images in a brain space does not involve the con¬
ceptual difficulties inherent in the notion of rotation in a mind
space. After all, the brain is a spatial entity—the mind is not. And
there is no reason in principle why images or structures having spatial
properties could not occur as topographic projections on the surface of
the cortex.
2
A word of clarification about this particular example of a lin¬
guistic representation. I do not wish to suggest by my use of it, that
linguistic representations in the brain somehow necessarily assume the
form of full-blown English sentences—that somehow exactly the same
neurological states and processes are activated in thinking about a cat
on a mat, as when the sentence 'the cat is on the mat' is said or
written. On the contrary, it is more likely the case that the brain
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Thus, a linguistic cognitive representation would not be like an
image in the following respects: It is in no sense a topographic repre¬
sentation; parts of a linguistic representation need not correspond to
parts of a represented object or scene, and distance between portions
of a represented object or scene is not implicit in it. Rather, dis¬
tance information (if represented at all) must be represented explicitly.
Not only this, but shape, size, and orientation are independent para¬
meters in the linguistic representation; it is possible to represent the
shape of an object without also representing size and orientation. In
the sentence cited above, for example, the word 'cat', gives us some
fairly clear information as to the shape of the object in question
(after all, cats have a characteristic shape) but we know little or
nothing about the size and orientation of the particular cat being
referred to. The cat could be large (like a tiger) or small (like a
kitten) or it could be an 'archetypal' cat which is meant to represent
cats in general and so be of no particular size. Similarly, the cat
could be positioned on its back, or standing on all fours etcetera.
Furthermore, in a non-analogue system, spatial problem solving (of
the specific type Shepard requires) would not be a matter of moving
structures around in the brain or a series of brain states occurring at
generates a representational structure which is a short-hand of the
sentence—generating perhaps structures for 'cat' and 'mat' only.
Needless to say this is largely an educated guess about the specific
form which linguistic representations take. Though there does seem
to be an evolutionary justification for arguing this—short-hand repre¬
sentations would certainly have the value of efficiency which in turn
has survival value. Also, observation of the early language behaviour
of children would seem to indicate that the brain can and does repre¬
sent in this short-hand way. Children regularly omit verbs and other
parts of speech, communicating largely by the way of nouns.
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a rate so as to create or provide for a continuous spatial pattern, or
scanning across areas, but a matter of generating a descriptive account
of each of the test stimuli in turn and comparing the descriptions for
similarity. In other words, in such a system, there is no sense in
which the solution is achieved in spatial terms. On the contrary, the
problem solving would be a discursive process—stimuli are analyzed and
described and inferences are made. And there would seem to be two pos¬
sible inferences relevant to this particular circumstance: the infer¬
ence that there is an exact part-for-part match between the two separ¬
ately generated descriptions, therefore the stimuli must have the same
global shape; or the inference that the two descriptions are not exactly
the same, therefore, the stimuli are not the same shape. Clearly what
counts in terms of the success or failure of non-analogue problem
solving is the accuracy of the descriptions and the logical validity
of the inferences.
Let us consider a particular case of spatial problem solving by way
of a linguistic system of cognitive representation. Suppose, for the
sake of simplicity, that one of the objects in the test pair presented
by Shepard to his subjects (call it 'X') has a configuration much like
that of the letter 'A'. Roughly speaking, this could be represented in
a linguistic format by way of the proposition—'two lines meeting at the
top to form a vertex and bridged about halfway down by a short horizon¬
tal line'. And suppose that the second object in the pair, (call it
'Y') looks something like an A on its side (3>). The linguistic repre¬
sentation for this could be 'two lines meeting at their right-hand ends
to form a vertex and bridged about half-way along the lines by a short
vertical line'. Presumably, the comparison of these two descriptions
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could be carried out on the basis of the following structural analysis:
The descriptions of X and Y, respectively, make reference to the same
number of lines—two lines to be precise, joined in each case at one
end in a vertex. And each description makes reference to the presence
of a short 'bridging' line approximately halfway along the vertex lines.
The descriptions are precisely structurally similar, therefore the
objects in guestion must be the same three-dimensional shape.
Now, in principle, there would appear to be no reason why the brain
could not be constructed as to routinely make use of linguistic forms
of representation and so function in respect of spatial problems in the
manner described above. Not only this, but as the example shows there
would appear to be no reason why, in the general course of things, a
problem of shape similarity could not be resolved by the descriptive
technigue. Having said this, however, it must be acknowledged that
strictly on a consideration of the 'logic of operation' of the linguis¬
tic system of representation, there would appear to be no reason for
the proportionality of the subjects' reaction times to the orientation
disparity exhibited by the test stimuli. If, as per our non-analogue
hypothesis, what is happening is that the descriptions of each of the
objects in a given pair are being generated and these descriptions are
in turn compared for similarity, then the reaction times should be more
or less a constant value. All things being egual, it should take no
longer for subjects to respond in a 60° rotation case than in a 20°
rotation case. The relative orientations of the objects in the pair is
of no conseguence to the descriptive process, for each of the object
descriptions is generated separately. Thus it cannot seriously be
argued that it should take longer to generate descriptions of the
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objects in the case of a pair exhibiting considerable orientation dis¬
parity as opposed to the case of a pair exhibiting a minimal orientation
disparity. The orientation factor is simply not taken into account, in
the descriptions, in a way that has temporal ramifications. And, it
is not taken into account in the comparison of the descriptions. It
is the structural similarity of the generated descriptions which counts
here.
Now that the analogue explanation turns out, as analysis, to be a
better bet than the alternative, linguistic explanation, should not, I
suggest, come as a great surprise to anyone. For the kind of mechanical
problem solving strategy envisioned on this explanation is ideally
suited to the resolution of the shape assessment problem. In fact, this
is the kind of strategy that we would almost always choose to employ in
such circumstances, should a choice be possible.
Let me be more specific. Suppose that we are participating in a
series of Roger Shepard's reaction-time experiments and suppose that
the exact details of these experiments are altered slightly. This time,
we—the subjects—are required to perform our calculations of similarity/
dissimilarity overtly, in the public forum, rather than silently or
mentally. We are presented not with mere depictions of the test objects
projected on a screen (as in the original experiments) but with actual
three-dimensional models strategically placed on a table before us and
affixed to the table by screws. We are told that the problem is to be
solved either mechanically or verbally—in the first instance by
moving the objects about until we are satisfied that a congruence of
shape can or cannot be achieved, in the second instance, by giving a
verbal description of each object in turn and then comparing the
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descriptions (again out loud) for similarity. We are also told that
speed is of the essence—the overall purpose of the experiments being
the determination of the minimum amount of time required to make spatial
judgments of this particular kind.
My question, then, is a simple one: can we predict, with any
degree of confidence, which of the two strategies described above we
will ultimately choose? Surely we can. Surely we do not have to wait
upon the experimental results to see what will happen. We know already.
We know that relative to the 'mechanical' rotation strategy, the verbal
strategy is a patent waste of time and no one but a fool (or a show-off,
perhaps) would even dream of attempting it. Quite simply, the verbal
strategy is just too difficult, too complicated, and too liable to error
to make it a serious contender here.
Prima facie, the analogue-rotation explanation for this kind of
spatial problem solving makes sense. People solve the problem and
exhibit reaction times which are precisely proportionate to the dis¬
tance or degree of rotation required to bring the objects into congru¬
ence because they are, in fact, doing something which, in brain terms,
is an analogue of the physical process of rotation. The linguistic
explanation, on the other hand, makes no sense at all. If people are
generating linguistic descriptions and making inferences on the basis
of these descriptions, then there is no reason why their reaction times
should be proportionate to the distance factor. To put it bluntly, the
linguistic explanation, so-called, does not really provide an explana¬
tion for the phenomenon in question. Moreover, the analogue explanation
is consonant with peoples' verbal reports that they did indeed rotate
mental images. The linguistic explanation, it will be noted, is not.
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2.4 The Metaphysical Thesis
Psychologists Roger Brown and Richard J. Herrnstein have sought to
interpret the rotation experiments in terms of what they describe as
the "common sense view". More specifically, according to Brown and
Herrnstein, the findings of the rotation experiments warrant the conclu¬
sion that people have been right all along to insist on the existence
of a mind's eye and to insist, further, that events occurring before
this mind's eye—events such as mental rotation—are things/activities,
as they put it, "in addition to" the physical events which are causally
responsible for them.
Consider, once again, Brown and Herrnstein's statement of their
interpretation of the rotation experiments:
The upshot was that there is an icon which is somewhat
analogous to the physical stimulus itself. In an older
vocabulary, based on personal experience rather than
experimentation, we might have said that the data sug¬
gest a mental image of the physical stimulus. Common
sense has always believed in a "mind's eye" in addition
to the physical events in our sense organs. In that
respect the research has just confirmed what people
already know.l
The thesis embedded here is metaphysical. Brown and Herrnstein
apparently take themselves to be asserting a thesis about the status
of the mental rotation phenomenon as compared to and, seemingly, as
contrasted with the status of physical events. The telling phase, in
this regard, is the phrase "in addition to", as it clearly suggests a
"'"Roger Brown and Richard Herrnstein, op. cit., p. 29.
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separation of the categories of mental and physical. Equally telling
is Brown and Herrnstein's assertion of a link to the common sense view,
for that view, regarding mind in general and imagistic activity in
particular, is quite unabashedly dualistic. Let me explain.
Suppose we set aside our philosophical training and preconceptions
about mental phenomena for the moment, and consider imagery from the
point of view of the casual, common sense image reporter. We shall be
constructing, then, a speculative, common sense metaphysics of mental
imagery. What interesting features, if any, can we report about mental
imagery on the basis of our own experience of it?
One thing which cannot escape notice is that in imaging we seem to
be confronted with something, to have something over against us or
presented to us—and something other than the material object or physi¬
cal event, real or fictitious, which we are trying to envisage. And
it seems natural to say that we are aware of an entity, to use the
entity-word 'image' to refer to it because we are experiencing something
which behaves in an entity-like way.
The image shows a certain independence of us, a certain obstinacy
or recalcitrance, almost as if it had a will of its own."'' Often, it
will not come when we summon it. It obtrudes itself on us when we do
not want it, stays when we try to get rid of it. It may even intrude
It is interesting to note, in this connection, the report of
Shepard's subjects (noted in the discussion of the original rotation
experiment in Chapter 1) that there is an upper limit to the speed at
which they could successfully undertake a mental rotation. (Shepard
clocked this at 60° per second.) If they tried to rotate their images
any faster than this, the subjects said, the images lost their struc¬
tural integrity.
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upon us and stay with us to the point of becoming an obsession. The
image of a car crash we have witnessed continues to haunt our minds for
hours, growing fainter at times, but still renewing itself, and it will
not go despite all our efforts to get rid of it; and then at last it
suddenly fades away of itself. What behaves in this way is naturally
described as an entity, a particular. A noun substantive, such as
'image' is just the sort of word that seems to fit it.
Modern philosophers are continually telling us that mental images
are not at all like pictures. But they are—at least when we consider
them as they appear to us phenomenologically. It is true, of course,
that a visual image cannot be handed around a table, as a photograph
can. It cannot be torn up, or destroyed in a fire, though sometimes
we may well wish that it could. It cannot be touched, nor seen simul¬
taneously by different people from different points of view.
All the same, in some ways, it seems to be very like a picture.
I am now imaging a mental rotation sequence, involving Shepard-type
test objects. I am aware of something—an image of the test object on
the left moving in a clockwise direction about the picture plane axis
toward the object on the right. There has been a change of image
orientation before my mind's eye. But I do not for a moment suppose
that this orientation change is occurring or has occurred in the
actual, physical test object pair. What changes is that presented and
inspectable something by means of which the visualizing is done.
In a similar manner, it can be said that a picture has an indepen¬
dent career of its own. It changes when the object of which it is a
picture does not change, or remains unchanged when the object does
change. It continues to exist when the object has ceased to exist.
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Conversely, it ceases to exist, while the object endures. Ihus in
having a history independent of the history of its original, a mental
image is like a picture. It is also, of course, like a picture in
having a more or less close resemblance to the object or event of which
it is an image; and it is like a picture, again, in being a means by
which we can think of its original.
But where are my images? What space do they inhabit? The answer
to this guestion is a paradox—they seem to be somewhere and yet at the
same time nowhere. Clearly, my visual image of the completion of a
given mental rotation is not anywhere in the physical world. Yet it
appears to me to be spatially extended. Its parts are spatially
related to each other by relations of location, and also by relations
of larger and smaller, and orientation. And the rotation process
itself, as it unfolded before my mind's eye, appeared to be a spatial
process. But, I have to say that the imagery is not in my head either
in the sense that I might say, it is two inches from my left ear or
behind my nose. It occurs, if anywhere, in the unusual space (for
which no dimensions seem appropriate) that we call the mind—wherever
that is.
Some images, though not my mental rotation image, are 'projected',
and do seem to have a place, not, indeed, in physical space, but in
the space of the percipient's visual field. For example, a visual
image of a long lost relative can be projected in front of the door.
Here it seems reasonable to say that the image is 'somewhere', at least,
somewhere in the percipient's visual field. Even so, it is 'there'—
in a very peculiar way. For, is it not, visually impenetrable.
Although the 'relative' image is at the door, no part of the door's
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surface is rendered invisible, as it would be if the real person
actually stood there.
Another interesting feature of mental images is that they seem to
make possible—causally possible—certain kinds of behaviour, most
particularly, problem solving or guestion answering behaviour. On being
asked whether a pair of Shepard's test objects are the same shape I
can refrain from performing the calculation by actually physically
rotating one object into congruence with the other and, instead, with
the help of mental imagery, perform this activity mentally. As to what
physical events in the brain go on as a correlative of this mental
activity, all I can say is that I know nothing of them. At the time
of the rotation, I simply do not experience them. They are, what, I
suppose, if pressed, I would be prepared to infer are the remote causal
ancestors of the experienced mental rotation.
There are several things worthy of note in this speculative
account relative to our original guery regarding the dualist tendencies
of common sense. First and foremost among these, is the descriptive
language which has been utilized. I have spoken of 'mental pictures',
'mind's eyes', and 'mental images'. These are, as I have already
noted, entity words and they clearly suggest that image phenomena have,
in some vague sense, an entity status. But what, precisely, is this
status? Apparently, it is unusual and even sometimes paradoxical.
Images are entities but they are entities unlike the physical objects
they supposedly represent—they are private, immaterial and, even
more surprisingly, they are spatial, but not in physical space. Con¬
juring up a large elephant before one's mind's eye does not mean that
anything weighing several tons is literally—physically within the
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confines of one's head. Nonetheless, according to the view espoused
above, there is still something there—in the mind—something big and
fat. And what of the process of mental rotation? Mental rotation, it
seems, is an experienced event—something we see unfolding before the
mind's eye. What goes on in the brain, on the other hand, as a corre¬
lative of this, is guite a different matter. It is a distinct event—
presumed to be the material cause of the experienced mental rotation.
So, there are really two events to be counted here--the experience of
mental rotation, and whatever it is that occurs in the brain to cause
this experience. (See Appendix A.)
Clearly, this 'two kinds of entity'—'two kinds of process' view
is dualistic. Egually clearly, by linking Shepard's research findings
to such a view, Brown and Herrnstein have, in effect, asserted a con¬
firmatory connection between these findings and metaphysical dualism.
What Brown and Herrnstein appear to be supporting, in the final analysis,
is the view that the results of the rotation experiments prove that
mental rotation per se has a special metaphysical stature—that it is a
mental, as opposed to, physical, process. The guestion is, then, do
the rotation experiments warrant this interpretation? Do they have
the metaphysical implications that Brown and Herrnstein apparently
believe that they do?
The short answer to this guestion is, no. The rotation experiments
do not vindicate the metaphysical dualism of the person of common
sense. That people are able to make judgments of shape similarity
without utilizing any external visual or tactual aid, and that the time
it takes them to do this is precisely in proportion to the number of
degrees that one object in a given pair must be rotated in order that
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it might be brought into congruence with the other, and that, as a
correlative of all this, people consistently report an experience of
mental rotation, certainly tells us something about the nature of the
problem solving activity—that it must, in some sense, be an analogue
of the physical process of rotation—but it does not tell us that that
activity is mental and not physical. Equally compatible with such
data is the view that mind and brain are identical and that what we
have in the case of the mental rotation phenomenon, is simply an
experienced neurological event of a particular kind.
What Brown and Herrnstein have seized upon here, clearly, is the
fact that the linear reaction-time pattern (which is significant of
analogue character of the problem solving activity) is consistently
coupled with the verbal report of experienced mental rotation. They
have inferred that this entails something about the metaphysical status
of the problem solving activity—that it is essentially an experienced
event. The consistent correlation of verbal report and reaction-time
pattern is, of course, striking and does invite speculation and, it
must be granted, that it is just what we would expect to be the case
if dualism per se were indeed true. If spatial problem solving of the
appropriate type is to be categorized as an experienced mental
activity, then people should be aware of mental rotation—they should
be able to monitor it introspectively—whenever it occurs. But we
should also expect this correlation of reaction-time pattern and
verbal report if people were simply experiencing certain alterations
in their neurological states. We should expect, in fact, that people
experience these processes in a way that roughly captures the nature
of the processes.
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In relation to the metaphysical issue, then, it seems to me that
the results of the rotation experiments are neutral. It may be that a
dualistic interpretation of the rotation phenomenon is appropriate and
it may not be. The results of the experiments do not seem to constrain
us either way.
However, that the rotation experiments fail to vindicate the meta¬
physical thesis, in no way signifies that Shepard's overall programme
of research is, in some crucial respect, flawed. It is one thing to
adduce evidence regarding the properties of the particular system of
cognitive representation operative in a problem solving seguence
(which, I take it, Shepard does), but quite another to settle the mind-
brain issue in favour of dualism, which is what would be reguired if
Brown and Herrnstein's interpretation of Shepard was true. Indeed, it
would be unrealistic to expect that scientific data alone could accom¬
plish this latter task.
People hold positions in metaphysics for various ja priori reasons—
most basically, because one position or the other happens to be a better
fit with the overall conceptual scheme which they have come to adopt.
I expect that philosophers in particular, find the conceptual divide
between 'the mental' and 'the physical' to be very impressive. The
language of 'mental' and 'physical' seems to describe two radically
different kinds of entities and two radically different kinds of events.
And so they would be guite naturally reluctant to accept the likelihood
of any kind of causal interchange between a 'physical' rotation process
and a 'mental' rotation process. Unless such a priori convictions can
be addressed directly, it is almost a surety that the data of Shepard's
rotation experiments will be read (by philosophers and by anyone else
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so inclined, metaphysically speaking) unsympathetically in terms of the
dualist thesis and sympathetically in terms of the identity theory.
And, as I have already argued, there is no reason, at least none so
far as the rotation experiments are concerned, why these a priori
convictions should not carry the day.
2.5 Conclusion
In sum, then, I have argued that, of the three theses of inter¬
pretation put forward by Shepard's colleagues in cognitive psychology,
only one—the metaphysical thesis—ought to be rejected. Brown and
Herrnstein have come to adopt this interpretation apparently, more on
the basis of their own a_ priori convictions about the nature of mind
than on the basis of any clear evidence for dualism (or for identity,
for that matter) which the rotation experiments bring to bear. The
other two theses of interpretation—the quantification thesis and the
causal thesis—I have argued, are, indeed, warranted by the results of
the rotation experiments.
CHAPTER 3
Image Rotation as Experienced Brain Process
3.1 Introduction
In large measure, Shepard is himself responsible for the dualist
interpretation of the rotation experiments given by Brown and Herrnstein.
The reason for this, I would argue, is .that Shepard is simply not inter-
ested in addressing conceptual issues in any systematic fashion and so
he has failed to state in clear terms just what he takes image repre¬
sentations and the rotation phenomenon to be. What he does in fact is
confuse the issue altogether by describing such phenomena in two
distinct languages—in the mentalistic language of common sense, and in
the physicalistic language of neurophysiology. And as readers, we are
left to draw our own conclusion as to what Shepard takes to be the
salient description."''
Shepard's omitting to declare himself unequivocally in this matter
is not merely an artifact of his personal mode of presentation. Cog¬
nitive psychologists, generally, seem not to worry about the mind-brain
problem. It is not entirely clear why this is, but philosopher Owen
Elanagan has proposed a plausible explanation. "In some quarters,"
writes Flanagan, "there is the view that the mind-brain problem can
simply be ignored. New law-like generalizations about cognition are
being discovered every day by scientists who worry not one iota about
the metaphysical nature of the underlying process." (Owen Flanagan,
Ihe Science of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983, p. 214).
Apparently the attitude of cognitive psychologists can be summed up in
the idea that, in science, "nothing succeeds like success."
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For example, in a discussion of an experiment, conducted by
M.I. Posner, designed to determine subjects' reaction times in a pattern
recognition task, Shepard has this to say about image representations in
general:
... these experiments appear to furnish rather strong
evidence concerning the nature of particular internal
representations - specifically whether they are princi¬
pally visual or verbal in form. However, the question
still remains whether these particular internal repre¬
sentations or "codes" are what we ordinarily refer to
as images.^
Now I take it that the implied contrast here is between image rep¬
resentations conceived as brain states and image representations con¬
ceived as a kind of experience. By way of the terms "internal represen¬
tations" and "codes," Shepard appears to be suggesting the former--a
state or a structure which is neurophysiological in nature, and by using
the descriptive phrase "What we ordinarily refer to as images," Shepard
would seem to be alluding to the common sense conception of imagery—
that it is a particular kind of experienced episode. This appears to
be the force and significance of the word 'ordinary' in this context.
But this is the only occasion on which I find Shepard actually
putting the two kinds of description into juxtaposition—and offering,
thereby, a kind of comparison and contrast. As a rule, Shepard simply
shifts back and forth without warning or justification between the
two. Sometimes Shepard describes image representation in the language
"'"R. Shepard and Lynn Cooper, 1982, op. cit., p. 73. (The under¬
lining is mine. )
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of physics—he is inclined to describe it, for instance, as a 'system'
or 'faculty'"*" achieved in the human species through a process of evolu¬
tion and which can simulate spatial transformations in the physical
world. Or, when he is drawing conclusions from one or the other of his
reaction-time experiments, he describes the nature of the image repre¬
sentation in the following terms:
Although we can not yet say anything specific about the
representation of three-dimensional objects at the
neurophysiological level, our results do seem to place
some significant formal or abstract constraints on the
nature of that representation. Perhaps the most impor¬
tant of these is that the internal representation
embodies important structural features of the three-
dimensional object that are not manifest in the two-
dimensional projection of the object on the surface of
the retina.2
And,
Such an internal representation cannot adeguately be
regarded as an undifferentiated neural event (such as
the activation of a particular neuron or population of
mutually interchangeable neurons) ... Instead such a
representation must have an internal structure that is
itself to some extent analogically related to the struc¬
ture of its corresponding external object. For during
the process of rotation, the parts and relationships
among the parts must be transformed in very constrained
ways in order to enable the kind of rapid, template-like
match against an ensuing visual stimulus that we have
demonstrated here.-^





At other times, however, Shepard gives image representations an
experiential content. In several of his articles and in his book, he
spends some time recounting 'famous' introspections of imagery such as
Albert Einstein's epochal Gedanken experiment of imagining himself
travelling along with a wave of light at 186,000 miles per second"'" or
the German chemist Kekule's report that he experienced spontaneous
imagery during idle reveries, of atoms joining and rejoining to form
2
chainlike molecules, "whirling in a giddy dance." And Shepard speaks
of his own experience during a period of hypnopomjsic suspension between
sleep and waking of a "spontaneous kinetic image of three-dimensional
structures magestically turning in space.At such times, he is given
to a recounting of the phenomenological flavour or feel of the imagery
experience. And he reverts guite obviously to the language and expres¬
sion which the common sense introspector naturally invokes when he is
giving his reports. Shepard makes use, for example, of expressions
such as the 'mind's eye' and he speaks of 'seeing' pictures before the
mind's eye. Indeed, it is in just such introspective terms that Shepard
describes Michael Faraday's original 'image-insight' into the nature of
electric and magnetic fields. He writes:
What kind of "intuition" or "instinct" was this? A
clue may be discerned in this; the invisible lines of
force, which Faraday visualized as narrow tubes ^
curving throughout space, rose up before him like things.




^R. Shepard, 1978, op. cit., p. 126.
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Now this is virtually guaranteed to warm the heart of any would be
dualist. That Shepard has seen fit to employ two distinct languages of
description will be taken to be significant of his intention to mark a
distinction between two kinds of representational phenomenon. It will
be assumed, that is, that, for Shepard, there are experienced images and
experienced rotations 'in addition to' physical images (in the brain)
and physical rotations. Equally telling perhaps from the dualist per¬
spective, will be the fact that experimental research on imagery has a
particular history. Hitherto, those who engaged in this research—
psychologists like E.B. Titchener, for instance—fell decidedly into the
dualist camp. Thus, since there has always been a connection between a
study of mental imagery and dualism and since Shepard says nothing
clearly to the contrary, it is an easy (though, false, as I have argued
earlier) inference to make that Shepard is himself following the tradi¬
tion established by his predecessors, and that his research has some¬
thing to do with proving the truth of metaphysical dualism—at least in
respect of the one kind of experienced phenomenon.
I would like to suggest that Shepard's comments be set aside. I
suggest this for two reasons: first, because it is obvious that Shepard
has nothing particularly illuminating (from a metaphysical point of
view) to tell us about the rotation phenomenon—(apparently, he has
simply not worked this out for himself with any degree of clarity or
detail); and, second, because it really doesn't matter what Shepard
himself believes or how clearly he expresses his belief. The important
thing, in this circumstance, is to establish the kind of account of
rotation which will best enable Shepard to sustain his overall analysis.
The rotation experiments demonstrate a causal connection between the
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phenomenon known as mental rotation and the problem solving activity of
Shepard's subjects. But how can this be? The rotation experiments them¬
selves do not explain just how this causality is effected—or just what
its nature is.
In this chapter, I shall attempt to work out a theoretical model
for this--a model of the kind of causality which makes sense out of the
asserted connection between a particular kind of experienced activity
and spatial problem solving. In particular, I shall be arguing that the
experience of image rotation is best not construed on the dualist
analysis. Rather, that experience is identical with physical processes
in the brain. Later in the chapter, I shall discuss the consequences
of adopting the 'image rotation-as-experienced-brain process' model for
Shepard's experimental method and I shall be particularly interested in
discussing this model in relation to introspective reports of imagery.
3.2 A Model for Image Rotation
On the strength of the reaction-time evidence adduced in the rota¬
tion experiments, Shepard has argued that the rotation phenomenon is
causally significant. According to Shepard, people solve the shape
assessment problem by generating image representations of the test
objects and by rotating them into positions of mutual congruence (or
non-congruence). There are several possible ways in which this asser¬
tion of 'causality by image rotation' can be construed.
In the first instance, we might adopt a literal interpretation of
the assertion. We might take it, that is, that it is peoples' experi¬
ence of image rotation which counts causally in the problem solving
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process. If people did not see before this mind's eyes, images in rota¬
tion, if they were not able to monitor the progress of such rotations,
they would be unable to solve the problem at hand and, at the same time,
exhibit the appropriate reaction-time behaviour pattern. On such a view,
the experience of the rotation is the necessary and sufficient condition
for the problem solving behaviour.
Now given that Shepard has established that the experience of a
rotation consistently accompanies the problem solving behaviour, a case
might well be made out—not a case of strict logical entailment, of
course, but a good probabilistic case—for the view that the experience
of rotation is a necessary condition for the spatial problem solving.
Having said this, however, it is not at all clear that we would be
entitled to say anything about the sufficiency of that experience rela¬
tive to the problem solving. In point of fact, the assertion of suffi¬
ciency here would require a preparedness to accept that causality between
the spheres of things/activities mental and things/activities physical
is possible and, indeed, does, in fact, occur. It requires, that is, a
preparedness to accept some version of the Cartesian interactionist
picture—specifically that imaging a rotation is sufficient to produce
certain electrical and chemical changes in the brain, which, presumably,
produces in turn, the subjects' pressing of correct response levers at
a specified time interval.
There are real problems with this picture of causality. After all,
if as the person of plain common sense and the Cartesian insist, 'the
mental' and 'the physical' per se are essentially different, it does not
seem reasonable to expect that one could give rise to the other. The
human brain is a physical organ, it occupies three-dimensional space and
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operates on the basis of electrical and chemical fluctuations/altera¬
tions in its physical substance. Surely it makes no sense to suppose
that something which is neither electrical nor chemical, indeed, some¬
thing which has no physical substance whatsoever—a 'mental' rotation—
could produce these changes.
As an alternative to the literal interpretation of causation by
image rotation, we might adopt an 'epiphenomenal' interpretation. We
might say, that is, that the experience of image rotation is a mere by¬
product—an epiphenomenon—of certain events in the brain which are the
real causes of the spatial problem solving. On such a view, the experi¬
ence of image-objects rotating before the mind's eye might be likened
to smoke which escapes from a factory chimney during a manufacturing
process. The smoke itself has nothing causally to do with the actual
creation of the product, it is simply a by-product of the operation of
machines and the burning of fuel which are causally significant.
It could be, of course, that what people apparently experience
during spatial problem solving sequences are just effects of brain
states and never causes of anything. This is a logical possibility
which is not entirely removed by the fact that the experience and the
problem solving behaviour always occur together. But, then, it seems
reasonable to ask why this should be so. Why should human beings have
evolved in such a way that they consistently have mind's eye experiences
of objects in rotation when they are engaged in problem solving of the
appropriate sort when, so the epiphenomenalist would have it, such
experiences have nothing whatever to do with the problem solving, and
in fact are mere distractions from the real causal events? Indeed, one
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is inclined to wonder why we should have evolved with minds and mind's
eyes at all, if such things are utterly inconsequential.
Even the factory smoke, which plays no role in the production pro¬
cess, does have some effects—effects which are, in some instances,
very important to trace. Smoke can be seen and smelled, for instance.
Also, it can cause your eyes to sting. It can harm plant and animal
life, interact with moisture in the air to form smog, darken windows,
and so on. But experienced rotations, according to the epiphenomenalist,
can do nothing of the sort. They quite literally do nothing at all.
If that is true, then they are like nothing else in the universe. They
are absolutely useless. But if everything else in the universe plays
some role in its working why should mental states—the state of mental
rotation—be different? Surely, in evolutionary terms, epiphenomenalism,
in regard to the image rotation experience, is a gratuitous assumption.
Additionally, it seems to me that epiphenomenalism is no more
coherent a thesis of causality than is Cartesian interactionism. What
it is, in fact, is simply one side of the Cartesian coin. On the epi-
phenomenonalist interpretation, brain events supposedly cause (occasion)
mind events (epiphenomena), but these latter are themselves entirely
inert. But if, as I have argued above, there are real problems about
how mind and brain, 'the mental' and 'the physical' interact generally,
such problems are not removed by restricting the causality to one
direction only—from brain to mind. An explanation is still required as
to how this causality could be effected given that mind and brain are
different kinds of things obeying different laws and principles of
operation.
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And, finally, it will be noted that the epiphenomenal interpreta¬
tion of causality by image rotation is contrary to the spirit of the
overall analysis which Shepard has been concerned to offer. Whatever
ambiguities of language we may find in this analysis, Shepard appears
to be adamant on one point—the rotation phenomenon—the phenomenon that
people report—has a causal role to play in the spatial problem solving.
Says Shepard, people generate these image objects, they cause them to
rotate, and they monitor these rotations before their mind's eyes.
There is a third possible interpretation of causality by image
rotation. Let us suppose that the identity theory of mind is true. On
this supposition, image rotation comes under an entirely new descrip¬
tion. It is not a mental—as opposed to, or in addition to—physical
event, but it is an experienced physical event—call it, perhaps, 'X'
series of physical events occurring in/on the human brain. In principle,
the causal connection between this physical series and the ultimate
physical series for which we are seeking causal explanation—the pres¬
sing of the correct response lever at the specified time interval—is
not a problem. There are no ontological chasms to be bridged.
Electrical-chemical events in the brain—the image rotation—bring about
other electrical-chemical events which in turn, act through the central
nervous system to produce the reguisite muscular movement and to acti¬
vate the speech centre.
Now suppose we take this identity interpretation one step further.
Suppose, that is, that we conceive the operation of the human brain
along the lines of modern digital computer with feedback capability.
If we do this, the causal significance of the individual's experiencing—
monitoring his/her image rotations becomes obvious. Consider the
84
























Computer Model of Image Rotation Process.
The basic components of this model are three: the computer
itself (with three programs), the display monitor, and the optical sensing
device. The computer is programmed with information about the standard
figure. This information is stored in the computer memory. At the
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beginning of a given problem solving seguence, information about the
test figure is programmed into the computer and both figures are pro¬
jected in the form of images onto the display screen—the standard
image on the left and the test image on the right. The sensing device
scans ("sees") the visual information, identifies each of the patterns,
notes the relative orientation discrepancy and sends this information
back to the computer program for image modification. A modification
signal is emitted and the test image is rotated on the display screen
a specified number of degrees. The sensing device continues to monitor
this process, noting the gradually decreasing orientation discrepancy,
and sends the information back to the computer which in turn continues
emitting the appropriate modification signals. This process of rota¬
tion and monitoring continues until the sensing device detects no dif¬
ference in orientation between the standard and test image. At this
point, the feedback output is 0.
In this general scheme of things, the role of the generated image
and the sensing device is crucial. The computer needs the visual
information in order to determine when and how much modification of the
generated image is required. And depending on just how the test image
looks relative to the standard, the sensing device either will or will
not feed information back to the computer.
In human terms, the computer is the analogue of the brain and the
image display and the sensing device are the mental image and the mind's
eye, respectively. Like the image on the display screen, the mental
image undergoes a process of gradual transformation—it changes spatial
orientation. And like the sensing device, the mind's eye monitors, and,
ultimately, guides the speed, direction and degree of that
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transformation.
Does this mean that there are, in some quite literal sense, objects
moving about in/on the brain? I do not think so—at least no more than
there are really objects moving around on the computer display screen.
Certainly it 'looks like' there are objects, but the truth of the
matter is that the computer hardware is digital. There are no objects
per se, but a complex series of electrical events—each event constitut¬
ing a unit in its own right. Together, these events are 'seen' by the
sensing device (and, indeed, by the naked eye) as a single entity. And
it is this 'seeing' of the electrical units, as comprising a whole, a
single image-object, which counts causally for the spatial problem
solving. That one perceived whole—the test image on the right—
eventually comes to achieve a match with the other perceived whole--the
standard image on the left—produces, in turn, (again by digital elec¬
trical activity) the final problem solving behaviour.
In a similar manner, it seems reasonable to suppose that experi¬
enced images in the brain are like the images on the display screen,
digitalized at a first stage. And then, upon that field, epistemic
sortings out may or may not be performed. These, obviously, are at
another logical level completely. One can fitly compare here the digi-
talizing that produces a pixel-picture (made up of tiny black-and-white
squares) in a newspaper, with what one chooses or does not choose to
see in that picture as a logically distinct entity. In terms of neuro¬
physiologies! hardware, images are not static structures which can be
spatially located and excised out as a single unit; they are a fairly
complex series of electrochemical events. These 'events' are seen or
experienced by the mind's eye as a single image. That they are
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experienced in this fashion produces the unique reaction-time behaviour.
People see images—whole images—gradually rotating into positions of
mutual congruence and so come to solve the shape assessment problems
in the length of time it takes to complete this wholistic process.
What about the mind's eye? Is there a separate mechanism, a part
of the human brain corresponding to this? There may be or there may
not be. Mind's eye scanning might well be best described as a stage in
the overall processing rather than as a distinct structure as it clearly
is in the computer model. Perhaps the best way to account for the
mind's eye, in terms of brain hardware, is to say that in imaging a
rotation, what is going on neurophysiologically, whatever states and/or
structures are activated are the same states and/or structures which
are activated when the experienced rotation is taking place externally,
in physical terms, only, in the latter case, the activity is activated
from the outside. (See Appendix B.)
3.3 Methodological Implications
I have argued that image rotation ought to be conceived on the
identity model. This model has been generated out of the need to pro¬
vide for Shepard a suitable metaphysics of image rotation—a way of
accounting for its apparent causality in spatial problem solving
sequences. It seems to me that this model bears further consideration
in regard to its methodological implications. In particular, I want
to consider the implications for introspection of taking image rota¬
tions to be experienced brain processes.
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Suppose that an individual, hand in pocket, claims that he is
holding several coins. We cannot tell for certain whether or not this
is true as we cannot see the inside of the pocket. Yet, all things
being egual, we will be guite prepared to grant a certain epistemic
authority to the individual's claim. We will reason that he is in a
good position to know the facts of the case. After all, people, hands
in pockets, ought to be able to feel and to identify familiar objects
such as coins. And unless we have some reason to believe that the
individual is lying to us, or that he has recently suffered a minor
stroke such that his hand is now paralyzed and incapable of grasping
and feeling small objects such as the coins, it will seem reasonable to
us to treat the report in the spirit of a true observation, and guide
our activity accordingly. We might, for instance, proceed to the
coffee shop with the individual fully expecting to have refreshment
purchased for us.
Now is the case of coin reporting really substantially different from
the case of the individual who reports that he has just solved a spatial
problem by mental rotation? Is the latter individual not egually in a
good position to report on his problem solving activity? On the iden¬
tity model of image rotation, he certainly seems to be. Given that the
experienced rotations are conceived to be identical with the brain
states activated in the problem solving seguence, the report of having
such experience must be recognized as a kind of observation of the
actual problem solving, or, at least some stage of it, in principle not
different from the individual's observation of the coins in his pocket
and, therefore, as a legitimate source of knowledge in the matter.
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It will be noted that the epistemic authority being granted to the
introspective report of problem solving by image rotation is not the
kind traditionally ascribed on the basis of a Cartesian analysis. To
be sure, the individual making the report has a 'privileged access' to
the problem solving activity—no one else can experience it. But this
is no more privileged than is the access which the individual has to
the coins in his pocket. It is not the case that the rotation activ¬
ity—as 'mental' activity—is intrinsically better known to its posses¬
sor than anything physical could possibly be known to anyone. Reports
of image rotation problem solving are not incorrigible. Individuals
could—like the hypothetical stroke victim, who is unable to feel and
identify the coins in his pocket—be suffering from some kind of neuro¬
logical deficiency or damage which makes physically impossible the
experience of the appropriate kind of brain state. In this event, the
introspective report of image rotation problem solving could not be
considered to be genuinely observational. Barring such possibilities,
however, the introspective report is observational. And the individual
making it, is necessarily in a good position to provide information
about the nature of the problem solving activity undertaken.
It is clear, then,that on the identity model, introspective
reports of image rotation are not just so much useless bag and baggage—
mere sounds, as the behaviourist would have it, the cause of which may
or may not be investigated. On the contrary, given the view that image
rotations are experienced brain states, the cognitive investigator has
every reason to seek out reports of such experience and to take these
reports quite literally and seriously as indicative of the nature of
the problem solving process. And they should constitute very useful
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starting-points and guides for further experimental research.
Notwithstanding the fact that introspections of image rotation and
of image phenomena in general could be conceived on the identity model,
and treated in this 'observational' fashion, most contemporary cogni¬
tive psychologists, (presumably harbouring behaviourist scruples) remain
suspicious of introspective reports of imagery and sceptical of their
value as empirical data, for example, cognitive psychologist Gordon
Bower has claimed that "people utter an awful lot of nonsense about
their mental imagery.... The normal person's introspections are fre¬
quently neither very discriminating nor particularly valid....""'" lilric
Neisser has suggested that asking subjects for introspections of their
mental imagery is "a little like asking them to describe shifting cloud
2
formations of a stormy sky." And D.F. Marks has argued that mental
imagery ought not to be defined by reference to conscious introspection.
Says Marks, "The mental image has been allowed to reenter the arena of
scientific psychology only on the condition that it be stripped entirely
of its mental and phenomenological connections.""^ And, even Alan Paivio,
himself an image researcher and a strong supporter of Roger Shepard's
work, denounces introspection as a possible technique for data gather¬
ing in cognitive science. He sees it, rather, as a technique for
Gordon H. Bower, "Analysis of a Mnemonic Device," American
Scientist, vol. 58, 1970, p. 498.
2
Ulric Neisser, "Changing Conceptions of Imagery," in P.W. Sheehan
(Ed.), The Function and Nature of Imaqery (New York: Academic Press),
p. 238.
"^David F. Marks, "Individual Differences in Vividness of Visual
Imagery and Their Effect on Function," in P.W. Sheehan , ibid., p. 92.
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hypothesis gathering. Paivio writes:
Consider, first, the role of conscious experience....
This is no longer used as a basis for defining the
functional attributes of imagery and for this shift
we must be grateful to John Watson. If used at all,
introspective evidence primarily supplements other
information in supporting the inference that imagery
is involved in task performance. Subjective reports
might also be used as an informal source of research
ideas, but they are not used to define the fundamen¬
tal properties of imagery....!
Significant here is Paivio's assertion of a distinction between
the utilization of introspections of imagery as heuristic devices (or,
as Paivio himself puts it, as an "informal source of research ideas")
and the taking of these introspections to reveal functional qualities
of image-type representations and image processes. For Paivio,
apparently, introspections of imagery can be used in the former sense,
but not in the latter. On such a view, mental imagery and image pro¬
cesses such as rotation, are really nothing more than theoretical con¬
structs—an entity construct and a process construct, respectively—
which the investigator postulates in order to get the experimental pro¬
cess in motion. And the constructs themselves are entirely expendible—
the investigator is quite prepared and in some instances even expects
that the 'objective' evidence so-called may not support their postula-
tion. Even so, Paivio contends, the investigator may do well to take
them seriously in an experimental framework and see what may come of
"'"Alan Paivio, 1974, op. cit., p. 50.
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them.
For example, it may well be scientifically useful, Paivio would
argue, to treat as true peoples' introspective reports that they gener¬
ate pictorial representations before their mind's eyes and that they
rotate them in order to conduct shape assessments, even though the
investigator himself may believe, for other reasons, that this is
unlikely to be quite accurate as a statement of causal activity. Such
introspective reports can constitute a starting-point for scientific
research, a basis out of which experimental hypotheses (hypotheses such
as the 'distance of rotation—length of reaction time hypothesis'
adduced by Shepard and Metzler in 1971) can be generated and out of
which, through the testing process, discoveries can be made.
The ultimate justification for such an experimental procedure,
therefore, is really a posteriori—by way of the test results achieved.
If the results sustain the hypothesis being tested, then the investiga¬
tor has good reason to infer certain functional properties. In the
case of the rotation hypothesis, positive results enable the investiga¬
tor to infer that there is indeed something like a rotation going on.
Alternatively, negative results, might well enable the investigator to
make a different kind of inference. If the subjects' reaction times
varied not with the distance of rotation, but with the structural com¬
plexity of the objects in the pairs, for instance, then the investigator
might infer a linguistic problem solving strategy. Either way, some¬
thing has been discovered which constitutes a useful basis for inferring
some functioning phenomenon—the image rotation or, (with the negative
results) the linguistic analysis—but this phenomenon, it will be noted
is, at no stage in the process, observed. Paivio writes:
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All of the more useful evidence on the nature of imagery
comes from objective methods in which the involvement
of imagery in a given task is encouraged by the use of
relevant stimuls materials such as pictures or concrete
words, by giving subjects instructions to image and so
on. These procedures alone do not reveal the functions
of imagery nor are they intended to do so. The inferences
about function are based instead on the measurable rela¬
tionship between the demands of the task and how subjects
perform on it.-'-
The identity view that I have been advocating runs contrary to
this. Introspective reports of images and of image rotations are not
just heuristics, utilized in an experimental framework, as Paivio and
others would have it, in the hope that, fortuitously, some empirical
fact of interest will be uncovered experimentally. The use of such
introspective reports is to be justified not just by their results
(which in the case of Roger Shepard's research happen as a matter of
fact to be significant and happen to warrant an inference to rotation
activity) but, also, and indeed primarily by their particular nature—
by virtue of the fact that the experienced rotation is a brain process
in operation.
Thus, it could be said that, on the identity view, image rotation
per se is already well-grounded on an observation basis, and that what
the rotation experiments accomplish is the provision of a second, infer¬
ential basis for postulating image rotation. This second basis helps to
confirm what people already know introspectively. Additionally, the
experiments provide further data which help to explain and elaborate
the nature of the rotation phenomenon and a basis on which the
^Ibid.
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investigator might make judgments about how felicitous ordinary language
introspective references to 'mind's eyes', 'pictures' and 'images' and
about descriptions of images moving about in a rotation fashion really
is.
Ihere is one final point I want to make in this context. It seems
to me that Alan Paivio, Roger Shepard and anyone else seriously inter¬
ested in conducting cognitive investigations would be well-advised to
take the metaphysical plunge that I have been advocating here. It is
all well and good to say, as Paivio does, that psychologists can proceed
experimentally on the basis of introspective reports even though they do
not, for the most part, believe that these reports have any special
observational credentials. In the practical circumstance, they will
not do so. Unless the investigator believes that there is something in
an introspective report, something in the fact that people consistently
say that they see or do such-and-such in these circumstances—unless the
investigator believes that this report is revelatory in some degree of
a fact of cognition—it makes no sense for him to pursue it as if it
were true. And Paivio is just kidding himself if he believes otherwise.
3.4 The Problem of Demand Characteristics and Experimental Design
Psychologist Martin Orne^ has alerted cognitive investigators to
the danger that many of their experimental results may be attributable
to the 'demand characteristics' of the experimental setting. That is,
^"Martin Orne, "On the Social Psychology of the Psychological
Experiment: with Particular Reference to Demand Characteristics and
their Implications," American Psychologist, vol. 17, 1962, pp. 776-783.
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the subjects may deduce the purpose of the experiment in which they are
participating and may manipulate their responses so as to give the
experimenter the results they think he wants. This is easily done, says
Orne, if there are no objective performances required and so the
response in question is exclusively a verbal one. In the case of
imagery research, Orne notes, subjects are typically instructed to pro¬
vide a response only after a certain condition has been met in an
image—a condition that is detectable to the subject and the subject
alone. The subjects may be told to respond, for instance, when they
have seen a particular object in an image, or when they have transformed
the image in some way. Orne argues that, in such circumstances, it is
quite likely that the resultant verbal report is more a function of
these demand characteristics than of any genuine observation that the
subjects may have made regarding their problem solving activity.
Obviously, Orne's argument cuts against the position I have adduced
above in connection with the observational status of introspective
reports of image rotation. For, if Orne is right, then it really
doesn't matter whether or not the introspective reports of image rota¬
tion are the products of conscious monitoring of events in the brain
and so, in principle, not essentially different from any other observa¬
tions, because in the practical circumstance, whatever observational
value they may have is bound to be eroded by the influence of demand
characteristics—by the fact that people will simply tell the investi¬
gator what they believe they ought to tell him. Using introspective
reports as if they could constitute data, as if they could be evidence
for anything at all is, therefore, a suspect scientific practice.
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The demand characteristic problem was originally identified in
the early part of this century through the conflict now known as the
'imageless thought' controversy. America's most famous introspective
psychologist, E.B. Titchener, believed that images played a necessary
and essential role in thought; indeed, for Titchener,- thought simply
was a train of images (not just visual ones of course, but auditory,
kinesthetic, and other images as well). Workers in his laboratory were
trained to be sensitive to the nuances of their internal lives, and
spent many hours performing relatively simple tasks, repeating actions
and experiences over and over until they were able to reduce their
thoughts to their fundamental imagistic components. Unfortunately,
some of Titchener's contemporaries came to the opposite conclusion. In
several influential experiments, the psychologists of the 'Wurzburg
School', under the directorship of Oswald' Kulpe, asked their subjects
to introspect on the contents of their minds while in the act of trying
to answer difficult guestions. These subjects (mostly psychologists
themselves) were often as vigorous in denying the presence of images
as Titchener was in affirming it.
In the first, and typical, experiment of this genre, a subject was
asked to lift two weights and to judge which was heavier. What was
surprising was that the subject had no notion of how the judgment was
made. To be sure, there were plenty of experiences and sensations, but
the judgment itself was not heralded by a seguence of coherent steps.
Rather, the judgment just seemed to pop into the mind, as the subject
said, full-blown and unguided by conscious processing. In a second
experiment, this time conducted with psychologist E. Durr as the subject,
the following question was asked, "Is this correct; 'The future is just
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as much a condition of the present as of the past'?" Durr answered
"No," in ten seconds. The interesting thing is that while Durr claimed
to be aware of how he worked out his answer t.n this guestion, this
'working-out' was conducted neither in images nor in words. Durr's
report follows:
First I thought: that sounds like something correct
(without words). Then I made the attempt to represent
it to myself. The thought came to me: Men are deter¬
mined by thoughts of the future. Then, however, imme¬
diately the thought: that the thought of the future
should not be confounded with the future itself; that
such confusions, however, constitute a freguent dodge
in philosophical thought. (Of words and images there
was throughout no trace.) Thereupon the answer: No.l
The imageless thought debate was never resolved. In fact, the
Titchenerians and the Wurzburg psychologists were reduced to an exchange
of dogmatisms—each group consulted its respective introspections and
begged to differ with the other.
How can the discrepant reports of these two groups of researchers
be accounted for? In part, it may be possible to appeal to the irreduc¬
ible notion of 'individual differences'. We know that subjects differ
widely in the vividness of the images which they find in introspection;
that is, in the degree to which their images are subjectively like
genuine perceptions. These differences, first reported by Galton
. Durr, reported in George Humphrey, Thinking: An Introduction




(1880), were quantified by Betts in terms of a 7-point scale.
Titchener was certainly a vivid imager; perhaps his opponents simply
were not. But this is surely not the whole story here. There seems to
be another factor at work. Titchener and his students were looking for
images and expected to find them; the Wurzburgefis were not. This must
have set up very powerful demand characteristics for each group of
subjects. And there is good reason to suppose that such effects would
be most powerful where the overtly required performance is itself ill-
defined and left more or less up to the subject, as, for example, in the
Wurzburg experiments.
The possibility of importing demand characteristics into an experi¬
mental procedure involving introspective responses is, I believe,
genuine. And it is a real problem—one which affects many of the con¬
temporary investigations of image phenomena as well as those of the
early introspectionist psychologists. I cite one example of this.
Psychologist Stephen Kosslyn has conducted experiments designed, so he
says, "to investigate the idea that images are limited in spatial
extent, and that the maximal subjective size of images is constrained by
the spatial medium that supports imagery representations."^
^Francis Galton, "Statistics of Mental Imagery," Mind, vol. 5,
1880, pp. 301-318.
2
G.H. Betts, "The Distribution and Functions of Mental Imagery,"
Columbia University Contributions to Education Series, vol. 26, 1909,
1-99.
^Stephen Kosslyn, 1980, op. cit., p. 73.
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In these experiments, subjects were asked to image an animal, such
as a rabbit, as if it were next to an appropriately scaled elephant or
fly. The subjects reported later that the elephant "took up most of the
room," leaving only a little for a tiny image of a rabbit; the fly, by
contrast, took up relatively little room, leaving plenty for imaging a
seemingly large rabbit. Also, these subjects reguired more time to see
properties (such as, the nose) of an imaged rabbit when it was next to
an elephant than when it was next to a fly, reportedly because proper¬
ties were harder to see on subjectively smaller images. This finding
was reversed when the subjects were asked to image the fly huge and
the elephant tiny. Kosslyn concluded "... these introspections suggest
that the medium in which one forms visual images is spatially bounded;
if it were not, the rabbit could have been the same subjective size
independent of the relative size of the adjacent image.
It seems to me, that in this experimental setting, there is plenty
of opportunity for the subjects to infer just what it is that the
experimenter is testing for, and hence, just what it is that he wants
them to say. Kosslyn asks his subjects to describe how the rabbit looks
relative to the elephant, given that they are to be pictured in appro¬
priate scale. Anyone, even a small child, knows that beside an ele¬
phant, a rabbit looks very small indeed. And we do not need to refer
to pictures of these objects in order to determine this. As for the
subjects' complaint that there was "little room" for the rabbit once
the elephant was imaged, such language could well be suggested to the
1Ibid.
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subjects by the experimenter's own use of expressions such as the mind's
eye, mind's space, etc. They might have inferred that, for the purpose
of this experiment, the mind is to be treated as a projection screen on
which elephants, flies, and rabbits are to be projected and the mind's
eye, as a projector. Equally, it is not surprising that the subjects
would take longer to identify and describe parts of smaller animals—
when the experimenter says, "Are the rabbit's eyes open?" and then, "Is
the elephant's trunk curled?", the subjects will be expecting that the
eye, since it is on a very small animal, occupying a very small space
on the projection screen, will be hard to find and hard to focus on
clearly. An elephant's trunk, by comparison, practically takes up the
whole screen and is easy to see and describe. In this experiment, the
experimenter's questions, and the language he uses to ask these ques¬
tions, give the subjects a more than adequate basis for inferring
experiment demands.
Now, it is a significant feature of Roger Shepard's experimental
findings that, in addition to the linear reaction-time pattern, the
subjects consistently report image rotation. In light of the demand
characteristic problem, we must consider just what weight these reports
ought to be given. Are they genuinely observational or are they, like
the reports of Stephen Kosslyn's subjects, very much a function of the
subjects' inferences about the experimenter's expectations?
A number of psychologists"'" have taken the view that Shepard's
"'"Namely, Charles L. Richman, David B. Mitchell, and J. Steven
Reznick ("The Demands of Mental Travel: Demand Characteristics of
Mental Imagery Experiments," The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 2,
1979, pp. 264-265), Zenon Pylyshyn ("Imagery Theory: Not Mysterious—
101
subjects have probably inferred that the experiments have to do with
rotation and so have come to report the appropriate kind of experi¬
ence. This view seems to be held almost as a matter of course in
respect of any and all experimental procedures which investigate
imagery on the basis of introspective reports and is not, so far as I
can tell, mediated by any significant degree of careful study of the
details of many of these experiments, and certainly not at all, of
Shepard's. This is unfortunate, as I believe the peculiarities of
Shepard's experimental design guard effectively against the possible
importation of demand characteristics into the experimental procedure
and so preserve the observational value of these reports. These design
considerations bear closer scrutiny.
Broadly speaking, Shepard's experimental mandate is to obtain
information about the functional gualities (if any) of visual imagery.
The obvious way to fulfill this mandate is to design a problem task—
a spatial problem task, which will encourage the utilization of imagery
in some capacity. As investigators, we might design problem tasks for
instance, which reguire the assessment of the spatial extent of speci¬
fied image objects, on the assumption that there ought to be a propor¬
tionate relation between the distance involved in the spatial assess¬
ment and the length of time taken by the subjects to complete this
assessment. There ought to be, in other words, a fairly precise corre¬
lation between the distance factor and reaction time.
Just Wrong," ibid., pp. 561-563), and Peter W. Sheehan ("Metaphor
Versus Reality in the Understanding of Imagery: The Path From Function
to Structure," ibid., pp. 567-568).
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In theory, we could design an experiment to test for this in a
number of ways. We could, for instance, proceed quite informally by
simply requiring subjects to picture the map of Canada and ask them to
mentally trace the outline of the map, signalling in some fashion when
they have completed the task. Then, for contrast, we could ask them
to do the same thing in respect of the map of Nova Scotia. The point
of this exercise would be to compare the reaction times for the two
tasks. If the functional system of representation in this circumstance
is imagistic then, on our hypothesis, relative distances must be pre¬
served and the reaction times must be proportionate to the distance
involved in the outlining task. It should, that is to say, take longer
to perform the mental outlining of Canada than Nova Scotia.
This is, however, a very rough and ready measure of the spatial-
temporal correlation inferred in our hypothesis, and needless to say,
the experiment is much too informal to stand as any kind of proof or
disproof of the kind of cognitive representation operative in this cir¬
cumstance. Suppose, for instance, it was discovered that the subjects'
reaction times were not proportionately related to the distance factor.
Suppose even that it took the subjects longer to complete the outlining
of Nova Scotia than the outlining of Canada. Would this prove that the
operative cognitive representation here was not imagistic? Not
necessarily—it could well be that in order to simplify the latter task,
the subjects did not bother to preserve the relative size distinction
between Canada as a whole and Nova Scotia in their minds and so used an
'inflated' image of Nova Scotia, one the same size perhaps, or one
larger than Canada for their representation. After all, this would not
be an unusual thing to do—most people who are knowledgeable about the
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geography of Canada (and certainly all native Canadians) are accustomed
to studying full-scale maps of the individual provinces and so would
have a natural predisposition to the simplification of the problem in
this way. And even if we attempt to prevent this situation from
developing by instructing the subjects to use the same image for both
tasks or we explain to them that it is important to maintain the rela¬
tive size distinction of each map, we can never be sure that they have
fully understood our instructions and are in fact complying with them.
And, as a further complicating factor, if we do this, we run the risk
of 'over-specifying' the task for the subjects—conveying tacitly the
message that the point of the exercise is to get the timing 'right'.
Consider the scenario from the point of view of the subjects.
They are instructed to mentally outline two objects, and they are told
that they must use a representation or representations which preserve/s
the size ratio between these objects. They know from their basic geo¬
graphy that these objects are vastly different in size and they know as
a matter of physics, that if the relative size is preserved as they
have been told it must be, it must take longer to outline the larger
object than the smaller object. Might they not, therefore, consciously
or even possibly, unconsciously, perform their outlining task in such a
way that their expectations (and our expectations) as to timing will be
fulfilled? Surely it is conceivable that given subjects functioning
with this expectation might take their time performing the first out¬
lining task but go rather guickly about the second. The point is that
if we give too much information by way of instructions, we create
expectations in the subjects which affect the outcome of the performance.
In any case, as we have no way of monitoring the speed of each outlining
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performance in each subject—we do not know whether such demand charac¬
teristics are operative. And even the subjects themselves may not be
entirely in control of their respective outlining speeds. They may,
for instance, simply be slow about outlining Canada because the task is
new to them and then pick up speed and proficiency the second time
around. Or just as plausibly, given subjects may be more conversant
with the basic geography of one or other of the maps and so perform the
outlining of that map with greater speed and proficiency.
Thus the problem with the map outlining experiment is that it fails
to place adeguate constraints on the information processing procedures
undertaken by the subjects. There is simply too much opportunity for
the tacit beliefs, information and experience of the subjects to influ¬
ence and even interfere with the process and outcome of the cognition.
Things like given subjects' knowledge of geography—their desire to
perform 'correctly', to please the experimenter etcetera, get in the
way of precise measurement of the supposed spatial-temporal correlation.
Suppose, then, that we attempt to devise an alternative experiment
—one which provides a control against the development of tacit
expectations of the experimental demands in the subjects. How can this
be done? It can be done by implementing two strategies: first by
simply refraining from over-specifying the task for the subjects and,
in so doing, causing them to infer the point of the exercise. And it
can be done by reguiring the subjects to solve a test problem which is
de novo with respect to the subjects' previously acquired fund of
knowledge. A problem, that is, in respect of which the subjects enter¬
tain no particular expectations simply because they have no clear basis
of information under the guidance of which they would be able or
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prepared to make inferences. Take a case in point. Suppose that we ask
a group of subjects to tell us how many windows there are in their
respective houses and then time the interval which elapses between ques¬
tion and answer. If the cognitive representation which is operative
here is imagistic—which is to say that it conveys information by depic¬
tion rather than description then the answer must have been arrived at
incrementally—by way of a step-by-step assessment of the spatial
extent of the four sides of the house, counting windows 'along the
way'—just as would be the case if the subjects were asked the question
when the houses are physically before them. This means, then, that the
length of the subjects' reaction times ought to be a function of the
number of windows counted. Clearly the virtue of this kind of problem
is that with a few notable exceptions,"'" people simply do not know how
many windows there are in their houses and none of the information
regarding the structure of their houses which they might well have
ready to hand, is adequate as an inference base. They might know cer¬
tain facts about their houses—that they are large or small, that they
are 'Cape Cod' or some other style, but these facts will furnish only
hints as to whether, relatively speaking, the house has many or few
windows but nothing more precise than this. Thus the problem forces
the 'cognitive' hand (if I may be permitted to mix metaphors) of the
subjects—it necessitates a kind of on-the-spot calculation of quantity
I have in mind people such as carpenters, engineers, fanatical
housewives or someone who has just replaced the windows in his house.
Such categories of people could presumably be culled from the test
group prior to the experiment.
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over space.
However, there are certain defects inherent in this experiment,
which makes it less than desirable as a test for our hypothesis. For
one thing, though all the subjects are working on the same problem not
all of them and more than likely, not any two of them will be working in
respect of the same problem object. Each subject will be making his/her
decision regarding quantity of windows by thinking of his/her own dwel¬
ling place. This makes for certain complications when it comes to inter¬
preting the data generated by this experiment.
Suppose, as a hypothetical case, that we find that there is no
clear correlation between the subjects' reaction times and the quantity
of windows they report after their deliberations. Some of the subjects
report a very few windows (say less than 10), but yet exhibit lengthy
reaction times, while other subjects report many windows (over 10), but
come to a decision in the matter much more quickly. What would this
prove? Would it prove that the kind of cognitive representation opera¬
tive in this circumstance is not imagistic? Not at all, for there is an
alternative explanation available here—an explanation which has to do
with the differences in the size of the houses considered, rather than
the nature of the representation which has been cognitively operative.
It is quite conceivable, for instance, that in the case of an individual
who reports few windows but has a disproportionately lengthy reaction
time that that individual's house is very large such that it takes him
quite some time to scan a representation of the house counting windows
as he 'goes along'.
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In other words, in such circumstances, an individual could well be
processing information by way of an image representation but because of
the unusual structure of his house (large with only a few windows) and,
accordingly, of his representation of it, he displays a reaction time
which is equally unusual and, in this case, entirely unexpected.
The point is that this experiment tests for the correlation of
reaction time to quantity of windows but ignores what is just as much a
crucial factor—the area which must be covered during the process of
counting. If that area is large, then even if the number of windows to
be counted is small, there ought to be an increase in reaction time to
account for this. For in an imagistic circumstance, where relative
distances are preserved, it is not just quantity of windows counted
which produces the reaction-time effect, but quantity over space.
The basic flaw in this experiment is clearly that it fails to pro¬
vide some kind of external control on the object in respect of which the
subjects will be conducting their problem solving activities. Because
they all use different objects, it is never entirely clear how we ought
to interpret the data. There is always the variable relating to the
structure of the house—in particular relating to the ratio of the num¬
ber of windows to space which complicates the issue. And even if the
data would seem to confirm our image hypothesis, we can never be sure—
such results could be indicative of the operation of the structure
variable rather than the nature of the kind of cognitive representation
used. The remedy for this situation is obviously to stipulate a single
test object for the subjects—preferably a test object which is easy to
visualize, but one in respect of which the subjects have had no previous
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experience and so entertain no expectations one way or the other."'"
Now Shepard's particular version of the reaction-time experiment
is distinguished by the fact that the subjects are not permitted to con¬
duct their spatial calculations in the abstract, in respect of objects
which they must conjure from memory. On the contrary, a test stimulus
is provided for them. This stimulus is comprised of objects which have
been specially designed by Shepard. The objects are presented to the
subjects in the form of perspective drawings and they are in pairs. At
first sight, the objects in a given pair appear to be more or less the
same, but it is difficult for the subjects to tell for certain, as the
objects are presented in different 'orientations'. (Object X in a given
pair may appear to be standing 'straight up', so to speak, while object
"Y" may appear to be on its side, relative to 'X'.) The subjects are
required to indicate by pressing the appropriate lever whether or not
the objects are the same shape.
It is worthy of note that this experiment has actually been under¬
taken by two psychologists—P.R. Meudell and later by W. Janssen. They
have published their results, respectively, in "Retrieval and Represen¬
tation in Long-Term Memory" (Psychonomic Science, vol. 23, 1971, pp. 295-
269 and in On The Nature of The Mental Image. Soesterberg: Institute
for Research on. Perception, 1976). Both researchers report the follow¬
ing: that the imagery hypothesis has been confirmed—specifically that
the time taken by the subjects to answer the question varied in a
linear fashion with the number of windows counted and that virtually all
the subjects when questioned after the fact claimed that they solved
the problem by imagining themselves moving around the house, visualizing
and counting the windows. For the reasons I have given above, I do not
think that this experiment is capable of providing a clear confirmation
of the hypothesis that the subjects were solving their problems by
visualizing themselves counting windows on imaged houses.
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A principal variable which Shepard seeks to record here is the sub¬
jects' reaction times. The reason for this is obvious: If, as per our
hypothesis, the subjects' calculations are going forward within the con¬
text of a system of analogue or imagistic representation, then the deci¬
sion as to shape similarity must be made on the basis of a rotation of
one image structure into congruence with the other. For in the analogue
format, problem solving is a wholistic-visual"^ affair. Accordingly,
the time required to reach a decision should be in proportion to the
degree to which one image must be rotated in order to achieve a congru¬
ence or fit with the other. Thus the greater the discrepancy in angle
of rotation between the orientations of the two objects, the longer it
must take the subjects to perform the appropriate image manipulation
and record their responses.
The significance of Shepard's provision of an external test stimu¬
lus is clearly that it serves to constrain the subjects' cognitive
operations. For instance, by requiring the subjects to focus their
attention on a single stimulus, Shepard successfully eliminated the
'object variance' factor which was likely to be significant in the
I use the adjectives 'wholistic-visual' here by contrast to
'analytic-linguistic'. The sort of problem solving exercise suggested
by these latter adjectives would be a descriptive one and would, pre¬
sumably, involve the generation of linguistic descriptions of the
parts and the proportions of the parts of each of these objects with
the eventual comparison of separately generated descriptions. This
would, of course, not be the case in the analogue format, where, pre¬
sumably, such a problem must be worked-out literally—in spatial terms
such that, in some sense, the solution would 'unfold', 'take place'
before the mind's eye of the subjects.
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experiments considered above. And having eliminated this, Shepard is
free to interpret his reaction-time data as clearly pointing or not
pointing (as the case may be) to an image form of cognitive representa¬
tion and to analogue problem solving. Not only this, but the very fact
of the presence of a stipulated test stimulus ensures a greater degree
of precision in the measurement of reaction time. It will be recalled
that in the 'map outlining' experiment, the reaction time is clocked as
the interval which elapses between the assignment of the test problem
and the subjects' verbal response. However, on this procedure, it is
never entirely clear when the individual subjects actually begin the
calculation process—obviously it is guite conceivable that some sub¬
jects are still assimilating the instructions long after others have
already moved to the solution process. On Shepard's procedure, this
contingency need not arise, the problem can be explained to the satis¬
faction of all the subjects prior to the presentation of the test
stimuli, such that with the onset of the stimulus, the clock can start,
so to speak, with regard to the mental calculation. And it must not be
forgotten that memory can also affect reaction time. If as in the
former two experiments, subjects are reguired to furnish from memory
the details of the object of concern, it can be expected that some indi¬
viduals will have less clear memory than others and so will still be
engaged in the process of sorting out and making decisions on detail
when other individuals, with, say, instant recall, are otherwise
engaged.
The particular design of Shepard's test objects is obviously sig¬
nificant as a controlling factor in his experiment. The objects in
guestion consist of cubical blocks attached face-to-face to form a
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rigid asymmetrical structure with two free ends and two or three right-
angled bends. In the experiment proper, these objects are presented in
the form of drawings or caricatures in which three-dimensional perspec¬
tive has been preserved. Obviously, Shepard's idea here is to design
objects that are easy to visualize but hard to describe verbally. If he
did not use such objects he would run the risk of failing to induce his
subjects to use visual imagery or of failing altogether because he has
demanded too much from their powers of imagination. Not only this, but
these objects, by virtue of their unusual design, are such that the sub¬
jects will never have experienced anything like them before. This being
so, the subjects will not have any preconceived notions or expectations
as to the outcome of the experiment."'' They are simply confronted with
new material and they react accordingly. Thus the novelty of the
objects is a valuable feature in that it neutralizes the possibility
that the subjects' expectations will interfere with the process of cal¬
culation and modify the experimental results.
But there is a further, more intriguing possibility presented by
the so-called 'novelty factor' in Shepard's experiment. I have argued
that because of the unfamiliarity of the objects, the subjects are
unlikely to develop any particular expectations as to the outcome of the
experiment. They will not be thinking that they ought to perform one
way or the other and so come to fulfill this expectation either
"'it will be recalled that in the 'map outlining' experiment, the
subjects might have developed expectations as to the timing of their
responses on the basis of their understanding of the relative size of
Canada and Nova Scotia and their (reasonable) inference that it ought
to take longer to outline the former than the latter.
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consciously or unconsciously. They simply have no 'stake1, so to speak,
in the experiment results. As a correlative to this, I would like to
suggest that neither will the subjects have any particular conviction
as to strategy—that is to say they will have no preconceived notions
as to how the process of calculation ought to go forward. This is by
contrast to the situation in the 'window assessment' experiment, where
subjects are guite familiar with the object of concern and they are
accustomed to resolving factual issues regarding the structure of this
object by 'taking a look' and, if need be, by walking around and count¬
ing features. They have, in other words, a strategy already worked out
in respect of this object. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that
the subjects will have a natural predisposition to attempt some such
strategy in the mental sphere. The strategy is, after all, in the day-
to-day practical circumstance in which painters or builders operate very
successful. But in the case of Shepard's objects, the subjects have no
strategy ready-to-hand—they could not because they have no opportunity
to develop one.
Now suppose that we find that in addition to the reaction times of
the subjects correlating neatly with the rotational discrepancy of the
test objects (as on our image rotation hypothesis they are supposed to)
they are consistent throughout the entire experimental sequence. In
other words, it takes the subjects no longer to solve a problem requir¬
ing a 60° rotation at the beginning of the experiment, than it does at
the end. Would this not tend to point not only to the existence of an
image rotation but to the automaticity of the problem solving strategy?
I think that it would. After all, the subjects have been presented with
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objects—of which they know absolutely nothing and yet they take no time
at the outset of the experiment to work out a calculation strategy, but
proceed without hesitation"''—performing as guickly and as proficiently
at the beginning as at the end.
Now I am not saying that the automaticity of the image representa¬
tion system has been demonstrated in and through Shepard's experiments.
Shepard himself does not explicitly make this inference and he does not
give details as to the consistency of the subjects' reaction times
(relative to given rotational discrepancies) over the course of the
experimental seguence which would make such an inference possible.
Indeed, it could well be that as a matter of empirical fact, individual
subjects do not exhibit consistent reaction times—they may well be
guicker at the end of the experiment than they are at the beginning. I
simply do not know.
What I am saying, however, is that without the novelty factor being
present, there would be no chance to infer anything whatsoever about the
automaticity of the image representation system. Suppose, that in the
case of the 'window assessment' experiment, we establish the consistency
of the individual subjects' reaction times over the entire experimental
seguence. This would entitle us to say absolutely nothing about the
automaticity issue. For it is, as I have already argued, entirely to
One could expect, I think, that if the subjects were having to
address the issue of strategy-^-decidingthat is, how to go about solv¬
ing the problem—that their reaction times at the outset of the experi¬
mental seguence relative to a given rotation disparity would be longer
than at a later time of the experiment simply because later they are
able to mechanically apply whatever strategy they have worked out.
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be expected that people would move without hesitation to the solution
of the problem—they have a strategy (good, bad, or indifferent from a
scientific or philosophical point of view) already worked out for this.
But when people do this in circumstances, such as in Shepard's experi¬
ments, where we know there is no way that such a strategy could have
been worked out in advance, then this is significant—and we begin to
have reason to make certain inferences—in particular the inference that
somehow it can be brought into operation, without the explicit cognition
of the subject, but automatically. (See Appendix C.)
There is one further aspect of Shepard's experimental design which
is worthy of note in connection with the demand characteristic problem.
Shepard's solicitation of the subjects' impressions of how they solved
the shape assessment problem is not, so far as the individual subjects
themselves can tell, strictly speaking part of the formal rotation
experiments. The subjects are simply required to answer the question—
"Are objects 'X' and 'Y' the same or different?—as quickly as they can.
And their overt responses are mechanical—they press a left or right-
hand lever indicating 'yes' or 'no' (these objects are/are not the same
shape). It is the timing of their responses which appears to be crucial
here. Introspective reports are solicited after all the experiments
have been completed and on a fairly casual basis. This casualness, of
course, is very desirable. For the subjects simply have no opportunity
to develop a clear sense that what they say counts for anything—that
it is the calculation strategy that is being tested as well as the cor¬
rectness and/or speed of their responses. Consequently, there ought to
be a strong presumption of sincerity on the part of these subjects in
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regard to their reports of image rotation.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that the image rotation phenomenon
is best conceived on the identity model—as an experienced brain pro¬
cess. In addition to this, I have attempted to work out, in schematic
terms, just what image rotation in the brain might amount to. In order
to accomplish this, I have made use of an analogy to computer operation.
I have also argued that certain important methodological consequences
follow from this view of image rotation—specifically, that cognitive
investigators ought to treat introspective reports of such phenomena as
genuinely observational. The process of image rotation is not just
theoretical—something postulated for the sake of getting the experimen¬
tal process started—but is a genuine problem solving strategy and
ought to be treated as such. Finally, I have argued that specific
aspects of Shepard's experimental design counter the possible incursion
of demand characteristics into the experimental process. Shepard's
subjects report image rotation during the spatial problem solving
sequences because this is how they experience the problem solving activ¬
ity of their brains.
CHAPTER 4
Spatial Problem Solving With Language: The Alternative Strategies
4.1 Introduction
Several psychologists and philosopher Daniel Dennett have sought to
discredit the theory of mental rotation by devising alternative problem
solving strategies which, they argue, Shepard's subjects could have used
in order to calculate the shape similarity of the test objects and
which would have produced the reguired reaction-time effect. Viewed
collectively, these alternative strategies are organized around the
belief that the basic unit of cognitive representation in the case of
spatial problem solving is linguistic rather than imagistic and that
instead of performing a mental rotation, the subjects are really just
describing the test objects to themselves.
Four different strategies of spatial problem solving by linguistic
means have emerged in the literature. I have provided names for each of
them. In order of their treatment in this chapter they are: the
wholistic description strategy, the feature-by-feature description
strategy, the rotation by propositional increments strategy, and the
tacit knowledge strategy.
In this chapter, each of these strategies for spatial problem solv¬
ing will be discussed in detail and each will be considered as a pos¬
sible rival to Roger Shepard's mental rotation strategy. In this
regard, I shall be concerned to look for two attributes: first of all
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and most basically, a rival strategy must provide an efficient means
of resolving the shape similarity/dissimilarity problem and, secondly,
it must do so in a way that is bound to produce the linear reaction-
time effect. For, clearly, a genuine rival must be seen to generate
the reaction times which people consistently exhibit when engaged in
Shepard-type problem solving.
4.2 The Wholistic Description Strategy
The wholistic description strategy has been proposed by psycholo¬
gist John R. Anderson. Anderson argues that the reaction-time pattern
exhibited by Shepard's subjects can be as well explained on the assump¬
tion of linguistic problem solving as on the assumption of mental
rotation. All that is required, says Anderson, is the production of
a description of each of the test objects with particular attention to
the orientation of each object in space. Anderson gives the bare bones
of his theory in the following passage:
One of the most influential phenomena uncovered in
recent research in cognitive psychology has been that
of mental rotation. The basic finding is that the
time to decide that one object is a rotation of another
object is a monotonic and often linear function of the
amount (degrees) of rotation. This is taken as evidence
that subjects mentally rotate an image of one object
of the pair into congruence with the other.... It is a
simple matter to propose a propositional model that
mimics this image model. The model would involve a
propositional description of an object and of its
orientation in space.^
John R. Anderson, "Arguments Concerning Representations for
Mental Imagery," Psychological Review, vol. 85, 1978, p. 200.
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Just what has Anderson in mind here? Presumably, Anderson intends
that each of the test objects in a given pair should be treated as a
separate unit and that detailed descriptions of each of these units
should be generated in turn. And, ultimately, these descriptions should
be compared for structural similarity. Ihis generation of descriptions
is easily accomplished, of course, if the objects are of very simple
construction, or, even better, if they are of some readily recognizable
shape (as in the hypothetical case discussed earlier where the objects
to be described were an A and A on its side - > - respectively) such
that the subjects already have a descriptive vocabulary ready to hand.
But now consider the specifics of generating descriptions for the
objects used in Shepard's experiments. The subjects taking part in these
experiments are presented with perspective drawings of unusual geometric
shapes. (See Figure 7.) The objects are of complicated design. They
are objects comprised of ten blocks. There are 'sections' or 'arms'
projecting in various directions from each of these objects, and these
arms have a right angle bend in them. As is the case with the arms them¬
selves, the bends appear to occur according to no particular pattern or
rule—their position along the respective arms appears, at first glance,
to be haphazard. Obviously, accuracy and detail count here. For a
candidate description must be specific enough to make possible an
informed comparison—one structural feature omitted or misdescribed
could negatively influence the outcome of the comparison.
Now it would seem that ordinary language is not a very effective
vehicle for the specification of these rather fine spatial relation¬
ships. In fact, a 'proper' descriptive account (i.e., one which is
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Figure 7
Reproduced from R. Shepard and L. Cooper, 1982, op. cit., p. 24.
sufficiently detailed) in this language of any one of Shepard's objects
would probably be exceedingly long. Presumably, at the least, the
'arms' would have to be given names of some sort (they could be called
'A', 'B' and 'C', for instance) and their respective locations on the
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'body' of the object and the particular directions in which they pro¬
ject, specified (say, arm 'A' is at the top right-hand side and is so
many degrees to the north-east of arm 'B' ) - Bends would reguire speci¬
fication and naming as well—specification, presumably, in terms of
where they occur on the arm and the number of blocks within the entire
structure would have to be specified.
Needless to say, this sort of descriptive process would be very
time-consuming—one serious mark against it as far as efficiency goes.
After all, the subject must make a series of on the spot decisions
about how to describe the object—names for arms on an object of a kind
never before encountered do not just come to mind as part of our ordi¬
nary language vocabulary. They must be devised and applied consistently.
(Obviously it would be a mistake to use letters to name arms in one
object and numbers to name arms on the other object.) Indeed, the whole
idea of a distinction between 'arm' and 'body' which is imported into
the description by the utilization of the concept 'arm' is ambiguous.
How do we decide what constitutes 'arm' and what constitutes 'body' in
these objects? On the other hand, do we have a more suitable ordinary
language descriptive terminology to substitute for arm? What about the
term I used earlier—'section'? Is this any less ambiguous than arm?
Is it really likely that someone upon hearing a description couched in
terms of sections would be able to develop a clear idea of the kind of
geometric structures with which Shepard is working?
And what about the storage capacity of the immediate memory? Would
it not be overtaxed to an incredible extent if we suppose this kind of
descriptive language? It seems hardly likely that the subjects would be
121
able to bear in mind and manipulate two such lengthy descriptions during
the final comparison process.
This is not to say that ordinary language does not have a distinct
spatial vocabulary. There is such a vocabulary (it contains concepts
such as below, above, to the right of, large, small, etcetera) and it
is perfectly adequate for the task of describing the world for ordinary
purposes, for in the ordinary course of things—when we are teaching
someone the rudiments of driving a car, or when cautioning a companion
to take care when descending a staircase—all we need to do is judge and
describe distance and objects more or less. It is speed and simplicity
which count here and too much detail just gets in the way. We may note
to the student driver, for instance, that the car must be steered 'a
little more to the left' (in Canada) if it is to avoid hitting the
parked car 'along the side', or we note to our companion on descending
a staircase that the last step is 'lower than the rest' so that he
might adjust his stride appropriately. The rough-and-ready quality of
this vocabulary is all well and good in the context of our day-to-day
dealings with the world but it is inadequate if we need to describe
certain unusual objects in space in any detail.
Of course, the inadequacies of our ordinary language spatial voca¬
bulary could be compensated for on the supposition that people utilize
a technical language of spatial description in their problem solving.
We know, for instance, that all geometrical spaces can be precisely
represented in the language of analytic geometry. For example, in this
language, the equation X = Y designates a straight line which
bisects the X and Y axes in Cartesian coordinate space.
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Owen Flanagan"'" has postulated this as the "possibility proof", as he
calls it, that people could conceivably function by analyzing the
Shepard figures and representing their spatial properties in the lan¬
guage of analytic geometry. He argues that people could then "compute
congruence ... by manipulating sentences."
But, I must ask, is this a plausible supposition? Certainly it is
true that Shepard's unusual objects could be represented precisely and
adequately in the language of analytic geometry. But how many people
is it reasonable to suppose are actually able to do this? The subjects
who have participated in Shepard's rotation experiments are a random
sample of university students, selected, for the most part, out of
courses in introductory and advanced psychology. Can we suppose that
all of these students or, indeed, that any of them, are sufficiently
conversant with the niceties of analytic geometry such that they might
undertake the descriptive exercise Flanagan has envisioned? And if
this is what the subjects do, then it is surely very odd that not one
of them has reported that this is how they undertake to solve the test
problems. On the contrary, the fact of the matter is that the subjects
consistently report the mental rotation strategy of problem solving.
And are we to infer that individuals (like myself for instance)
who have nothing more than the most rudimentary knowledge of formal
geometry are, by necessity, excluded from the possibility of solving
the spatial problem. If we adopt Flanagan's supposition of problem
solving by way of the language of analytic geometry, then surely we must
"^Owen J. Flanagan, Jr., 1984, op. cit., p. 191.
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infer something of this nature. This will be a surprise to many people
- myself included - who have no difficulty solving the problems but who
know next to nothing about describing objects in the language of analy¬
tic geometry.
Flanagan's supposition fails, then, because it presupposes a know¬
ledge and skill which in point of fact very few of us have. It is one
thing to say that in principle people could utilize a given language in
order to solve their spatial problems, but quite another to provide a
plausible argument demonstrating that this is in fact what they do. In
this connection, it is interesting to note that within the fields of
mechanical and civil engineering, the chosen medium for conveying
spatial information about unusual shapes (such as machine parts) is the
diagram. This is a striking practical endorsement of the efficiency of
analogue - as compared to - linguistic representations of spatial infor¬
mation.
To take a specific instance of this, in mining operations, it is
sometimes necessary to join two tunnels. Obviously, in physical terms,
this will be achieved in either one of two ways: by constructing a
third 'connecting' tunnel between the original two or by extending one
or both of the original tunnels in an appropriate direction at an appro¬
priate angle so as to bring the tunnels to a point of intersection. The
engineer's problem is to calculate the absolute position of the tunnels
relative to one another and this requires that he generate representa¬
tions of each of the tunnels in three dimensions. The engineer solves
this problem by drawing sketches of each tunnel from the perspective of
three views—specifically—the 'top', 'front' and 'side' views.
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This is essentially an imagistic process for the engineer. For
example, in order to draw the front view of a tunnel, the engineer
visualizes the tunnel as if it were not surrounded by earth, but free-
floating, so to speak, and visualizes himself directly in front of the
tunnel so that he can look 'squarely' at it—his line of vision being
at right angle to the tunnel structure. Likewise, the engineer draws
the top view by visualizing himself standing directly over the tunnel
at right angle to the earth surface looking down at it. And he draws
the side view by visualizing himself standing to the right or left of
the tunnel. Obviously, once the relative three-dimensional positions
of the tunnels is established, the determination of how best to achieve
the joining is quite straightforward—indeed, it is as if the tunnels
were no longer out of sight beneath ground, but structures physically
present to the engineer.
Apparently, a trained engineer can generate this kind of three-
dimensional representation with a fair degree of speed and with a
minimum of effort. By contrast, a 'descriptive' solution to this prob¬
lem of specifying the relative locations of the tunnels would be
unbelievably complicated and quite possibly unachievable."'" And in any
case, engineering graphics is the chosen method of dealing with these
kinds of design problems and, routinely, aspiring engineers receive a
minimum of a full term's training in this. A standard text in the sub¬
ject, describes the nature of this training in these terms:
This has been argued by J.H. Earle in the introduction to the
textbook, Engineering Design Graphics (Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley
Publishing Company, 1983).
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The student of engineering requires training both in
visualizing the appearance of structures and in repre¬
senting the exact shape of structures by means of
drawings. Such training may be acquired by studying
the geometry of engineering drawing, and by solving
problems. The student of this subject obtains very
valuable training in thinking in terms of three-
dimensions . 1
There is one further point that I want to make about the wholistic
description strategy. As I have indicated earlier, a strategy which is
a genuine rival to mental rotation must be able to produce the linear
reaction-time effect as well as provide a means of solving the problem
at hand. Obviously, Anderson and Flanagan believe that the strategies
they have proposed can accomplish this former task (otherwise there
would be no point in their proposing these strategies in the first
place). However, of the two, Flanagan alone makes an attempt to explain
how the linear reaction-time pattern might come about. In a footnote
to his discussion of problem solving in the language of analytic
geometry, Flanagan suggests that it may be the case that the number
of propositions required to describe each of the objects in a given
test pair will increase linearly with the degree of orientation dis¬
parity of the objects and that, consistently with this, computation time
2
over them will increase linearly as well.
George J. Hood, Geometry of Engineering Drawing (York, P.A.:
The Maple Leaf Press Company, 1926), p. 2.
2
Owen Flanagan, 1984, op. cit., p. 310.
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Frankly, I do not follow Flanagan's reasoning here. On the sup¬
position that people are generating linguistic descriptions of the test
objects in turn and then comparing these descriptions, reaction times
should be a function of the complexity of the objects being described
and nothing more. Simply put, the time taken to calculate the shape
similarity of an object pair involving objects with many component
parts should be greater than the time taken to perform the same calcu¬
lation in respect of an object pair involving objects with few com¬
ponent parts.
Consider a particular case. Suppose that Shepard's subjects'
calculations are going forward on the basis of a system of linguistic
representation (either ordinary language linguistic representations or
the linguistic representations of analytic geometry). And suppose that
the test pair in a given case is structurally complex, but exhibits an
orientation disparity of a mere 20°. If linguistic representations are
being used, and all of the component parts of the objects are being
described, then it should take the subjects longer to complete the
object descriptions (and, hence, longer to complete the overall simi¬
larity calculation) in this case than it would in a second case in which
the subjects are presented with a pair of structurally simple objects
exhibiting an orientation disparity of, say, a full 180°. In the latter
case, the descriptions of the objects will be short and uncomplicated
and therefore, will take less time to generate.
It will be noted that, on the wholistic description strategy, a
fluctuation and variation in the subjects' reaction times can occur and
that, over the course of a number of trials, this fluctuation can even
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give the appearance of conforming to a linear pattern. But the pattern
in guestion will be tied to the object complexity factor rather than
to the orientation disparity factor. And thus it does not produce the
genuine Shepard reaction-time effect which is reguired if the wholistic
description strategy is to rival the mental rotation strategy.
4.2 The Feature-by-Feature Description Strategy
Anderson and Flanagan have argued that the subjects participating
in Shepard's experiments represent the test objects to themselves separ¬
ately and wholistically - which is to say that they generate a descrip¬
tion of each object in a given pair in its entirety and in sequence.
But there is, of course, no reason to suppose that the linguistic
descriptions must be of wholistic construction. On the contrary, it is
perfectly conceivable and, in fact, it has been argued by psychologists
Marcel Just and Patricia Carpenter,"'" that the subjects describe the
test objects to themselves on a 'feature-by-feature' basis, such that a
single linguistic representation is simultaneously generated for both
objects.
According to Just and Carpenter, the feature-by-feature description
process occurs in the following manner: One object in the pair, (X),
is scanned by the individual subjects and a significant component part
of X is identified and described. The second object (Y) is scanned
for the purpose of locating the corresponding part to that described
"'"Marcel Just and Patricia Carpenter, "Eye Fixations and Cognitive
Processes," Cognitive Psychology, vol. 8, 1976, pp. 441-480.
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in X and, if found, is described. This process of feature identifica¬
tion and description in X and Y is continued until all the significant
features have been accounted for, in which case, the objects are found
to be of similar three-dimensional shape. Supposedly, it is the degree
of orientation disparity between X and Y which complicates this pro¬
cess. The greater the disparity, the more difficult and hence more
protracted will be the task of identifying the corresponding features
in Y. Thus, on this particular strategy for problem solving there
should be some kind of correlation between the reaction times exhibited
by the subjects and the degree of orientation disparity of the test
objects.
Now it is interesting to note that our practical experience in
regard to matters of spatial decision-making would seem to attest to the
validity of the reasoning behind the feature-by-feature strategy. It
does seem, that is to say, that whenever we are attempting to locate
some specific feature on a 'second object' involved in a comparison,
it is of substantial assistance if that object is in strict spatial
alignment with the first object. Indeed, anyone who has worked on a
jigsaw puzzle will appreciate how much more quickly the piece with the
odd-shaped bump on it which fits into the space in the puzzle with the
odd shaped bump is recognized if that piece just happened to have fallen
beside the space in question and is arranged such that the respective
bumps are in spatial alignment.
Suppose, to take a particular case, that we are looking at two
keys—one which we know to be our front-door key and the other which we
think or suspect is the spare front-door key. In the absence of the
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appropriate empirical test (by actually trying the supposed spare in the
front-door), we might"'" decide the issue by undertaking a feature-by-
feature comparison of the two keys. Now if the keys are in strict
spatial alignment—if the 'top' of each key (which is to say, the part
that is or can be attached to a key ring) is facing the same direction,
then the task of comparison will be relatively straightforward. All we
have to do is identify some structural feature (presumably a bump or a
groove) on the model key and then scan across in a straight line to
locate the corresponding area on the second key. If when we do this we
do not find the same bump or groove then we know that the so-called
second key is not a spare. If we do find the appropriate structure then
we continue our feature-by-feature comparison.
On the other hand, if the keys are not in strict spatial alignment
and if for some reason we are not able to move them into the desired
arrangement, then the process of comparison becomes somewhat more
involved. We cannot just move directly to the corresponding area on the
second key, but must reconceive the situation, reasoning that since the
keys are reversed or since the second key has been rotated so many
degrees out of congruence with the model, the structural feature in
guestion, should, if present, be somewhere on the left-hand (as opposed
to the right-hand) side or is to be found off to the left slightly,
"'"I say we might decide in this way for the sake of argument and
for purposes of providing a practical illustration of the manner in
which feature-by-feature description might go forward. Obviously the
preferred means of resolving this problem (in the absence of the possi¬
bility of trying the key in the door) would be analogue - by physically
placing the keys one over the other so as to determine the congruence
of their respective bumps and grooves.
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etcetera. Or, in the absence of any clear geometric sense as to where
the particular bump and/or groove might be located on the second key
we must resort to simply visually scanning the key to see if we can
find it. There is, in other words, at least one additional step
involved here--we must reconceive the corresponding areas under the
guidance of some sense of where these areas ought to be, or failing
that, attempt to find the feature by a process of scanning which, if we
are not lucky enough to come upon the feature right away can be labour-
ious and even require repetition. In either case, there is necessarily
an increase in the time it takes for the spatial calculation to go
forward.
figure 8
Clearly, these keys are not identical and this is more obvious in
Frame //2 than in Frame ill. Spatial alignment in feature-by-feature
comparison counts.
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Now clearly, this second strategy for spatial assessment by lin¬
guistic means has a considerable advantage over the original Anderson
and Flanagan strategy. It will be recalled that in the case of the
latter, the orientation factor has no causal influence on the course
and outcome of the descriptive-comparative process. Descriptive rep¬
resentations of each object are generated separately and wholistically
and it is the inherent structural complexity of the objects which pro¬
duces the fluctuation (if any) in the subjects' reaction times. But
if we assume that descriptions of the objects are constructed on a
feature-by-feature basis, the orientation factor then becomes causally
significant. For integral to the feature-by-feature strategy is what
might be described as a 'search component'. Features must be located
on the second object involved in the comparison and this process is
made more difficult (and hence more protracted), if the objects are
out of congruence with one another.
Thus it would appear that we have in the feature-by-feature
strategy some competition for Shepard's image rotation strategy. There
is, that is to say, reason on the new strategy to assume that there
will be some kind of correlation between reaction time and the orienta¬
tion factor. But, the question is, what kind of correlation will this
be? It will be remembered that Shepard's experiments indicate a corre¬
lation of a very specific kind; the reaction times of the subjects
increase gradually and uniformly with the degree of orientation dis¬
parity of the test stimuli. For every degree of increase in orientation
disparity there is a proportionate increase in reaction time. Will
this be the case if we suppose the feature-by-feature strategy? In
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particular, does the degree of difficulty in recognizing and locating
specific features on the second object necessarily increase in propor¬
tion to the degree of orientation disparity?
This, it seems to me, is the real test of this strategy. If there
is not, or not always, an increase in the difficulty of the 'recognizing
and locating' task, then there is no reason to suppose that the reaction-
time effect demonstrated by Shepard in his experiments can be replicated
on the supposition of feature-by-feature problem solving. And if this
is so, then we must conclude that such a strategy for problem solving
does not constitute a convincing alternative to the image rotation
strategy. After all, as I have argued above, the logic of operation of
mental rotation dictates the kind of reaction-time behaviour that is in
question here. An 'alternative' strategy must do the same.
Let us suppose, then, that the orientation disparity of two
objects (X and Y) is a full 180°, such that each object is 'on its side'
relative to the other. Is it not conceivable that in this circumstance
(in respect of some object pairs at least) it would be as easy, or even
easier to recognize corresponding features in X and Y than it would be
to recognize the same features if the disparity between X and Y was a
mere 20° or 8D°? In such a case, the absolute side-by-side presentation
of the objects might well accentuate, relatively speaking, the features
of the objects and so facilitate rather than hinder their comparison.
In fact, if X and Y are the same shape—all the parts and relations are
simply reversed (which is to say that right becomes left in one object
while left becomes right in the other and top becomes bottom in one
object, while bottom becomes top in the other) and we simply have to
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mechanically carry-out the implications of this right-left/top-bottom
reversal in order to identify the location of the features found first
on X, on Y.
What I am suggesting, then, is that in the 180° disparity situa¬
tion, there is less chance that the subject will be forced to undertake
a 'hit and miss' calculation procedure. Provided that the subject in
guestion recognizes that Y has been rotated 180° about the picture-plane
axis away from X, he can proceed more or less systematically to calcu¬
late the location of X's features on Y. He should expect, for instance,
that a given feature on the right hand side of X is to be found on the
left hand side of Y and so go directly there. On the other hand, in the
case of a less extensive orientation disparity—say a disparity of 80°,
Y is much less dramatically placed relative to X and the subject is
highly unlikely to have any clear geometric sense of where the features
found on X are likely to be on Y. It will not be the case that the fea¬
tures on Y will simply and uniformly be in a position of reversal rela¬
tive to those on X. And the subject is more or less obliged, in this
circumstance, to undertake a wholesale scanning procedure, the effi¬
ciency of which (as I have noted above) is very much a function of luck.
I would argue, therefore, that in this circumstance the Shepard reaction-
time effect would not obtain. The subjects' feature-by-feature analysis
of the 180° disparity pair will be more efficient and, therefore,
reguire less time or, possibly, roughly the same amount of time that
will be required to make the similar calculation in respect of the 80°
disparity pair. This circumstance serves, in short, to falsify the
prediction of Just and Carpenter that the feature-by-feature strategy
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could produce the reaction-time behaviour described by Shepard.
There is another empirical circumstance which, it seems to me,
would negate the ability of the feature-by-feature strategy to produce
the Shepard reaction-time effect. What if the first component part the
subject identified in object X is simply not to be found in object Y?
Then, clearly, on the feature-by-feature strategy, the subject would
conclude that X and Y are not the same virtually instantaneously—
without any further investigation. And the subject's reaction time will
be correspondingly instantaneous. This could well happen in a case
where the orientation disparity between X and Y is considerable—say
130°. On the other hand, it could happen in a second case, that it is
the fourth feature compared which is found to be missing in Y, but the
orientation disparity between this X and Y pair is a mere 20°. Once
again the subject would respond negatively to the test pair—but this
time not instantaneously. For on the feature-by-feature analysis, the
reaction time of the subject reflects the number of features compared.
Clearly, in respect of these two cases there cannot be a gradual and
uniform increase in reaction time in accordance with orientation dis¬
parity. On the contrary, the reaction time for the 130° disparity pair
would be shorter relative to the reaction time for the 20° disparity
pair. And once again, I conclude, the Shepard effect is not achieved
by the alternative, feature-by-feature strategy.
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4.4 The Rotation By Propositional Increments Strategy
Daniel Dennett has elaborated a third strategy for spatial problem
solving in a linguistic medium. According to Dennett, during a Shepard-
type problem solving sequence, there occurs a kind of private dialectic
in which the subject engages with himself. The subject asks himself,
for example, "What would one object 'look like' relative to its counter¬
part if it were turned just this much?" and then he proceeds to describe
the indicated transformation. This process continues through a gradu¬
ated series of questions and answers until it becomes clear to the
subject whether or not there is an equivalence of shape between the
pictured objects. Presumably, it is Dennett's calculation here that
the more extensive the orientation disparity exhibited by the test
objects, the greater the number of increments there must be in the
subject's problem solving strategy. In particular, the subject must
ask himself more questions in order to decide whether or not the two
objects are the same shape and so must take longer to arrive at his
ultimate solution. Dennett describes the process which, he argues,
takes place during the problem solving sequence:
Isn't it really just that these discrete steps are
discrete propositional epidoses? Now it looks like
this, but if I imagine it turned that much, it would
look like that ... ah yes, it would eventually look
just like the other one. But the flicking, you may
insist, is clearly part of a motion observed—the
axis of rotation is, perhaps, vertical, not horizontal.
But your reason for saying this is just that your
intermediate judgments define the rotation. They are
judgments that fall in an order that would be the
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proper order of perceptual judgments in the case
of watching a real image rotate around a vertical
axis.1
It seems to me that Dennett's proposal is problematic in several
respects. First of all, and perhaps most crucially, it presents a
problem of interpretation. Presumably, Dennett's primary intention
here has been to deny that there is or could be any such thing as a
rotation going on and that there are no images in the mind or in the
brain. (There is just a series of linguistic, or as Dennett describes
them, 'propositional' , episodes which, because they occur in an ordered
sequence—a sequence which apparently follows that appropriate to an
actual rotation—create the illusion of continuity.) But if this is so,
then I am at a loss to know what to make of certain of his remarks in
the passage cited above. Surely he has imported images and the process
of rotation, for that matter, in the backdoor of this account.
In particular, I am concerned about Dennett's caricature of the
calculation process which is contained in the statement: "Now it looks
like this, but if I imagine it turned just that much, it would look
like that ...." My question is this: What can this and that possibly
refer to but distinct stages of the image rotation process? Indeed,
what Dennett seems to be describing here is not a rival to the image
hypothesis, but the image hypothesis, complicated a bit by the sugges¬
tion that we 'eavesdrop' on our brain processes, registering certain
stages of these processes propositionally. We note that one object
"^Daniel Dennett, Brainstorms (Massachusetts: The MIT Press,
1981), p. 168.
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looks more like the other now (that it has been rotated a few degrees)
than it did before, and we continue to make such rotations until it
becomes clear to us that the objects are the same shape or that they
are not. But the essential process here, I take it, the process which
bears the burden of the actual cognition, is still image rotation.
The propositional episodes are simply accompaniments of this process.
The situation which Dennett appears to be describing, is not
unlike that of a child using building blocks to construct a model air¬
port, commenting (in this case, out loud) on the various stages of the
construction. ("Now I put this red block on the green one, and it
looks like a tower....") The commentary is a verbal reaction to the
airport making, it is in no sense an alternative construction process,
or even a constituent process. It may be useful in that it could serve
to help the child focus his attention on his work or it may simply
function so as to register the child's pleasure at the completion of
each stage of the task; but it is clearly unnecessary. The child need
not engage in the commentary in order to perform the construction, and
in fact, as an adult, will almost certainly not do so.
So if this is what Dennett has in mind, then I see no difficulty
for the image rotation strategy for problem solving postulated by Roger
Shepard. It is not in any sense essential to this strategy that there
be no propositional accompaniment or reaction to it. Shepard simply
argues that problem solving of the type undertaken by his subjects
could not go forward and achieve the behavioural results that it does
except through the operation of a process of image rotation. If
Dennett wants to argue that there is a kind of propositional monitoring
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of this process going on—that we 'focus in' on certain stages of the
image rotation (presumably those defined by the questions the subject
puts to himself) rather than just taking note of the completed rotation,
then I think Shepard would have no objection. There is still a rotation
for all intents and purposes.
Now Dennett, I have no doubt, would be quite unwilling to accept
this interpretation of his position. In fact he would probably want to
insist that it has been his intention all along to argue the more
stringent thesis—specifically, that there is no image rotation, there
is instead, a series of discrete propositional episodes which somehow
'name' or describe stages of a rotation (either of images or of the
actual objects) if it were to take place. But if this is what Dennett
has in mind, then I think that he is espousing a highly dubious empiri¬
cal thesis. It would be difficult and, I expect, virtually impossible
for anyone to carry out a spatial calculation of the required type
exclusively within the confines of a propositional format.
Consider the mechanics of such a calculation. According to
Dennett, the subject proceeds by asking himself questions about the
object pair—questions having to do with how the objects 'would look'
relative to one another if one object in the pair were tilted just a
few degrees toward the other. In the absence of any kind of imagistic
guide, the subject must answer this question in the abstract, by making
certain inferences. But what are these inferences? Dennett is not
explicit on this point. Presumably they would have a form something
like this: If object Y is rotated a few degrees (say 10°) in a clock¬
wise direction, all the parts of Y will be positioned (say) 1/8" further
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to the south-east of their present position, and this means that Y will
look more like X in this new orientation than it did before. The sub¬
ject then proceeds to consider a second increment of orientation for Y
and if there is reason to infer that the objects (X and Y) will look
even more alike than they did in the original increment, the subject
continues to consider a further increment, and so on until he is con¬
vinced that X and Y could be rotated into a position of congruence or
superimposition.
It will be noted that never once during this entire process does
the subject, according to Dennett, have access to a model or represen¬
tation of Y in any of its new orientations. The basis of the subject's
'inference to similarity' for each of the increments of Y, is the
proposition that Y is 1/8", or 1/4", or 3/8" (and so on as the case may
be) south-east of its original position. Now my question is this: Does
this propositional description give the subject the kind of information
which would enable him to infer a specific fact about the visual
appearance of Y—that it 'looks' (to use Dennett's own words)—more
like X than it did before? I hardly think so. For how can the subject
know what Y is going to 'look like' relative to X, if he does not know
what Y 'looks like' in itself (i.e., in its new orientation)? After
all, the subject has never seen Y in this orientation and he is barred
from doing anything about this by Dennett's abolition of imagery from
his representational repertoire. The point is that the propositional
description of Y in each of its new orientations is only useful to the
subject in his calculations of visual appearance to the extent that the
subject is able to generate some kind of visual impression of Y under
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the guidance of this description. The simple stipulation that Y is in
such-and-such a position does not give any clear indication of its
visual appearance, let alone of its visual appearance relative to a
second object.
Furthermore, Dennett's account presupposes that there will be a
consistent increase in the appearance of similarity between X and Y at
each stage in the rotation of Y. But this, surely, is an unwarranted
assumption. Is it not likely that the situation in respect of some
object pairs at least will be guite different from this—that it will
take a whole succession of stages in the rotation of Y before there is
even the slightest appearance of similarity? Or perhaps even more
dramatically, might it not be the case that for the first few incre¬
ments in the rotation of Y, Y will appear to be even less and less
like X than it did in its original orientation, and it only begins to
appear similar to X at a much later stage of the rotation process, say,
past the 60° mark? Surely, from a strictly logical point of view there
is no reason to assume that just because one thing is becoming more
like something else, it must give the appearance of doing so at every
stage along the way.
Consider a particular case of objects in rotation. The objects
which follow (call them 'X' and *Y'), are the same three-dimensional
shape. Taking X as our standard or model, in the first frame Y is
220° out of congruence with X. Suppose that Y is rotated 10° in a
counter-clockwise direction toward X. Does it look any more like X
than it did in its original orientation? No. Suppose Y is rotated a
further 20°. (This presumably would be stage two of the rotation
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according to Dennett's account.) Does Y look any more like X? Once
again, I think not. In fact, it is not until Y has been rotated a full
170° from its original position so that it is only 50° out of congru¬
ence with X that it begins to look like X.
Figure 9
Y is 220° out of congruence
with X
Y is rotated 10° in a
counter-clockwise direction
Y is rotated a further 20°
Y is 50° out of congruence
with X
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In itself this fact about the degree of similarity displayed by
object pairs undergoing a series of rotations is neither surprising nor
particularly significant. But against Dennett's overall strategy for
problem solving, it is decisive. For according to this strategy, the
subject is justified in proceeding to a consideration of a further stage
in the rotation of Y only if there has been an increase in the appear¬
ance of similarity of Y relative to X. But, as I have argued above, in
the case of some object pairs, the increase does not occur systemati¬
cally— for the first few increments in the rotation of Y, there is no
appreciable increase in the degree of shape similarity displayed by the
objects. This being so, the subject, following Dennett's strategy,
would be compelled to conclude prematurely that X and Y are not the
same shape. In other words, Dennett's strategy of calculation by
'propositional rotation' would, in this circumstance, systematically
militate against the achievement of the solution of the problem.
I have argued that there are two possible interpretations of
Dennett's account of the spatial calculation involved in Shepard's
experiments. On each of these interpretations, that account is found
to be unsatisfactory. The account presented in the first interpreta¬
tion does not present a genuine alternative to the image hypothesis.
There is no denial of the operation of image phenomena—there is simply
the suggestion that there might be some mental-propositional accompani¬
ment to the rotation process occurring in the brain. We talk to our¬
selves or make inquiries about certain stages of that process. The
account presented in the second interpretation is a genuine alternative
in that propositional episodes supposedly bear the weight of the
143
cognition. I argue, however, that this account has practical liabili¬
ties. The subject could not even solve the Shepard-type problems, let
alone exhibit the appropriate reaction-time effect, if he is con¬
strained to carry out the calculation in accordance with Dennett's
strategy of rotation by propositional increments.
4.3 The Tacit Knowledge Strategy
The fourth and final strategy for spatial problem solving in a
linguistic medium to be found in the literature has been espoused by
psychologist Zenon Pylyshyn."'' Pylyshyn argues that spatial cognition
is 'cognitively penetrable'—that is, the knowledge, beliefs, and goals
of the subject or subjects involved in the problem solving exercise
weigh significantly in the course and outcome of the overall processing.
Pylyshyn's is by far the most extensive treatment and critique
of the image hypothesis in the literature. In addition to the work
which he has published denouncing the hypothesis in general, three
of Pylyshyn's articles give special treatment to Shepard's experiments.
("What the Mind's Eye Tells the Mind's Brain: A Critique of Mental
Imagery," Psychological Bulletin, vol. 80, pp. 1-24; "The Imagery
Debate: Analog Media versus Tacit Knowledge," Imagery, Ned Block, ed.,
1981, op. cit., and "The Rate of Mental Rotation of Images: A Test
of a Holistic Analog Hypothesis," Memory and Cognition, vol. 7, 1979,
pp. 19-28). Pylyshyn's ideas have been discussed in some detail by
Kosslyn and Pomerantz ("Imagery, Propositions and the Form of Internal
Representations," Cognitive Psychology, vol. 9, pp. 52-76) by Kosslyn,
Pinker, Smith and Shwartz ("On the Demystification of Mental Imagery,"
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 2, 1979, pp. 535-581); by
John R. Anderson ("Arguments Concerning Representations for Mental
Imagery," Psychological Review, vol. 85, pp. 247-277); and by John
T.E. Richardson (Mental Imagery and Human Memory, New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1980). Roger Shepard, however has not undertaken a
defense of his position relative to the arguments articulated by
Pylyshyn. Shepard appears to be more concerned with conducting his
experiments and discussing the results than with a systematic defense
of his overall position relative to particular critics.
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For this reason, says Pylyshyn, it cannot be the case that spatial prob¬
lem solving of the type that Shepard investigates, goes forward on a
non-linguistic basis, in a non-linguistic medium or format. In order to
substantiate this claim about cognitive penetrability. Pylyshyn asks
us to undertake the following mental exercise: Imagine holding in your
two hands and then simultaneously dropping two objects—a rock, say,
and a maple leaf. "Which object," Pylyshyn asks us to consider, "in
your image hits the ground first?""'" Imagine, then, turning a large
heavy flywheel by hand. Now imagine applying the same torque to a
small aluminum pulley. Again he asks, "Which one completes one revolu¬
tion in your image first?" For most people, these imaginings unfold
naturally and effortlessly, without any apparent need to reason through
what would happen. In their respective imaginings, the rock hits the
ground before the leaf and the pulley completes one revolution first.
But, Pylyshyn would insist, it is a mistake to assume from the
automatic way in which the imagery unfolds and from the regularity of
the content of that imagery (across subjects) that the underlying cog¬
nitive process is somehow an autonomous biological process which oper¬
ates exclusively under the constraints of the neural tissue in which it
is instantiated. On the contrary, such results could and ought (in
Pylyshyn's opinion) to be explained on other grounds. People have the
imagery experiences they do because of the nature of their experience
of the world. Fleavy objects like rocks have been observed to fall more
"'"Zenon Pylyshyn, "The Imagery Debate," in Imagery, N. Block,
(Ed.), op. cit., p. 168.
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quickly than light objects like leaves or feathers. Pylyshyn writes:
Whatever happens as the sequence unfolds under one's
mind's eye is a function of what principles one
believes govern the events in question. Clearly, the
laws of dynamics or optics and the principles of
geometry that determine the relation, say, between
the perimeter and the area of a figure are not intrin¬
sic (built in) to the representational media or to
the functional mechanisms of the mind. Not only must
one have tacit knowledge of them, but the way in
which imaginal events unfold naturally can usually be
influenced with considerable freedom simply by inform¬
ing the subject of the appropriate principle. Thus
what seems to be a natural and automatic unfolding
process is cognitively penetrable—that is, it is
under the control of an intellectual process with all
that this implies concerning the intervention of
inferences and reasoning through.2
In truth, of course, it is not the greater weight of the rock
which accounts for its speedy descent to the ground—it is its size and
shape. Conversely, it is the particular size and shape of the leaf
which accounts for its relatively slow descent. The rate of accelera¬
tion of bodies falling in space is, strictly speaking, a function of
the force of gravity. What affects this rate are factors such as size,
shape, and wind velocity. Two identically-shaped objects—say two
cannon balls—a conventional cannon ball and a hollow one would,
theoretically, reach the ground at the same time. But these facts of
physics aside, the point which, I take it, Pylyshyn is concerned to
make here is that people develop their expectations about the behaviour
of physical objects on the basis of their observations. And, in the
ordinary course of things, we do not have the opportunity to observe
object pairs such as hollow cannon balls and conventional ones falling
simultaneously. (And even if we did, we would probably have to have
the principle of physics represented by such a pair pointed out to us.)
We see, rather, rocks falling and leaves falling (separately) and are
struck by the gentle drifting of the leaf by comparison to the direct
descent of the rock. And so we come to infer (incorrectly, as it hap¬
pens in this case), the principle that rate of acceleration of falling
bodies increases with weight. Pylyshyn is suggesting here that these
inductively induced expectations govern the imagery that we have so
much so that if we were asked to imagine the two cannon balls falling
we would probably 'see' the heavy one reach the ground first.
2Ibid., p. 169.
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Thus for Pylyshyn, if people's experience and understanding of the
physical world were substantially different, if for instance in the
case described above, it did not seem to them that the rate of acceler¬
ation of bodies falling in space increases in proportion to weight,
their imaginings relative to such circumstances would be appropriately
altered. (They might, that is, imagine the cannonballs hitting the
ground simultaneously.) Accordingly, Pylyshyn proposes a simple
behavioural test which can be used to detect the presence of the condi¬
tion of cognitive penetrability. If a certain behaviour pattern can
be shown to be systematically connected to certain beliefs which
people (for good or bad) are known to hold then, says Pylyshyn, we must
conclude that the explanation of that behavioural pattern must appeal
to operations upon symbolic representations such as beliefs and goals—
the explanation must, in other words, contain rule-governed cognitive
or computational processes.
Suppose, says Pylyshyn, that a group of Shepard's subjects are
presented with geometrical figures which have the appearance of being
unusually heavy. And suppose that it is their belief that all things
being egual, heavy objects take longer to rotate about an axis than
light ones. On the tacit knowledge account, we might well expect that
this belief would be reflected in the subjects' reaction-time
behaviour—that it would take the subjects longer to solve a problem
involving objects at a 60° orientation disparity in a case where the
objects in guestion are (believed to be) heavy than in a case where
the objects in guestion are (believed to be) light. And what if in
fact this expectation is borne out experimentally? How do we explain
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this apparent correlation between the pattern of the subjects' behaviour
and their beliefs? Do we say that the correlation is not explicable in
logical terms and that the real explanation has to do with the nature
and operation of analogue mechanisms in the brain? Or do we attempt to
find an alternative 'inferential' explanation—one which makes explicit
reference to the underlying physical beliefs of the subjects? Pylyshyn
argues that it is the latter explanation which is required here. He
writes:
... it is clear that in this case the explanation must
appeal to the subjects' knowledge of the behaviour of
heavier objects rather than to any intrinsic property
of images. It is our contention that such an appeal
to tacit knowledge will be required ... this is the
primary reason for preferring a propositional to an
analogue account of mental processes.1
Now in point of fact, Pylyshyn does not actually test for the
reaction time/weight correlation postulated above. He appears to offer
this rather, in an effort to concretize for us the general character of
the behavioural test which might be applied in order to detect cogni¬
tive penetrability. What he does is make a more general claim. This
is the claim that 'tacit knowledge' can explain (and by implication is
causally responsible for) the so-called mental rotation phenomenon.
But what kind of 'tacit knowledge' does Pylyshyn have in mind here?
Minimally, I take it, it must fulfill the following requirement: it
must be knowledge the having of which will cause the subjects to behave
^"Z. Pylyshyn, 1979, op. cit., p. 20.
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in accordance with the reaction-time pattern described by Shepard.
It must be conceded that Pylyshyn's idea that people in general
have developed a kind of rough-and-ready physics based on their obser¬
vation of the physical world has some merit. Our experience of the
physical world and of the dynamics of its operation is pervasive—we
observe spatial problems being worked out in physical terms all the time.
It would not be unreasonable, then, to suppose that, with repetition,
these observations could assume for us the status of physical laws and
that these so-called laws could infect our thinking in subtle yet fun¬
damental ways. Ihey might, in effect, constitute a kind of informal
information base for our inferences about objects and their interaction.
And it could well be that such information is only available to us at an
intuitive or unconscious level. We have access to this body of informa¬
tion, that is to say, only when we are acting upon the world (eg.
playing baseball) or perhaps when we are engaged in what we call
visualizing some physical process, but not when we have to reason
verbally or to answer certain kinds of guestions in the abstract.
It must also be conceded in Pylyshyn's favour, that people in
general have inferred certain rather general principles about the dyna¬
mics of objects in rotation. In particular, they can be expected to
have inferred that there is a correlation between 'rotation time' and
'distance of rotation'—that all things being egual, it takes longer to
complete a considerable rotation than a minimal one. No doubt, the
observations relevant to such an inference would have been made at a
very early age under relatively mundane circumstances. Children playing
with construction blocks, working a jigsaw puzzle, or learning for the
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first time to fit a key in the front door of their houses will have had
to perform rotation-like manipulations and will have noticed that in
some situations—when, for instance, the puzzle piece has to be turned
all the way around—that it takes longer to complete the immediate task
of filling in the space in the puzzle than in other circumstances—when
the puzzle piece has to be twisted just a small degree.
So let us suppose, with Pylyshyn, that people in general and
Shepard's subjects in particular, do indeed have some such tacit know¬
ledge available to them. They harbour, that is to say, a strong
(though inarticulate) conviction about the length of time a given rota¬
tion ought to take—specifically that a rotation over many degrees will
take longer than a rotation over few degrees. Let us suppose as well,
(and this time strictly for the sake of argument) that such a conviction
or belief could, at an unconscious level, influence the course and out¬
come of the ultimate problem solving activity in the sense that it
provides a sort of background assumption (possibly among others) for the
subjects' reasoning. Can we, on this basis, go the further step and say
that having this belief the subjects are bound to (or even likely to)
exhibit the reaction-time pattern described by Shepard?
I do not think so. First of all, the reaction-time pattern in
guestion is very precise. Shepard's subjects exhibit reaction times
which are linearly related to the degree of orientation disparity of
the test stimuli. With every increase in orientation disparity there
is a proportionate increase in the length of time the subjects take to
reach a decision. On the other hand, the kind of tacit belief which we
have granted people in general are likely to have about rotating objects
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and which, according to Pylyshyn's ostensible theory, is supposed to
produce the reaction time in question, is very rough and ready indeed.
At its most articulate, it expresses an expectation that there ought to
be a temporal/spatial correlation—a correlation, that is, between
rotation time and degree of rotation, but nothing more explicit than
this. In particular, precise linearity is not part of this belief.
Now we might well discover that upon explicit questioning some
people will be prepared to elaborate on their tacit belief regarding the
rotation time/rotation distance correlation by suggesting that the
increase of the former relative to the latter could be monotonic and so
perhaps come eventually to espouse a belief in linear gradation. It
seems to me, however, that this cannot properly be considered a consti¬
tuent of the so-called system of tacit physical belief which Pylyshyn
has postulated. It represents, rather, an after-the-fact working-out
of a logical entailment inspired, it will be noted, not by experience
but by our (Socratic-like) questioning.
In fact, I would suggest that the idea of linear gradation is not
something which can be generally inferred from experience at all. The
reason for this is simply that our ordinary experience of the world is
too haphazard to make possible the observation of precise temporal pat¬
terns. We notice a pattern only if it is striking in some very immediate
practical sense, and then only if it is a pattern detectable without
precise measurement. The situation in which a puzzle piece has to be
rotated almost in a full circle is noteworthy perhaps because of its
difficulty (this is especially true for small children for whom the
requisite manual dexterity necessitates considerable concentration) and
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the length of time it takes to complete the manipulation is noteworthy
as a concomittant of this. But we do not note as a matter of course
just how much more time is required in this case than in a case where a
piece has to be rotated only a short distance. Nor do we note just what
the differences in relative distance of any two rotations is. They are
just noted as being 'longer' or 'shorter' relative to one another. This
might well be adequate (with the repetition of such episodes) to give
the impression that there ought to be some kind of correlation between
rotation time and rotation distance, but without precise measurement
such as occurs in a controlled experimental environment of the length of
time relative to the length of distance, a pattern of precise linearity
is not detected."''
That Shepard's reaction-time pattern is not something which can be
observed in the course of our ordinary comings and goings with the world
is well-attested. Roger Shepard and Lynn Cooper (in Mental Images and
Their Transformations, 1982, op. cit., p. 10) and W.K. fstes (in
Handbook of Learning and Cognitive Processes, vol. 5, 1978, p. 2) have
on separate occasions acknowledged the significance of the development
in cognitive psychology of chronometric measurement techniques and
instrumentation. Without these, the psychologists claim, the linear
correlation between reaction time and rotation distance could never
have been detected. The fact that must be appreciated is that on a
subjective - impressionistic kind of analysis of timing - by just
watching people, for instance, we would never notice a difference of
several milliseconds between one reaction time and another. To the
naked eye, assisted only by the second hand on a watch, all or most
reaction times in a given experimental sequence, would appear to be
roughly the same. We need, therefore, sophisticated timing techniques
and instrumentation in order to make obvious to us the difference in
reaction time and thereby the pattern of reaction time relative to the
distance variable. Shepard says this:
On introspection, then, the mind's most efficient and auto¬
matic operations appear to the mind itself to be virtually
instantaneous as well as effortless. Little wonder that
philosophers like Hume, who based their conclusions on the
subjective observation of their own mental processes rather
than the use of more objective and faster-operating physical
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I would argue, then, that even if we suppose Pylyshyn's basic
thesis regarding the existence of tacit knowledge and the likelihood of
its significant influence on cognitive processing, we do not have the
specific kind of tacit knowledge available to us which is relevant to
the production of the reaction-time behaviour which is in guestion here.
To put a fine point on this, we do not have a belief in the linear
gradation of rotation time relative to rotation distance and so cannot
in any sense be construed to be governed or guided cognitively and,
ultimately, behaviourally, by such a belief.
This brings me to a second, more fundamental criticism of Pylyshyn's
position. There would seem to be absolutely no reason why, given his
position, a belief about the temporal character of a rotation process
should affect the ostensible cognition involved in the solution of
Shepard-type problems at all. After all, this cognition has to do
with very specific problems—it has to do with the similarity or dis¬
similarity of shape of two geometrical figures. Pylyshyn has been at
some pains to maintain, rotation, mental or otherwise, has no signifi¬
cant role to play in the ultimate computation of this. People may well
be under the introspective impression that they solve spatial problems
by manipulating images before their mind's eyes, but, Pylyshyn says,
instruments to clock such processes in others, could speak
as if a more complex or extensive mental transformation
"costs the imagination no more trouble" (David Hume, An
Equity Concerning Human Understanding, 1948, vol. 2, p. 16)
than a simpler or less extensive one. It was not until
1969, following the successful application of refined
chronometric techniques to processes of mental comparison
... that we actually began our attempt to time mental pro¬
cesses. (R. Shepard and L. Cooper, Images and Their
Transformation, op. cit., p. 10.)
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this is a false impression. They only think that they solve spatial
problems in this way because that is how they have always seen such
problems solved in the physical world. On the contrary, according to
Pylyshyn, the essential cognitive process involved in spatial cognition
generally and involved in Shepard-type problem solving in particular, is
inferential. Now if this is so, if Shepard's subjects are not rotating
images but making inferences to shape similarity, then it seems to me
rather clear that information having to do with rotation time or
reaction time is irrelevant. How long it ought or ought not to take to
complete a rotation has nothing to do with the shape similarity of two
objects. I would argue, then, that even if we were to grant that people
might have a tacit belief in the linear gradation (of rotation time
relative to rotation distance) there is no reason for that belief to
enter into the cognition—that cognition being, so Pylyshyn says, an
inference to similarity.
Thus Pylyshyn's tacit knowledge account of Shepard-type problem
solving does not provide a viable alternative to the analogue hypothesis.
Its major liability is that it, like the other alternative strategies I
have considered, fails to explain the reaction-time behaviour of
Shepard's subjects. In the first place, we do not have the kind of
tacit knowledge relevant to the production of this reaction time (we
have no opportunity to develop such knowledge outside of an experimental
context) and in the second place, there is no reason for our tacit know¬
ledge of the physics of rotating objects to influence our (inferential)
computation of shape similarity.
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It will be noted that in addition to his particular treatment of
the mental rotation phenomenon, Pylyshyn has been concerned to promote
a second, 'underlying' or 'generic' thesis regarding the operation of
the so-called faculty of imagination. It is Pylyshyn's notion that this
faculty cannot generally be considered to operate autonomously—it is
subject to the influence and, indeed, the governance of the tacit
beliefs held by the person(s) in the process of imagining. In respect
of this generic thesis, I am inclined to concede that there would well
be some truth buried here. Perhaps in some circumstances, there is a
logically coherent relation between the imagery experiences that
people report and the tacit beliefs that they have. Perhaps it is the
case, for instance, that trained physicists would (if required to per¬
form the mental exercise described earlier) report 'seeing' before their
mind's eyes the two objects (of comparable shape and size but of dif¬
ferent weights) reach the ground simultaneously, while the ordinary
population, drawing their tacit physical beliefs on an ordinary experi¬
ence basis, would report seeing the heavy object in the pair hit the
ground first. (I do not know. This obviously requires empirical
investigation and it would seem to be incumbent on Pylyshyn to provide
it.) And, if some such correlation is established then it is perhaps
arguable that an inferential or 'tacit knowledge' explanation of the
cognition in this circumstance, is required.
Having said this, however, I do not think that the image hypothesis
or image explanation (for the cognition of Shepard's subjects) is jeo¬
pardized in the least. This is one instance (quite possibly among
many?) where the faculty of imagination appears to be operating autono¬
mously—in accordance with principles which are not acquired but 'pre-
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wired', so to speak, in the human brain on a species-wide basis. It may
be the case that in some instances of the operation of what we commonly
describe as imagination a tacit knowledge explanation is required but
it is just not the case in respect of the cognitions of Shepard's sub¬
jects. There is no explanation in terms of tacit knowledge for the
behaviour of these subjects."'"
4.6 Considerations of Efficiency
In the final analysis, then, the hypothesis of image rotation seems
to furnish the only currently available account of the principal finding
of Shepard's experiments: namely, that the subjects' reaction times
increase linearly with the degree of orientation disparity exhibited by
the test objects. Four alternate linguistic strategies for spatial
problem solving have been postulated and discussed. Out of this group,
For the record, it should perhaps be mentioned that Pylyshyn has
conducted a brief course of experiments (reported in Pylyshyn, 1979,
op. cit., pp. 19-28) designed to prove the knowledge dependent charac¬
ter of mental rotation. Pylyshyn claims to have shown in these experi¬
ments that certain (cognitive) factors such as the inherent structural
complexity of the test objects and the degree of practice which the
subjects have attained, increase and decrease, respectively, the sub¬
ject's reaction times. I have chosen not to deal with these experi¬
ments because they are considered to be controversial within the
discipline--Lynn Cooper and Peter Podgorny have conducted a similar
course of experiments (reported in "Mental Transformations and Visual
Comparison Processes: Effects of Complexity and Similarity," Journal
of Experimental Psychology, vol. 2, 1976, pp. 503-514) the results of
which disconfirm (or at any rate throw into question) Pylyshyn's
results. Also Steven Kosslyn and his associates (Pinker, Smith,
Shwartz) have argued very convincingly (1979, op. cit., pp. 535-581)
that Pylyshyn's data (if accurate) can be explained by inherent proper¬
ties of the neural tissue—in the case of practice, for instance, by
the gradual strengthening of synaptic connections with repeated firing.
Accordingly, I have chosen to restrict the discussion to what is cer¬
tainly the philosophical heart of Pylyshyn's position (the explanation
by 'tacit knowledge' thesis). I shall leave the presentation and inter¬
pretation of data to the psychologists.
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two strategies, specifically, Zenon Pylyshyn's 'tacit knowledge' stra¬
tegy and Daniel Dennett's 'rotation by propositional increments' stra¬
tegy, have been found to be deficient because they stipulate problem
solving technigues which are actually incapable of resolving the
similarity/dissimilarity question. The other two strategies, the
'wholistic description' strategy postulated by Anderson and Flanagan
and the 'feature-by-feature description' strategy postulated by Just
and Carpenter, stipulate problem solving techniques which seem in prin¬
ciple to be capable of resolving the similarity/dissimilarity question
(though with considerable difficulty), but which could not reasonably
be expected to give rise to the specific kind of behaviour pattern
exhibited by Shepard's subjects.
Having said this, however, I cannot rule out the possibility that
someone will yet devise a strategy for problem solving which satisfac¬
torily accounts for Shepard's reaction-time finding without making
reference to anything like mental images and image rotations. What,
then, if some such strategy is devised? Does this mean that the strategy
of image rotation ought automatically to be set aside? I think not.
That it may be possible to contrive a linguistic strategy for the kind
of problem solving involved in Shepard's experiments, does not mean
that such a strategy is necessarily the correct one. It simply means
that the calculation at issue here could be made in linguistic terms.
But the question of whether in fact it is so made, is still to be
answered.
Now suppose, for the sake of argument, that this situation does
indeed arise and that we have two possible strategies for spatial prob¬
lem solving which account for the Shepard reaction-time effect—the
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image rotation strategy and a (yet to be devised) linguistic strategy.
Are we obliged then to simply acknowledge a situation of stalemate? Or
are there grounds which can be adduced which tip the balance in favour
of one or the other strategy?
It seems a reasonable assumption that the human brain processes
information in a way that maximizes the efficiency and optimality of
its performance, this means that a constraint on any theory of cogni¬
tive representation is that it not propose that the brain is processing
information inefficiently. Unfortunately, it is not always a trivial
matter to decide how the efficiency of a given system or organ should
be measured in the absence of detailed knowledge of its physiological
implementation. J.R. Anderson"'' has proposed that the efficiency of a
system can be measured in terms of the efficiency of its computer simu¬
lation. If some such proposal were accepted, it would be possible to
place considerable constraint on a theory. However, it is unlikely
that there is going to be widespread consensus in the field about such
a definition. Nonetheless, it seems possible to apply very general
(i.e., non-implementation specific) notions of efficiency to impose some
constraints on theories of cognitive representation.
One very general consideration leads to an interesting conclusion.
It is the case that well-designed systems tend to have special represen¬
tations for the kinds of information they have to process frequently,
these representations are designed to facilitate the kind of computa¬
tions useful for this kind of information. For instance, we know from
""John R. Anderson, 1978, op. cit.
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physiological evidence, that visual and auditory information is given
very different encodings at initial neural levels. Another example of
this comes from an advanced computer language like Interlisp.^" Inter-
lisp has list structures that are useful for encoding symbolic struc¬
tures (like propositions), arrays that are useful for encoding dimen-
sionally organized information (like pictures) and even some string
capabilities useful for encoding seguential information (like verbal
input). The array and string capabilities are additions to the original
2
Lisp language which had only list structures. These additions were
forced by the practical needs of doing various types of information
processing operations in Lisp.
Now assuming that the brain is a 'well-designed system' and given
that spatial decision making is a day-to-day, if not moment-by moment
concern (we have to make such decisions every time we move about the
physical environment or make use of a tool), it seems reasonable to
suppose the evolution of a representational system the basic structures
of which are as analogous as possible to the spatial structures in the
world which they represent. Egually, it seems reasonable to suppose
that such a system would have available to it, analogue processes -
that human beings might do in their mind/brains what they would do in
the physical world should it be possible, safe, and convenient.
"'"W. Teitleman, Interlisp Reference Manual, (Palo Alto, California:
Xerox Palo Alto Research Center, 1976).
^J. McCarthy, P.W. Abrahams, D.T. Edwards, T.P. Hart, and
M.J. Levin, Lisp 1.5 Programmers Manual (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1962).
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Rotation is one such process. After all, as any child will tell you,
the easiest and most definitive way to determine whether or not two
objects are the same shape is to try to match them together physically.
If one is barred from doing this by practical considerations, then the
next best thing is to try to achieve a match in theory.
There is a further point about efficiency which bears considera¬
tion. In the discussion of the wholistic description strategy, atten¬
tion was drawn to the difficulties inherent in providing an adequate
linguistic description for Shepard's test objects. This is a problem
not just for the wholistic description strategy, but for descriptive
strategies per se - to the extent that the spatial properties of the
test objects must be transcribed into a linguistic format, an adequate
spatial vocabulary must be provided as well. This difficulty is side¬
stepped, however, in fact the transcription step is eliminated
altogether, if we suppose along with Shepard, that the spatial proper¬
ties of the test objects are not encoded in the brain linguistically,
but that they are encoded imagistically - in structures which are
internal analogues of the corresponding physical realities. On this
supposition, the need to provide a transcription of the spatial infor¬
mation simply disappears.
4.7 Conclusion
I have been arguing the merits of the case for the mental rotation
strategy for spatial problem solving relative to the outstanding lin¬
guistic opposition. Roughly, the merits seem to be twofold: First of
all and most particularly, mental rotation is the only strategy which
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has thus far been adduced which can actually be seen to bring about the
reaction-time behaviour which Shepard's subjects exhibit. Secondly,
this strategy and the analogue system of cognitive representation which
is consistent with it, are favoured by considerations of efficiency.
An image or analogue system of cognitive representation is capable of
processing spatial information in its own terms. In the particular case
of Shepard-type problems, this means that the global shapes of the test
objects can be processed as global shapes. The shape information does
not have to be transcribed into an alternative language prior to the
actual similarity/dissimilarity assessment. On the contrary, that
assessment can be taking place even as the rotation proceeds.
CHAPTER 5
The Case In Principle Against Imaging
5.1 Introduction
Now it seems to me that philosophers and psychologists have advo¬
cated the non-image rotation stance relative to Shepard's imagery
research at a fairly considerable theoretical cost. For aside from the
fact (which I sought to establish in Chapter 4) that the various lin¬
guistic strategies turn out, on analysis, to be incapable of accounting
for the reaction-time phenomenon, they rely on a base of supposition,
which is, to put it plainly, too obviously contrived to be believable.
Indeed, I venture to say that contrivance is the single most striking
feature of the theories as a group.
Clearly, it is essential to the linguistic strategies (if they are
to function in their appointed role as the official opposition) that a
link be established between linguistic/propositional problem solving per
se and the orientation factor. Somehow the linguistic theorists must
show that the relative spatial positioning of the test objects affects
the course and outcome of a linguistic cognition. Since linguistic
structures and inferential processes are not normally or naturally con¬
strained by spatial considerations, the linguistic theorists have had
to arrange for this. They have had to address themselves specifically
and deliberately to the guestion, 'What do we need to suppose to be the
case if the reaction-time behaviour pattern exhibited by Shepard's sub¬
jects, is to come about by linguistic means?' And they have been forced
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into the difficult and, I dare say, undesirable position of having to
make rather extravagant suppositions.
In the case of the feature-by-feature description strategy, for
instance, the required link is provided on the supposition of an
unusual kind of descriptive tactic. Instead of describing each object
separately and wholistically, the subjects are supposed to go about
generating these descriptions on a piecemeal basis. They identify and
describe a single feature on one object (the 'standard') and then
attempt to locate this feature on the second object and so on for all
the features present.
The tacit knowledge strategy relies on a pair of suppositions:
the supposition that people in general, and Shepard's subjects in par¬
ticular, have acquired a belief about the length of time it ought to
take to find the shape similarity of two objects by rotation and the
supposition that this belief enters into the subjects' inference to
similarity in an unconscious but significant way - causing the subjects
to take longer to complete the inference in the case of an object pair
displaying a considerable orientation disparity, than in a lesser
disparity situation.
Daniel Dennett's theory of rotation by propositional increments
operates on the supposition that the subjects undertake to 'mimic' a
physical rotation propositionally. They ask themselves a series of
questions having to do with the visual appearance of one object rela¬
tive to the other, should it be turned 'just so far'. And the ques¬
tions occur in a sequence appropriate to the course of a rotation of
the test objects if it were actually to take place. This apparently
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means that the greater the orientation disparity displayed by the test
objects, the greater number of questions privately asked.
We can, of course, suppose with Dennett that people perform rota¬
tions non-spatially. But really why should we suppose this? More to
the point, is there any justification for this supposition other than
that Dennett apparently thinks it is required if his propositional
theory is to be retained in the face of Shepard's data? We do not find,
for instance, that people report propositional rotations. Nor has it
been demonstrated to be the case that people can be trained to perform
such rotations on paper - writing out successive descriptions of the
appearance of one object relative to the other if it were rotated in
stages about an axis. Nor is there any reason to believe that such a
strategy would be an efficient way to solve the spatial comparison
problem. Digital computers do not employ the propositional rotation
strategy. And it is not even clear that they could be programmed to do
this.
Equally, we can suppose with Pylyshyn that people's inferences
about shape similarity are influenced by their beliefs (granting for
the moment that they have such beliefs) about rotation. But again we
must wonder why anyone would want to suppose such a thing. There is no
connection - logically speaking - (except in the theory being challen¬
ged) between information relating to the length of time it takes to
complete a rotation and the issue of the shape similarity of two
objects. So to suppose, as Pylyshyn apparently does, that the rotation
belief enters into the calculation process in a cognitively significant
way, is to suppose that that process is essentially and consistently
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invalid. And surely we have every reason to believe that it is not
invalid. In the vast majority of cases, people (or at any rate a
representative sample of people) come up with the correct assessment
of the objects. And it is hardly likely that this kind of consistency
would result from invalid reasoning.
And we can suppose that Shepard's subjects are employing the
feature-by-feature description tactic relative to the comparison prob¬
lem. After all, as I argued in Chapter 4, there is no reason in prin¬
ciple why it would not be possible to solve the problem (though not to
mimic the reaction-time effect) on a feature-by-feature basis. But
even here we are bound to consider this an unlikely possibility -
surely no reasonable person would pursue this tactic when the simple
description of each object in turn, will accomplish the comparison with
less difficulty and less room for error. Indeed, the only basis on
which the supposition makes any sense at all is if we are prepared to
suppose as well that the subjects themselves have, for some reason, a
desire to mimic the Shepard reaction-time effect, and have come to
settle upon the feature-by-feature tactic (unnecessarily as it happens)
as the means of securing this end.
I suggest, then, that the various suppositions which lie at the
heart of the linguistic strategies are gratuitous, so gratuitous that
one is compelled to wonder to what purpose they have been supposed by
the linguistic theorists in the first place. Why would an otherwise
careful philosopher like Daniel Dennett, for instance, willingly place
himself in the awkward position of having to propose and defend some¬
thing like propositional rotation? Surely he would be better advised
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to simply adopt image rotation as the (or, at any rate, a promising)
explanation of the reaction-time phenomenon?
This may be the reasonable course but Dennett and the other lin¬
guistic theorists are apparently determined - do-or-die - to avoid it.
In the face of such determination one is compelled to draw the conclu¬
sion that the analyses of these theorists, in respect of Shepard's
work, have all along been guided by ulterior motives. For some reason
they have taken it to be necessary to deny the legitimacy of cognitive
explanations couched in terms of images and image rotations, indeed,
they seem to see themselves as having a duty to do so.
What, then, is the explanation for this out-of-hand rejection of
image rotation? Why do Dennett, Pylyshyn and others take it to be a
foregone conclusion that however, ultimately, the reaction-time
phenomenon comes to be explained, the image/analogue explanation is
simply unacceptable - indeed impossible? Why do they begrudge the
postulation of images so?
5.2 Thinking in Images: The Conventional Theory
There is a simple answer to this question. Apparently, the lin¬
guistic theorists believe that there is more at stake here than the
simple acceptance or rejection of an explanation for a specific kind of
spatial cognition. Apparently, they believe that acceptance of the
image rotation theory brings with it a whole 'Pandora's Box' of undesir¬
able theoretical consequences. Wittgenstein and Ryle in philosophy,
and John Watson in psychology nailed the lid on this box some years ago
and so the present generation of philosophers and psychologists are
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reluctant to re-open it. I suggest that the Pandora's Box has to do
with the problem of meaning - what the linguistic theorists fear most,
and rightly so, is that they will be committed to the view that images
are (sometimes) the vehicles of thought in the strong sense that think¬
ing is identifiable with imaging.
Undoubtedly, there is some basis for this fear. In the history of
philosophy and psychology, support for imagery has almost always gone
hand-in-hand with some version of the imagist theory of meaning. The
classic example of this is to be found in the work of the British
Empiricists. Locke and Hume maintained that having an idea or concept
is really having an image experience of a particular sort. We receive
impressions of heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain, and
the mind makes images or copies of these impressions, which are called
ideas. These ideas give rise in the mind to feelings of desire or hope
or fear. The mind in turn makes copies of these new ideas and thus
there comes into being another set of ideas.
Locke and Hume believed imagery to be ideally suited to the task
of explanation because images seem to reguire no interpretation at all.
It is this feature that images have been taken (not just by Locke and
Hume but by empiricists generally, both classic and modern) to share
with pictures, and, in turn, it is one of the features that is supposed
to set pictorial modes of representation apart from linguistic modes.
Images are not, so it is supposed, arbitrarily or conventionally
related to the things they represent such that their particular 'repre¬
sentational functions' would have to be learned, they simply resemble
these things. The meaning of the image is dictated by its very nature
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- an image of a coffee cup does not appear like or indeed stand for a
kitchen sink. Psychologist George Humphrey describes and endorses this
particular understanding of the logic of image representation:
... when we have an image of a boy dressed in blue,
what is happening is that we are imagining the boy
directly. We do not first make an image and then
bring in some additional process which tells us its
meaning, i.e., that this is an image of a boy. If
we are asked what colour the boy's coat is, we can
say that it is blue just as though we were actually
perceiving the boy and were asked the same guestion
Thus the meaning of the image presents no problem.^
What causes difficulty, Humphrey goes on to say, is the insistence,
on the part of some people, that imagining and interpreting the 'ima¬
gined product' must be distinct cognitive operations. There is no
reason to assume this, says Humphrey, images wear their interpretations
'on their sleeve', so to speak. We know what an image is an image of
- simply as a concomitant, of its very construction - because it 'looks
like' what it represents.
Likewise, Hume endorses the representation-by-resemblance view.
Hume writes,
When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas
I form are exact representations of the impressions I
felt; nor is there any circumstance of the one, which
is not to be found in the other. In running over my
other perceptions, I find still the same resemblance
George Humphrey, Thinking: An Introduction to Its Experimental
Psychology (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc.,1963),p.225.
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and representation. Ideas and impressions appear
always to correspond to each other.1
E.B. Titchener undertakes a more detailed account of how images
represent particular objects via some form of resemblance. He cites
the following as exemplary cases, culled, so he claims, from his own
image repertoire. Notice that Titchener's images are unlike Hume's in
that they are not exact copies of what they represent. As Titchener
describes them, they are more like impressionist paintings. The key,
however, is that for Titchener - like Hume - resemblance counts for
representation. An image of a triangle must look like a real triangle.
Otherwise, says Titchener, it could not bear the meaning of 'triangle'
for him. Titchener writes,
My own picture of the triangle, the image that means
triangle to me, is usually a fairly definite outline
of the triangle figure that stands for the word
'triangle' in the geometries ... horse is to me, a
double curve and a rampant posture with a touch of
mane about it; cow is a longish rectangle with a
certain facial expression, a sort of exaggerated
pout. Again, however, these things mean horse and
cow, are the psychological vehicles of these logical
meanings.2
Thus, on the empiricist view, language stands in a purely external
relation to thinking. Words are to be used as marks of ideas (images)
"'"David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford, 1951),
L.A. Selby-Bigge (Ed.), Book I, Part I, p. 3.
2
E.B. Titchener, Lectures on the Experimental Psychology of the
Thought Processes (New York: Macmillan, 1909), p~! I9~!
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in the mind of the speaker. They have no natural connection with ideas
but are made into signs by the arbitrary choices of men. Since words
are the labels of ideas, the ideas must be present before they are
labelled. Wrote Locke,
In the beginning of languages, it was necessary to
have the idea before one gave it a name.l
Thus it would be a logical possibility that a human being with a
mind well-stocked with ideas should have failed, for some reason, to
assign any marks to them. This person would be occupied with thoughts
and observations, but devoid of a public language. He would have a
private language, composed entirely of imagery. (See Appendix D.)
The received opinion current in philosophy (and perhaps to a
lesser extent) in psychology, is that theories of representation of the
sort sketched above are, in several crucial respects, flawed. It is
believed that such theories sin against certain conceptual standards -
laws even - established in the first instance by Wittgenstein and Ryle
and elaborated by a 'second wave' of philosophical critics - V.O. Quine,
Norman Malcolm, and Wilfrid Sellars (to name a few). These are stan¬
dards about the nature of representation, about the possibility of a
'private language' and about what might or might not constitute 'rock
bottom' cognitive explanation. Together they comprise what might be
loosely described as the 'logical behaviourist' case against the use of
John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding. J.W. Yolton,
Ed. (New York: 1961) Bk. Ill, Ch. 9, Sec. 2.
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imagery in cognitive explanations. Any theory, such as Roger Shepard's,
which proposes imagery in this kind of explanatory capacity must ulti¬
mately be judged against these standards.
The crucial guestion, of course, remains to be asked: have any
of these standards (laws)"^ actually been infringed by Shepard's theory?
Would Wittgenstein or Ryle, for instance, if faced with the details of
Shepard's reaction-time experiments, have to rule out of court the
possibility of explanation in terms of analogue structures and pro¬
cesses in the brain? Would they have to maintain that it is impossible
in principle for such structures and processes to exist/operate some¬
where/somehow in the neurophysiological substrate? Would they have to
maintain that such structures and processes cannot do the job of repre¬
sentation marked out for them by Shepard? Would they have to maintain
that Shepard's theory would entail an infinite regress of explanations?
In what follows, I propose to consider the logical behaviourist
case against imagery with a view to deciding whether or not the mani¬
fest intolerance of the linguistic theorists in respect of Shepard's
theory is justified. I do not propose to enter the miasma of exegeti-
cal dispute which surrounds Wittgenstein's private language argument-
deciding, for instance, whether or not Wittgenstein should be inter¬
preted as a behaviourist. I intend to treat generic arguments rather
I use the expression "laws" here because it seems to me that the
Wittgenstein/Ryle reflections on the nature of mind, introspectionism,
etcetera, have the status of laws among virtually the entire philo¬
sophical community. If there is ever such a thing as conventional
wisdom in philosophy, this is it.
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-f-o be,
than individual philosophers, indicating what I takf=/ the gist of these
arguments and leaving the questions of scholarship to the experts.
Ultimately, I shall be arguing that Shepard's theory does not run
afoul of logical behaviourism - that, indeed, there is no philosophical
case as such to be made out against Shepard's theory. Philosophers and
psychologists have come to think that there is perhaps because they
have interpreted Shepard along conventional empiricist lines. They
have interpreted him, that is, as espousing and defending the 'imagist'
theory of meaning. They are wrong about this. Shepard is espousing
and defending a theory or more precisely, perhaps, a scientific/empiri¬
cal hypothesis about the physical causal condition(s) which bring(s)
about spatial cognition of a particular kind. Images, on this view,
are not the bearers of meaning but 'engineering' features of the human
brain which are computationally significant. They make a difference to
the course and outcome of the spatial cognition. In short, while I do
not deny that there is a case - a pretty devastating case - to be made
out against theories (like those postulated by E.B. Titchener and John
Locke) which postulate images as the basic units of cognitive meaning,
I deny that it can be applied in this instance. Shepard's theory
requires special consideration and treatment - the 'stock' criticisms
of imagery and image theories generally will not do here.
5. 3 Four Issues
What, then, are the 'stock' criticisms - the logical behaviourist
case, so-called? I take it that the substance of this case has to do
with four main issues. For purposes of identification, they may be
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called:
i) the representation-by-resemblance issue;
ii) the images-as-propositions issue;
iii) the infinite regress issue; and
iv) the privacy issue.
5.4 The Representation-by-Resemblance Issue
Consider the representation-by-resemblance issue. Earlier, I indi¬
cated that it is a central contention of Locke, Hume and company that
images constitute the sum and substance of thought. To think that the
university is in flames is ultimately to entertain a mental picture or
series of pictures of the university engulfed in fire. This imagery
gets its message across - refers to the university, and conveys infor¬
mation about its state - by simply resembling its subject matter. In
this, it is supposed, it differs from language which conveys meaning
symbolically, on the basis of arbitrary convention. Clearly, such a
view assumes that there is no problem in recognizing a picture - say,
of a man as a man. Just as anyone who could pick out a real man could
identify a mirror image of a man, so, it is thought, could he pick out
a pictorial representation.
The logical behaviourists deny this. Indeed they are strongly
inclined to doubt the very intelligibility of the suggestion that there
is a stage at which cognitive processes are carried out in a medium
that is fundamentally non-discursive. The reason for this is simply
that, for the logical behaviourists, resemblance is inadequate for
representation. Images/pictures must always come under a description
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to mean anything.
The logical behaviourist point can be substantiated by way of a
consideration of pictures and how they serve to represent. Suppose,
for instance, that we are shown a picture of a skyscraper in a large
city. Is it obvious from the picture itself what it is a picture of?
It could be (could it not?) a picture of a particular landmark sky¬
scraper such as the Empire State Building in New York. Alternatively,
it could be an example of a skyscraper for purposes of identifying a
kind of building, an exemplar of a class. It could be an illustration
for a general article on twentieth century architecture in the West,
or even a composition to hang on the wall for its 'artistic quality'.
Even if we are shown a realistic picture - a photograph, say, which is
readily identifiable as the Empire State Building, it may have a non-
pictorial meaning, as in a situation where it and like-shaped displays
are used to signify products made in New York City, while Eiffel Tower
shapes indicate Paris-made items. Without some accompanying rule - some
standard of assessment - it is impossible to tell what the picture is
for and hence what its subject really is.
The lesson here is a familiar Wittgensteinian one - meaning is not
'simply given' in pictures. Rather, a picture is a proposition-radical,
says Wittgenstein - there are any number of assertions, denials, ques¬
tions, etcetera which can be made/asked in a picture. Wittgenstein
puts the problem of the meaning of pictorial representations this way,
Imagine a picture representing a boxer in a particu¬
lar stance. Now, this picture can be used to tell
someone how he should stand, should hold himself; or
how he should not hold himself; or how a particular man
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did stand in such-and-such a place; and so on. One
might (using the language of chemistry) call this
picture a proposition-radical.1
I see a picture; it represents an old man walking
up a steep path leaning on a stick. Might it not
have looked just the same if he had been sliding
downhill in that position?^
The root of the problem, according to the logical behaviourist, is
that pictorial representations are insufficiently abstract to convey
meaning on their own. Any picture of a thing will, of necessity, dis¬
play that thing as having indefinitely many properties; hence pictures
correspond (and fail to correspond) in indefinitely many ways to the
things they resemble. Suppose we want to say (or think) in pictures or
images that the Empire State Building has many windows. A picture of
the Empire State Building with many windows might convey this meaning
but it can also convey the meaning that the Empire State Building is
large or, for that matter, that it is difficult to heat or that it is
made out of brick of a particular colour. Notice that a symbolic
system of representation such as language is exempt from these worries.
This is one of the respects in which language really is abstract. A
picture of the Empire State Building with many windows is also a pic¬
ture of a 'large' Empire State Building. But the sentence "The Empire
State Building has many windows" abstracts from all of the building's
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Trans, by




Taken together, these sorts of considerations strongly suggest
that there is not much sense to be made out of the notion that there
might be an internal representation system in which images (which is to
say, pictures in the mind or brain) are the vehicles of meaning - that
is, in which entertaining an image or series of images is identical to
thinking that such and such is the case.
Let us put the logical behaviourist point in the context of
Shepard's theory. On the basis of his reaction-time findings, Shepard
has argued that his subjects perform the similarity/dissimilarity cal¬
culation by rotating image-like or analogue structures in the brain
into a position of mutual congruence. Suppose, then, that we ask the
following question: Is it possible to represent the thought 'Object A
can be rotated into congruence with Object B' in pictorial form? This,
presumably, is the thought that mediates the problem solving activity
of Shepard's subjects.
As a test of this, we might show a group of subjects (not neces¬
sarily Shepard's subjects, but subjects selected at random) a picture in
which Object A (one of a pair of typical Shepard-type test objects) is
superimposed over Object B. (In the picture, the superimposition is
obvious because A is slightly smaller than B, is appropriately labelled,
and is outlined in the colour blue, whereas B is outlined in the colour
red). Would seeing this picture be equivalent, for the subjects, to
having the thought in question? Would it convey to them the meaning
'Object A can be rotated into congruence with Object B'? Conceivably
it could, but just as conceivably, it could communicate the thought
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that 'there are two Objects, A and B, and A is outlined in blue and B
is outlined in red.' Equally, it could communicate the thought that
'A is smaller than B', or that 'A is the same shape as B. '
It will be noted that this latter 'thought' is not equivalent to
the thought 'A can be rotated into congruence with B.' Clearly, each
implies the other (if two objects are the same shape then they can be
rotated into congruence and vice versa, if they can be rotated into
congruence then they are the same shape). But it is quite possible
that a given individual - a small child, say - would think one thing
without realizing the entailment to the other. In any case, the predi¬
cate 'can be rotated into congruence' conveys possibility or poten¬
tiality whereas the predicate 'are the same shape' is definitive - it
states what _is the case.
We could, of course, attempt to assist the subjects in their inter¬
pretation of the picture, in particular, to assist them in their ability
to 'see' this potentiality by presenting them with two pictures - one
in which objects A and B are simply side-by-side and one in which there
is the superimposition of A over B. Or even better, we might elaborate
on this scheme, by presenting the subjects with three pictures - the
two pictures described above, plus another picture, placed between
them, in which object A has been rotated a number of degrees about the
picture plane axis toward object B. Would the subjects, if we ask them,
"What do these pictures mean?" say they mean that object A can be
rotated into congruence with object B? They might say this, or they
simply might choose to describe each of the pictures separately. And
what about a group comprised of subjects who have participated in
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Shepard's experiments? What will they take the pictures to mean?
Given their previous experimental experiences, it is perhaps quite
likely that they will recognize them as displaying the potentiality for
congruence. After all, they will have some notion that objects of this
sort, displayed in a series, should be viewed, wholistically, as stages
in a problem solving process.
Now I suspect that the logical behaviourist would take this thought
experiment to illustrate the following: The object of the pictorial
series presented to the subjects is not defined by any of the specifi¬
cally pictorial properties displayed. Rather, it is carried by the
description under which the series is intended. It may well be that a
group of Shepard's subjects would say that seeing the pictorial series
did, in point of fact, make them think of the possible congruence of A
and B. But if this is so, it is not because of the series itself, but
is because the subjects have been primed by their previous experience,
to view it in a particular way. What counts here, the logical
behaviourist will be concerned to point out, in terms of the communica¬
tion of meaning - is not whether or how much the pictures resemble
the object, but just how the perceivers 'read' the pictures.
Let me say, then, that I think the logical behaviourist argument
regarding the nature of pictorial representation and more specifically
regarding the difficulties inherent in the notion of 'representation-
by-resemblance ' , is well-taken. In particular, it seems to call into
question an idea about imagery which has played a long and influential
role in a number of important empiricist theories of cognition. The
idea in question is this: that thinking, problem solving, etcetera,
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must, at rock-bottom, consist in imaging. The logical behaviourist
argument shows guite clearly that this is not possible. If it is under¬
stood just how pictures and/or images represent, there can be no ques¬
tion that they could stand alone as the units of cognitive reference.
Images/pictures reguire interpretation. And to the extent that this is
so, there is really no sense to be made out of the idea that cognition,
spatial or otherwise, can take place in a medium that is fundamentally,
entirely non-discursive.
Having said this, however, I do not think that the logical
behaviourist argument is absolutely devastating in its consequences for
the image theory. More precisely, I do not think that we have here a
refutation of the image theory per se but just perhaps one version of
it. (This is the version maintained by the British Empiricists and,
perhaps less frequently, by the sense datum philosophers, which makes
images the sum and substance of thought.) That thinking cannot consist
in imaging does not, I would argue, prove that images (or analogue
structures) do not exist or that they are entirely without function.
These are logically distinct possibilities. Thus it is still possible,
I take it, to argue as Shepard does for a role for imagery in cognition
so long as one does not make images the vehicle of thought in the tra¬
dition of J. Locke.
Roger Shepard has argued that people - his subjects in particular -
solve the similarity/dissimilarity problem by performing a rotation of
image-like or analogue structures in the brain into positions of con¬
gruence (or non-congruence, as the case may be). The logical behaviour¬
ist, on the strength of his image representation argument, might add a
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valuable note of caution here. He might say to Shepard: It cannot be
the case that this is all that is going on. The thinking, problem
solving cannot consist in manipulating images or analogue structures.
At some stage these structures and activities must be interpreted -
they must come under a description - and at that stage what carries the
weight of the cognition are the analogue structures together with the
propositional intentions that interpret them. There must be a dual-
code processing - discursive/propositional as well as analogue - going
on.
5.5 The Images-as-Propositions Issue
This brings me to the second issue - the issue I have described
as the 'images-as-propositions issue'. A number of logical behaviour¬
ists - Daniel Dennett among them - have been inclined to argue a more
radical thesis about imagery. They have been inclined to argue that
not only is it the case that images require propositional interpreta¬
tion, but they are really nothing but propositions - just a way - a
metaphorical way as Ryle would have it - of talking to ourselves. Thus,
on this more radical thesis, the idea of imagery as some kind of cogni¬
tive representation is cast aside altogether.
Frequently, this thesis is argued on the basis of certain alleged
facts about what it is to have an image experience as opposed to what
it is to have a perceptual or physical object experience. The strategy
of the comparison is to point out that, in the case of the latter,
there is actually something 'there' to be perceived whereas, in the
case of the former, there is not.
180
It is argued, for instance, that, usually, when we are imaging,
we know what our mental image is an image of without the need to
inspect it for clues. Even when an image just arises in the mind and
cannot be recognized, no closer examination will provide clues to its
identity; we have to wait until the name comes to us. In the extreme
case of dreaming, we may 'recognize' a person even though his charac¬
teristics are entirely different from those possessed in real life.
In perceiving, on the other hand, the object perceived may be identi¬
fied gradually, by the collection of clues. Thus, 'having an image'
of an object differs from contemplating either the object or a picture
of it. The image is not a picture in a special private gallery.
Psychologist John Heil marks the distinction between looking at some¬
thing and imaging it in this way:
One cannot have an image of X without knowing that
the image is of X. Not so for looking, for example.
You are asked to imagine a house by a pond in rural
England. You do this. Would it make sense to ask
whether you are certain the image is of a house and
not, say, of a paper mache mock-up; whether you are
certain the scene is in England and not in Arkansas?
Imagine Jimmy Carter. Now: how do you know it is
Carter and not his twin or someone else disguised
as Carter? This shows too, that images are not
like pictures (where these and similar guestions
make sense).^
Eurthermore, it is argued that there are no factual discoveries to
be made in imaging. Suppose, for instance, that we are looking at a
"''John Heil, in "Commentary on Kosslyn et al. : Demystifying
Imagery," The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 2, 1979, p. 557.
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photograph of a particular tiger in the London Zoo, or suppose that we
are actually standing before the tiger's cage at the zoo. The percep¬
tual experience either of the picture or of the actual tiger can be
used to give new information. From this experience, it is possible to
discover the number of stripes on the tiger's back. But, it is argued,
the curious thing about imaging is that we cannot do this. Images are
supposed to be pictures in the mind or in the brain (or in some kind of
internal space) but, apparently, when we attempt to advert to them, to
glean new information, no such information is forthcoming. Unless we
already happen to know - as a matter of fact - how many stripes this
particular tiger has, the mental image will not assist us. This sug¬
gests that images are not 'there' in the sense that pictures of striped
tigers are there - they cannot be scanned for information.
Daniel Dennett takes this point to be absolutely crucial in its
significance for the image theory. If, as the image theorists suggest,
images are something other than or additional to propositions - a
distinct kind of cognitive representation - then, he reasons, it should
be possible to refer to them and in so doing obtain new (visual) factual
information. We should, for instance, be able to count the number of
stripes on the tiger's back. But, if as seems phenomenally to be the
case, we cannot do this, then, surely, there is nothing to this idea of
imagery in the first place. Surely there are no visual arrays before
the mind's eye or the brain's eye or wherever, which can be scanned for
information. Dennett proposes the striped tiger case as an 'acid test'
for images, which, he claims, they ultimately fail. Dennett writes:
Consider the Tiger and his stripes. I can dream,
imagine or see a striped tiger, but must the tiger
I experience have a particular number of stripes?
If seeing or imaging is having a mental image, then
the image of the tiger must - obeying the rules of
images in general - reveal a definite number of
stripes showing, and one should be able to pin this
down.... If, however, seeing or imaging has a
descriptional character, the guestion need have no
definite answer.1
Dennett's views are echoed by Zenon Pylyshyn. Pylyshyn argues
that visual, factual discoveries cannot be made with imagery. He
writes:
One misleading implication involved in using the
imagery vocabulary is that what we retrieve from
memory when we image, like what we receive from our
sensory systems, is some sort of undifferentiated
(or at least not fully interpreted) signal or pat¬
tern, a major part of which is simultaneously avail¬
able. This pattern is subsequently scanned percep¬
tually in order to obtain meaningful information
regarding the presence of objects, attributes or
relations.^
That this is misleading, Pylyshyn argues, can be seen by way of
a consideration of the phenomenological facts. He invites us to sup
pose that we are recalling a scene from a party which we attended -
sometimes, he says, the visual imagery is very clear and sometimes i
''"Daniel Dennett, "The Nature of Images and the Introspective
Trap," in Imagery, N. Block (Ed.), 1981, op. cit., p. 55.
2
Zenon Pylyshyn, "What the Mind's Eye Tells the Mind's Brain:
A Critique of Mental Imagery," in Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 80,
1973, p. 10.
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is not so clear. About this latter case he says:
When our recollections are vague, it is always in
the sense that certain perceptual qualities or
attributes are uncertain - not that there are geo¬
metrically definable pieces of a picture missing.
This suggests that one's representation of a scene
must contain already differentiated and inter¬
preted perceptual aspects. In other words, the
representation is far from being raw, and so to
speak, in need of perceptual interpretation.^
Thus, on the basis of these phenomenological observations, it is
concluded that imaging an object is unlike perceiving an object because
only in the latter case does the person stand in some relation to a
second entity, (i.e., the actual object perceived). That is, imaging
an object is not at all like seeing an object, but is more like the
result of having recognized an object, that is, knowing what that
object is. Part of the difficulty, as Ryle has argued, is that the
grammatical expression 'S has a mental image' is misleading as to its
logical form. There is, Ryle argues, a crucial logical difference
between lookipg and imaging - looking is a relational expression and
imaging is not.
To say 5 is looking at X, for instance, is to say that S is in *
some relation to something, X. If it is true that S is looking at X,
then it is also true that there is an X at which S is looking. This is
not obviously so, however, for imaging. If 5 is imaging X, then S is
not in some special relation of imaging to something X. Nor need it be
"'"Ibid.
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be true that there is an X that S is imaging. Imaging is logically
intransitive, says Ryle, it is unlike looking and seeing - more like
sitting and sleeping. To say that 5 imagines X is just to say that
S is doing something, that S is imaging X-ly. The difference, then,
between 5 imaging X and his imaging Y is not that there are two things,
X and Y, to which S may be in some relation, but that in the one case
S is doing something X-ly, while in the other case, he is doing some¬
thing Y-ly. If we understand how the language functions - understand
that there is a metaphor at work here - then we will not be tempted to
think there is an image - a visual array - to which a kind of percep¬
tual reference can be made, and from which perceptual information can
be gleaned.
At bottom, I take it, people like Ryle, Dennett, Pylyshyn and Heil
object to images because they believe them to be metaphysical curiosi¬
ties. In particular, they claim to be incapable of making any sense
out of the idea that images are pictures (in the mind, or in the brain,
or wherever). They reason that if images really are in some sense
pictures then they ought to meet certain minimal requirements. It
ought to be possible (sometimes at least) to be puzzled as to their
identity, as sometimes we are so puzzled about pictures, and it ought
to be possible to make genuine discoveries of fact about our imagery.
The truth is, they argue, that neither of these things seem to be pos¬
sible. Images simply do not behave according to our expectations.
Indeed, on a reasonably close consideration of our ordinary language
conventions for talk of imagery, it becomes very clear, they argue,
that it makes no sense to ask questions about identity, discovery,
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etcetera. Apparently, we always know what we are imaging - we never
have to take a second look so as to decide.
Clearly, what is at stake here, as far as the logical behaviourist
is concerned, is the existence of imagery. That images fail to meet
the requirements stipulated for them provides something like a demon¬
stration that there are no images, or, at any rate, that what we call
images are really propositions in disguise. The argument turns on two
things: certain empirical claims about what happens (or fails to
happen) when we are supposedly engaged in imaging and certain tests -
adduced a priori for the existence of imagery.
Consider, first, the empirical claims. The logical behaviourist
asserts that people's image experiences are never ambiguous. Intui¬
tively, this sounds correct. While attempting to answer a question
about Benjamin Franklin, I might well call to mind an image that, in
truth, better depicts Abraham Lincoln or, for that matter, the current
university librarian. But, for me, the referent of the image is still
Franklin and I do not have to examine it sometime after the fact of my
construction of it, to know that this is so. The referents of my
imagery seem never to be problematic.
But, intuitions aside, do the logical behaviourists' empirical
claims square with the facts? Is it ever the case that people have
imagery which is informationally ambiguous? Apparently, this sometimes
occurs. To take a particularly striking instance of this, in the book,
The Mind of a Mnemonist,"^ A.R. Luria records a number of feats
"^A.R. Luria, The Mind of a Mnemonist (New York: Basic Books,
1968).
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accomplished by a mnemonist referred to as S. S would be given verbal
descriptions of complex scenes, often containing a number of individual
items out of context, country scenes, say, with writing utensils in
them, which he memorized imagistically• According to Luria, occa¬
sionally S could not remember some detail or other of the scene he had
previously memorized. When this happened, S claimed that the context
in which he encoded the detail was either too visually similar to pro¬
vide sufficient contrast to see the item or it was too dark. S claimed
that he would have to take a second look at the scene in order to dis¬
cover the missing item, often he would simply visualize himself walking
through it perhaps more than once. S reported:
I put the image of a pencil near a fence.... But
what happened was that the image fused with that
of the fence, and I walked right on past without
noticing it. The same thing happened to the egg.
I had put it up against a white wall and it blended
in with the background. How could I possibly spot
a white egg up against a white wall?... Sometimes
I put a word in a dark place and have trouble seeing
it so I go by.l
And there are other less remarkable instances of this image ambi¬
guity. Stephen Kosslyn (in press) describes an experiment in which
subjects were given different descriptions (descriptions such as 'two
overlapping rectangles' or 'four squares abutting a central square') of
ambiguous patterns and were asked to image the pattern. All the sub¬
jects correctly answered questions put to them about the presence of
"''Ibid. , p. 36.
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parts in the imaged pattern (a rectangle, say) even though different
parts were derived from different ways of parsing the figure. Some¬
times, however, the subjects reported difficulty - claiming that they
could not tell whether the embedded part was a square or a rectangle or
some other geometric figure. This was particularly so when the part in
question was small relative to the entire image. In addition, Kosslyn
and Alper^" had subjects image pairs of objects, one of which was to be
imaged so small that it appeared as a speck in the image. Such patterns
can be considered ambiguous in that a rabbit (one of the test objects
utilized) with a speck on its back could be interpreted as a rabbit
supporting a miniscule car, a miniscule typewriter, or a miniscule
breadbox, and so on. And, in fact, the subjects reported difficulty in
remembering which object it was they had imaged at the size level of a
speck, while they had much less trouble remembering the larger 'host'
2
object. Finally, it has long been realized that any two-dimensional
pattern is inherently ambiguous as a depiction of a three-dimensional
scene, since many three-dimensional scenes could have given rise to the
same two-dimensional projection. Pinker and Finke (in press) have
shown that when subjects image a display of objects suspended in three-
Stephen Kosslyn and Steven Alper, "On the Pictorial Properties of
Visual Images. Effects of Image Size on Memory for Words," in the
Canadian Journal of Psychology, Vol. 31, 1977, pp. 32-40.
2
See Kosslyn and Alper (1977) for details of various experimental
controls supporting this conclusion and Janice Keenan and Robert Moore
("Memory for Images of Concealed Objects: A Re-examination of Neisser
and Kerr," in the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Pluman Learning
and Memory, 1979, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 374-385) for supporting evidence.
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dimensional space, they can 'see' both the three-dimensional structure
of the display and the two-dimensional geometric shape inherent in the
frontal projection of the display. This corresponds to the well-known
'railroad tracks' ambiguity in perception: We can see that the tracks
in front of us converge toward the horizon, but we can also see the
same tracks parallel at every distance.
Thus, it would seem that the logical behaviourists have failed to
get the facts straight regarding imagery. The data cited above indi¬
cate that, sometimes, particularly when the imagery in guestion is
recalled rather than simply generated on the spot in response to a
verbal description, questions of identity and interpretation do indeed
arise. This means, of course, that contrary to the logical behaviour¬
ist pronouncement, images do not fail to meet the requirements stipu¬
lated for them. Images do appear to behave as one might expect if they
were, in some sense, cognitive representations separate and distinct
from propositions.
Equally, it would seem that the logical behaviourists have been
engaged in the most flagrant of armchair psychology. After all, how
does Dennett know that people can never make discoveries about imagery
- that they can never count the number of stripes on the backs of their
respective imaginary tigers? Has he ever actually put this to the
test or sought out relevant data from psychological experiments of the
appropriate types? Suppose, just for the sake of argument, that a
'striped tiger' experiment is conducted. Suppose that a group of sub¬
jects are shown a realistic photograph of a striped tiger, and then,
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sometime later, asked to form a mental image and count the number of
stripes on the imaginary tiger's back. Is it a priori obvious that they
would be unable to do this - that, indeed, they would claim to be unable
to make sense out of the instructions? Surely it is conceivable that
some individuals would report that they had counted so many stripes,
just as some others might well claim to be unable to do this. Not only
is it conceivable, but the fact is that people actually do claim to be
able to make factual discoveries on the basis of their image representa¬
tions. And incidentally, more often than not, their discoveries turn
out to be true. In the experimental series discussed earlier (in
Chapter 4), Mendell and Janssen"'" found that when questioned as to the
number of windows in their places of residence, the subjects reported
calling up images of their respective houses, mentally walking around
them, counting windows as they went. The control in this experiment is,
of course, the reasonable expectation that most people do not know, in
the sense of having the number at the tip of their tongues, how many
2
windows there are in their houses.
P.R. Mendell, "Retrieval and Representation in Long-Term Memory",
op. cit., 1971 and W. Janssen, On the Nature of the Mental Image, op.
cit., 1976.
2
It will be noted that Dennett's thought experiment is somewhat
different from the one I have adduced here. The difference is this:
In the latter case the subjects are required to image a particular
striped tiger (one presented to them earlier in a realistic photograph)
whereas, in the former case - Dennett's case - the subjects are simply
asked to call to mind ja (which is to say, any) tiger. Now it seems to
me very likely that Dennett's argument regarding the possibility of
genuine discovery with imagery is best served by putting forward for
our consideration his particular version of the thought experiment.
Imagery called-up to represent a generic tiger is much more likely to
be inspecific on the question of stripes than imagery called up to
represent a particular tiger. It might, for instance, simply consist
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Hitherto, I have been concerned to argue that, contrary to what
the logical behaviourists apparently believe, images do not fail to
meet the tests prescribed for them. In the process of this, I have
more or less taken for granted the validity of these tests relative to
the problem of the existence of images. I now want to consider whether
or not these tests are indeed relevant to this problem.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that it had turned out that the
logical behaviourists were correct in their empirical assessment of
imagery - people never encounter difficulty interpreting their images
and they never report factual discoveries mediated by images. What
would this prove? Would it show us something about the structure or
function of images or about whether or not they really exist? Surely
not, or, at least, not necessarily. Surely it is entirely possible
that there might be image-like structures in the brain which are ambi¬
guous (just as the duck/rabbit drawing used in psychology texts is
ambiguous) but that other cognitive faculties - like propositions or
subvocalizations to the effect 'I am seeing a duck' or 11 am seeing a
in the representation of a tiger's head, or may be of a tiger viewed
at some considerable distance up a tree. In either case, there would
be no stripes represented. Indeed, it is arguable, that in such a
case, when called upon to think of a tiger, people would not have an
image representation at all. In any case, the peculiarities of
Dennett's thought experiment may go some of the way to explaining
why Dennett seems so confident that people would never claim to be
able to answer the 'number of stripes' guestion. Dennett seems to
be assuming that a pictorial representation of a tiger per se must
represent a determinate number of stripes. Normally this would be
so, but I think we might want to grant that an out-of-focus photo¬
graph would constitute a tiger representation even though it is -
because of the blurring - inspecific about the number of stripes the
tiger has.
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rabbit' - are activated in such a way that the subject is aware of only
one reading of the ambiguous pattern. In fact, as any instructor of
introductory psychology can attest, this frequently occurs in percep¬
tion. Observers often have difficulty seeing the different interpreta¬
tions of an ambiguous figure. Clearly, that this is so does not alter
the fact of the objective existence of the figure or of its ambiguity.
The observers see it, see even its ambiguity, but have access to and,
therefore, report one reading only.
The point is that even if it is true that people are always per¬
fectly clear about the identity of what they purport to image - that
they can always give propositional representation to their image
experiences so-called; and even if they cannot make factual discoveries
on the basis of their imagery - they cannot, to use Dennett's example,
count the number of stripes on their imaginary tigers' backs, this does
not entail that an image is not 'there' in the sense of being present
in the brain as a distinct kind of representational structure. It
could simply mean that the image and the imaging activity are operative
at a prior stage of cognition - a stage to which we do not always have
direct access.
Alternatively, it could simply mean that the image is fleeting in
the sense that there is not enough time to make discoveries of the
'stripes-on-the tiger's-back' kind. Images on television frequently
display this characteristic. We might well see an image of a tiger in
India on a documentary presentation, we might, indeed, notice that the
tiger is striped, or has numerous stripes but because of the brevity
of the duration of the image, be unable to count the precise number.
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Alastair Hannay argues this point convincingly against Dennett's
'striped tiger' test. He writes,
... an inability to pin down the number of stripes
on an imagined tiger may be due to the fleetingness,
not the absence of the image ... the inherent
instability of much visual imagery may be shared by
some kinds of exemplary image - for example, a tiger
may be represented by a changing assortment of dots
and streaks - the numerical indeterminacy of the
imagined tiger's stripes should seem no reason at
all for denying that we see an image of it before
the mind's eye.l
It is worthy of note, in this connection, that the research find¬
ings of D.O. Hebb regarding the neurophysiological bases for perception
and imagination suggest that images are quite likely to be 'fleeting'
in the way that Hannay and I have indicated. The explanation for this,
according to Hebb, has to do with the way in which the original per¬
ceptual encoding takes place. In the visual perception of a complex
object (something like a striped tiger, say) 'first-order' cell assem¬
blies in the brain are activated. They record a series of visual
impressions or views of the object. (These views are determined by
which parts of the object the eyes have fixated on during the percep¬
tual sequence.) This information is then further analyzed and becomes
integrated into the perception of a single object via the operation of
'second order' cell assemblies.
^A. Hannay, Mental Images - A Defense (London, Unwin Brothers Ltd.,
1971), p. 172.
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Imagery, according to Hebb, involves the spontaneous reinstatement
of the preceding perceptual activity. And depending on which hierachi-
cal order of cell assemblies is activated, the resultant imagery varies
in its vividness, sensory concreteness, and stability. Apparently,
excitation of first order cell assemblies, produces vivid imagery but
in bits and pieces only. The subject (if he or she is aware of it at
all) experiences not a whole visual array, but 'flashes' of imagery,
replications of the various views of the object as conveyed during the
original perception. In the case of a tiger image, presumably, the
subject might have access to the tiger's head, paws, tail and back, but
none of these altogether. Hebb describes the fleetingness of the
memory image in these terms:
Both the memory image and the eidetic image arise
from perception. As we will see, this does not
mean that the memory image is identical with percep¬
tion (though eidetic imagery may be), but it does
have implications that have not been recognized.
The percept of any but the simplest object cannot
be regarded as a static pattern of activity iso¬
morphic with the perceived object but must be a
seguentially organized or temporal pattern. The
same statement applies to the memory.1
So it would seem that the logical behaviourist tests are not
definitive at all. It could be that people have images but because of
the 'fleetingness characteristic' or the 'accessibility problem' or
D.O. Hebb, "Concerning Imagery," in Images, Perceptions and
Knowledge, J.M. Nicholas (Ed.) (University of Western Ontario Series
in Philosophy of Science, Boston: D. Reidel Co., 1974), p. 143.
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some combination of these, they are unable to make use of their images
in the way that they might make use of (or behave in respect of) a
picture in a portrait gallery. This does not mean that there are no
images, no analogue structures which convey spatial information liter¬
ally rather than discursively, but just that there are no (portrait
gallery) pictures in the brain or in the mind.
In one way or another, I believe that the logical behaviourists
have been making too much of the need for interpretation when they
express qualms over the idea that there are such things as imagistic
thoughts. And, as I have indicated earlier, in connection with the
discussion of the representation-by-resemblance issue, I have sympa¬
thies with their concerns. Whatever else Shepard may be saying in
his analogue theory, he cannot be saying that analogue structures can
stand on their own as the units of cognitive meaning. They do require
interpretation. Nevertheless, the logical behaviourists seem often to
go on to assume (or argue) that once we realize that pictures and other
modes of representation require interpretation, the differences between
the various modes must only be surface differences. In addition, it is
often claimed that since all modes require interpretation, if they are
to function symbolically, the underlying understanding of pictures and
other modes must be propositional. This is, I take it, the basic
structure of the inference which lies at the heart of the present issue.
There are no images, it is concluded, there are just propositions.
But the fact that we must, at some stage, interpret pictures and
interpret our images, does not mean that pictures and images really
are just a propositional mode of representation. Images under
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description are, after all, still images. Nor do I see why it is
reasonable to dismiss ja apriori the idea that images may have a func¬
tion.
Of course the case for this functional utility must be established
on the basis of experimental investigation, but a_ priori one can point
out two respects in which the construction of images might be helpful in
cognition. First, if images represent spatial properties and relation¬
ships in an analogue form, then they may be more efficient for carrying
out certain tasks than discursive, verbal representations. An example
of such a task would be the similarity/dissimilarity assessment task
reguired of Shepard's subjects. Second, an image might manifest emer¬
gent properties which could not be readily computed from the original
fund of propositional information available to the subject. An example
of this would be counting the number of windows in one's house by
'reading off' the information from an image. Clearly, if the subject
does not happen to know as a matter of fact, how many windows there
are in his house, he can only compute this on a pictorial basis. No
other facts about his house will provide him with any basis for infer¬
ring window number.
The point is that images may integrate with discursive modes of
internal representation. Recall, once again, the details of the
Shepard experiments. There are two cognitive processes postulated by
the proposed explanation of the results. In the first phase, a pair of
images is constructed. In the second phase, a rotation to congruence
or non-congruence takes place. The explanation thus implies (what
common sense also suggests) that we have cognitive faculties that can
196
construct images which display the information that corresponding
descriptions convey discursively. The reaction-time results demonstrate
that having the information displayed as an image (i.e., in analogue
form) facilitates performance in certain kinds of tasks. (In effect,
using the imagery rather than a description enables the subjects to
perform the task of shape assessment in parallel rather than in series:
they can be dealing with object A and object B at the same time.)
5.6 The Infinite Regress Issue
There is, then, the third issue in the list (of logical behaviour¬
ist complaints) adduced earlier to be considered. This is the infinite
regress issue. In general, it can be said that the issue focuses on
the nature of cognitive explanation. And it is generated, say the
logical behaviourists, by virtue of the fact that non-behaviourist
philosophers and psychologists have insisted on postulating internal
representations in the crucial explanatory role.
The problem is, they argue, that such representations simply
duplicate the activity they were postulated to explain and, thus, they,
in turn, require explanation. The argument given in support of this
can be stated in abstract terms: nothing is intrinsically a represen¬
tation of anything. Something is a representation only for or tjo
someone. Thus, any representation or system of representation requires
at least one user or interpreter of the representation who is external
to it. And any such interpreter must have a variety of psychological
or intentional traits - it must be capable of a variety of comprehen¬
sion, and it must have beliefs and goals (so it can use the
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representation to inform itself and thus assist it in achieving its
goals). Such an interpreter is then a sort of homunculus - a little
man inside the head who does everything the external man apparently
does. He reads-off or hears the given information (presumably in
former case, from some kind of internal viewing screen or, in the
latter case, from some kind of inner voice) and then performs the
requisite operation.
Suppose we say, for instance, as presumably the image theorist
does, that we cannot account for spatial problem solving of a given
type unless we suppose that the mind/brain is capable of representing
the problematic situation to itself in imagistic terms. Does this
explain the problem solving activity? On the contrary, it simply
invites the retort - 'What good would image representation do us unless
we have an inner eye to perceive it, and equally, how are we to explain
its capacity for perception and problem solving?' The very notion of a
'mind's eye' seems to require a second processing system, or 'mind's
eye's brain', to interpret information from the mind's eye, which, in
turn, would require another eye to interpret the images projected onto
this internal brain, and so on in an infinite regress. Daniel Dennett
puts the problem of postulating images as cognitive explanations in
these terms:
For an image to work as an image there must be a
person (or analogue of a person) to see or observe
it, to recognize or ascertain the qualities in
virtue of which it is an image of something.
Imagine a fool putting a television camera on his
car and connecting it to a small receiver under the
bonnet so the engine could 'see where it is going'.
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The madness in this is that although an image has
been provided, no provision has been made for any¬
one or anything analogous to a perceiver to watch
the image. This makes it clear that if an image
is to function as an element in perception, it will
have to function as the raw material and not the
end product, for if we suppose that the product
of the perceptual process is an image, we shall
have to design a perceiver-analogue to sit in front
of the image, and yet another to sit in front of
the image which is the end product of perception
in the perceiver analogue and so on ad infinitum.
And consider Wittgenstein's statement of the infinite regress prob¬
lem relative to the postulation of imagery:
How is he to know what colour he is to pick out
when he hears 'red'? Quite simple: he is to
take the colour whose image occurs to him when
he hears the word. But how is he to know which
colour it is 'whose image occurs to him'? Is a
further criterion needed for that?^
Here the original puzzle has to do with how we know to what colour the
word 'red' refers. The alleged explanation (on the traditional empiri¬
cist account of language use) is that we find this out by having an
image of 'red'. But Wittgenstein's argument then runs, if we need a
criterion to determine to what colour the word refers, we should equally
need a criterion to determine to what colour the image refers. And,
similarly, it might be added, we should need a further criterion to
Daniel Dennett, "The Nature of Images and the Introspective
Trap," in Imagery, Ned Block (Ed.), op. cit., p. 52.
2
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, op. cit., p. 239.
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determine to what colour this new criterion applies, and so on. So, in
effect, we could never use the criterion. To point this out underlines
the unsatisfactory character of the original explanation and makes it
perfectly clear, too, that we cannot evade the difficulty by intro¬
ducing a third, fourth, or fifth criterion into the story.
The gist of the infinite regress argument, I take it, then, is
this: If the fact that people solve spatial problems of the similarity/
dissimilarity type when they are seated in a psychology laboratory with
the test objects physically present to them is somehow in need of
explanation, that explanation cannot be furnished by simply arguing
that people can generate internal replicas of the objects in guestion
and so simulate the problematic situation. On the contrary, if the
former ability/activity is in need of explanation, then so also is the
latter ability/activity. Retreating to the 'internal form' makes no
substantial difference to the problem solving. Thus, it is concluded
that postulating analogue structures as Shepard, for instance does, does
not provide an explanation, it only pushes that explanation back a
step.
Now it seems to me that there are three considerations that could
well mitigate the force of the infinite regress argument as far as
Shepard's image theory goes. The first of these has to do with whether
or not the first step in the alleged regress does in fact duplicate
in its entirety the activity it is designed to explain (and hence
invite explanation itself). Shepard has argued that the problem
solving activity of his subjects goes forward on the basis of the
generation in the brain of structures which are analogues of the
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physical objects in question. One could formulate this more formally
in terms of the general pronouncement: Spatial problem solving of
type 'X' requires the utilization of internal analogue structures.
But, it will be recalled, there is more to Shepard's story than this.
Shepard stipulates both structures and processes which operate on and
manipulate these structures. Not only are there analogue structures
in the brain, but, according to Shepard, these structures undergo a
process of rotation - analogous to the process which would, presumably,
take place physically/behaviourally if the subjects were free (as they
are not in the experiment) to handle the test objects and move them
into positions of relative congruence. Thus what happens in the
internal forum is in no sense a replication of the activity in need of
explanation. On the contrary, the 'explanatory' activity includes a
further, and, as it happens, crucial, processing step. There is a
genuine causal explanation here: people solve spatial problems of the
given type because the rotation enables them to do this. Certainly
there is a regress of explanation here in the trivial sense that there
is in any explanation - a problematic situation or term has been
explained in terms of something else. But it is, I take it, a regress
of one stage only.
Secondly, there is no reason to assume that if the similarity/
dissimilarity calculation is or must be preceded by the generation and
rotation of analogue structures in the brain, then the calculation of
similarity/dissimilarity in the case of the internal analogue struc¬
tures themselves requires the generation of further analogue structures
and so on. On the contrary, all we are asked to assume is that the
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nervous system of the human organism is 'constructed' or 'wired' in
such a way as to accomplish the relevant rotation operation.
This is, I take it, essentially the same argument that Jerry Fodor
has put forward in order to defend imagistic explanation from the infin¬
ite regress objection. Fodor characterizes the objection in this way,
Having images is supposed to be part of the percep¬
tual process. But now, if images themselves have to
be perceived (scanned, etc.) to recover the infor¬
mation they contain, then surely we have taken the
first step in a regress which will eventually reguire
the postulation of images without number and endless
perceivers and look at them.-'-
To this Fodor replies:
This is, however, a bad argument. It assumes, guite
without justification, that if recovering information
from the external environment reguires having an
image, recovering information from an image reguires
having an image too. But why should we assume that.^
If we consider just how the average computer operates - just how
it eventually comes to cash-out its own internal representation struc¬
tures - we can, says Fodor, learn a valuable lesson. The lesson has to
do with just how human cognitive representations such as images might
get 'cashed-out' without any deficit of explanation. Fodor gives a
"'"Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought (Thos. Crowell and Co.
Inc., 1975), p. 19.
2Ibid., p. 19.
202
rough sketch of computer operation. Real computers characteristically
use at least two different languages: an input/output language in which
they communicate with their environment and a machine language in which
they talk to themselves (i.e., in which they run their computations).
'Compilers' mediate between the two languages in effect by specifying
bi-conditionals whose left-hand side is a formula in the input/output
code and whose right-hand side is a formula in the machine code. Such
bi-conditionals are, to all intents and purposes, representations of
truth conditions for formulae in the input/output language, and the
ability of the machine to use that language depends on the availability
of those definitions.
Fodor's point is that though the machine must have a compiler if
it is to use the input/output language, it doesn't also need a com¬
piler for the machine language. What avoids an infinite regression of
compilers and, presumably, what would avoid an infinite regression of
images, is the fact that the machine or the brain is built to use the
machine - or image - language. Writes Fodor,
Roughly, the machine language differs from the input/
output language in that its formulae correspond
directly to computationally relevant physical states
and operations of the machine. the physics of the
machine thus guarantees that the seguences of state
and operations it runs through in the course of its
computations respect the semantic constraints on
formulae in its internal language. What takes the
place of a truth definition for the machine language
is simply the engineering principles which guarantee
this correspondence.!
"^Ibid. , p. 66.
203
One might say, then, the cognitive explanation by way of analogue
structures and processes in the brain, is a 'privileged' kind of
explanation - just as, in religious contexts, explanation of the
existence of the universe, by way of the postulation of an Unmoved
Hover is a 'privileged' kind of explanation. God is, so to speak, a
bottom-line in the causal chain - it makes no sense to ask on what
(causal) basis God exists, it is simply in the nature of God that He
does. Egually, it is in the physical-neurological nature of the human
brain that similarity/dissimilarity assessments can be made on the
basis of the generation and rotation of analogue structures - no
further explanation - no further postulation - is invited or reguired.
The third consideration which, it seems to me, is relevant to the
discussion of the infinite regress problem and its conseguences for
Shepard's work is this: Shepard has put forward for our consideration,
a straightforward empirical hypothesis - problem solving of type 'X'
goes forward on the basis of the generation and rotation of analogue
structures in the brain. The infinite regress does not apply in the
case of assertions of this sort, any more than there is a regress
involved in asserting that every happy marriage is preceded by a happy
engagement. This latter is simply a sociological hypothesis to be
examined as such. A person can put forward this hypothesis without
being at all committed to asserting that every happy engagement is
preceded by a previous happy engagement. Similarly, to assert that
spatial problem solving of type 'X' is preceded by 'analogue' brain
activity, is to propose a physiological hypothesis which could be
criticized only by making observations and seeing whether we can
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discover cases where in fact spatial problem solving of the given type
occurs without the requisite analogue activity. A person, like Shepard,
who says that in fact such problem solving is always so preceded is not
at all compelled to hold that every instance of analogue activity is in
turn preceded by another instance of analogue activity. An infinite
regress argument, to put the matter generally, has no applicability to
the straightforward empirical assertion that every A is preceded by
a B.
The regress argument would have applicability only in circumstances
where the 'explanatory assertion' purports to be conceptual rather than
straightforwardly empirical/causal. Let me explain. Suppose that
Shepard had argued that being preceded by the generation and rotation
of analogue structures in the brain is what makes a given activity an
instance of problem solving of type X. Roughly, the thesis here is
that the problem solving activity is constituted by its particular
etiology. This assertion, the logical behavourist might well say, is
problematic. In particular, it does not provide an explanation of any¬
thing. For on this account, one cannot possibly know that a given
piece of problem solving behaviour is in fact the genuine article
without first knowing that it is preceded by analogue activity. But,
then, according to the regress argument, it must equally be the case
that the problem solving quality of this activity is constituted by
its relation to previous analogue activity and so on jad infinitum. So
we are never in a position to discover whether an act is or is not
spatial problem solving of the given type, although this is just what
the alleged explanation set out to tell us how to do.
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Ryle and, I take it, the other logical behaviourists seem to har¬
bour an objection in principle to imagery simply because, more often
than not, when philosophers and psychologists have postulated such
entities, they have cast them (incorrectly) in the conceptual role.
Which is to say that they have sought to use imagery to explain what
spatial problem solving, or intelligence, or thought etcetera is. But
conceptual problems as Ryle rightly insists, cannot be dealt with by
postulating entities and/or processes in an internal forum. Problem
solving behaviour is not what it is because it has the kind of etiology
it has. Indeed, the physical causality of the problem solving behaviour
is beside the point here. That the behaviour of Shepard's subjects
constitutes problem solving behaviour of type 'X' is decided by extra-
causal considerations - specifically, that the subjects are participat¬
ing in a psychology experiment, that they are seated in a laboratory,
and that they are pushing buttons, pulling levers, etc. indicating, when
successful, answers which the psychologist conducting the experiments
has already decided are correct. The satisfaction of these (behav¬
ioural/contextual) conditions is what makes this an instance of problem
solving of type 'X' - these conditions define the nature of the act."'"
Richard Rorty explains the origin of the Rylean objection
(paranoia?) to (about) intellectualist theorizing at some length in his
book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton University Press,
1979). Rorty argues that because philosophers and psychologists have
so often been guilty of offering causal explanations in response to
conceptual problems and vice versa, Ryle and company have come, over
time, to adopt an 'across the board' reaction to intellectualist theor¬
izing of any kind. In particular, they see the dreaded infinite
regress problem, cropping up whenever internal entities, states (such
as images) etc. are proposed. Rorty writes, "The central point is that
explanatory entities postulated by psychologists reduplicate problems
in the explananda only when these problems are bad problems anyway -
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The important thing to bear in mind for the purpose of assessing
Shepard's image theory is that conceptual explanations and causal
explanations are not in competition. Each is an acceptable kind of
explanation. In particular, it is perfectly acceptable to seek a
causal explanation for the behaviour of Shepard's subjects (or anyone,
for that matter, engaged in similarity/dissimilarity calculations of
appropriate sort), so long as one does not make the mistake of
attempting to answer the conceptual/definitional question, to explicate
how to identify spatial problem solving with this explanation.
Shepard's analogue theory, I take it, does not offend against Ryle's
(conceptual/causal) distinction. The analogue theory is explanatory
for the purposes it was originally designed.
5.7 The Privacy Issue
The fourth and final issue that logical behaviourists adduce in
connection with imagery is the privacy issue. The logical behavour-
ists insist that however plausible for empirical reasons an image based
account of cognition may be (even if, as in the case of Shepard's
experiments, such an account appears to explain an otherwise very
puzzling reaction-time pattern), it must be wrong. It is in the nature
of the case, they argue, that our experience, naming, and use of images
for example, "How is recognition possible?" Philosophers like Malcolm
and Ryle are accustomed to bad philosophical answers to bad philo¬
sophical questions: "How is motion possible? - as the actualization
of potential qua potential;" "Why does nature follow laws? - because
of God's benevolence and omnipotence." Consequently, they tend to
see such questions lurking behind even quite specific and limited
research programs." p. 239.
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is idiosyncratic. Because of their highly individual and concrete
nature, and because they presumably subsist somewhere/somehow in the
internal forum, images do not, indeed, cannot conform to a socially
based set of rules and conventions. And, in principle, there is nothing
to prevent their being used entirely at random.
At bottom, I take it, the logical behaviourists object to what
they take to be the 'private language' implications of postulating
imagery. It is thought that by countenancing imagery one is as well
countenancing - even endorsing - the possibility of a private language.
And this possibility, the logical behaviourists, following Wittgenstein,
reject ja priori.
Wittgenstein, on my reading of him in the Philosophical Investiga¬
tions , is basically concerned to show that no definite sense attaches
to the notion of a term in a private languge being used coherently - as
opposed, that is, to being used at random. Wittgenstein has, in this
respect, two ways of characterizing a private language: either as one
whose terms refer to things that only its speaker can experience or as
a language for the applicability of whose terms there exist no public
criteria or rules or conventions. For Wittgenstein's purposes (which
I take to be that of attacking the idea of a sense datum language)
these two formulations come to pretty much the same thing. If I am the
only one who can know what a term like 'image of object A' refers to
then, clearly, the conventions for applying that term cannot be public.
For, by hypothesis, only I could tell when the conventions are satis¬
fied; only I know whether a certain event is of the kind that falls
under the conventions. And in such a situation, says Wittgenstein,
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where there is no possibility of an objective, public check, there is
really no difference between getting the use of the term 'image of
object A' right and getting it wrong - no difference between obeying
the conventions for the use of the term and failing to obey them.
Now this raises certain questions in relation to the topic of
present concern. Do Shepard's 'mental images' and 'mental rotations'
constitute a kind of private language as judged by either or both of
the standards of privacy adduced by Wittgenstein? More generally, we
might ask, does Shepard, in his formulation of the image rotation
theory, make the mistake of postulating states and processes for which
there is in principle no possibility of establishing grounds for their
coherent use? And, do the terms 'mental image' and 'image rotation'
as they are utilized in Shepard's theory, refer to things and events
which are essentially and irrevocably private?
With these questions in mind, let us review, briefly, the facts
of the case. It is a general assumption of Roger Shepard's image rota¬
tion theory that the image rotations which people report are experi¬
enced brain states of a particular kind. They are states with which
people have an active relationship. People monitor the process of a
rotation and so come to solve the shape assessment problem in the
length of time it takes for the rotation (into congruence or non-
congruence) to be completed.
Are these monitored states private? D£ facto they certainly seem
to be. Mental images in general and image rotations in particular are
internal - we cannot put them on a table, so to speak, for all to see.
This means that we cannot provide an ostensive definition for an
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instance of image rotation as we can for the dog 'Fido'. Image rota¬
tions cannot be seen or experienced by other people with the 'outer
eye' .
But privacy, surely, is a matter of degree, not of all or none.
And just because a given object or event is not ostensively definable,
does not mean that it cannot be so defined in certain circumstances.
Consider, once again, the situation in which a companion reports that
he is holding several coins in the right-hand pocket of his jacket.
Are the coins private to this individual? Certainly, they have all
the earmarks of being so. No one but the individual making the report
can see or have any physical contact with the coins and so as external
observers we must take it more or less on faith that our companion
knows what he is talking about and that he is not intending to deceive
us. However, we could if we were inclined, require or even force our
companion to let us take a look and see whether or not there are any
coins in the pocket to be handled. Coins are the kinds of things that
can in principle be brought into the public forum and be subjected to
public inspection.
Now it seems to me that Shepard's image rotations are very like
the coins in our companion's pocket,which is to say that they are pri¬
vate as a matter of fact but not necessarily or irrevocably so. Let
me explain. It is a crucial feature of Shepard's image rotation theory
that it has to do, ultimately, with neurophysiological states and
events. The image structures and image processes are actual physical
states and processes occurring in/on a physical organ - the human
brain - which people are able to experience. Such things are, I take
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it, public, at least in principle. Of course, it is true that such
structures and processes have not yet been identified in the brain
through neurophysiological investigation. But this simply reflects
current limitations in our ability, technically, to deal with, examine,
and map the brain. The important point is that, if Shepard's theory
is true, there can be some sl<*/an empirical discovery to attest to its
truth - a discovery of some kind of neurophysiological state and/or
event which has analogue properties. And, if so, such a discovery will
be open to public examination, public discussion and image rotations
will then be, like the revealed coins, ostensively definable."'"
Of course it is one thing to argue that other people can identify
and observe the image rotation activity in the brain tissue of an
individual reporting image rotation but quite another to argue that
other people can actually experience - that they can actually see images
of Shepard-type objects rotating before their mind's eyes. In the case
of the hidden coins, it is not only possible for other people to see
them, but they can actually replicate the reported phenomenological
experience by placing their hands into the jacket pocket and grasping
the coins. They can, that is, have the experience of handling the
coins, just as the original coin reporter did. Now I see no reason why
"'"Of course, observation of brain activity is very likely to be
a complicated affair and it is probably reasonable to expect that
'observing' an image rotation in the cerebral cortex of an individual
reporting it, will not be exactly like having a mind's eye experience
of rotation or observing a rotation in a movie. After all, the brain
and movie screens are radically different kinds of substance. And
current research seems to indicate in fact that 'observing' mental
imagery will be more a matter of tracing electrical impulses with the
aid of instrumentation of some description than the straight-forward
seeing of shapes in rotation with the naked eye.
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this phenomenological replication could not be a possibility for image
rotation as well. If it is true that neuroscientists can ultimately
identify, in the brain, image rotation, then surely it is possible that
such brain activity could be generated or simulated in the brains of
other people (a la Wilder Penfield?). In this case, we might say that
not only can people see and verify image rotation as it occurs in an
individual reporting it, but they can also experience the same image
rotation themselves, by way of a replication of the appropriate brain
activity. And we might say to them, (though without literally point¬
ing) "This is image rotation." I would argue, therefore, that judged
by the first standard of privacy adduced by Wittgenstein, image rota¬
tions are not private. In principle they are open to the scrutiny and
experience of others.
Now the question is, what can we say about the second standard of
privacy adduced by Wittgenstein? This is the standard which has to do
with public conventions. Are there currently in place standards or
rules or language games to use Wittgenstein's description, for the
correct use of verbal reports of image rotations?
The first thing that ought to be acknowledged here is that image
rotations (and, indeed, image experiences of any sort) would appear to
be quite unlike pains or itches in that there are no obvious primitive
behavioural manifestations of them. (People do not grasp a leg and
wince as they do with a cramp, when they are imaging.) There are
certain behavioural signs which might be observed, such as an indivi¬
dual's having a pensive expression and gazing towards an indeterminate
and intrinsically unimportant area of space but this hardly
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distinguishes between the individual's reciting a poem to himself or
day-dreaming (linguistically) and imaging a rotation nor could these
behavioural signs be intimately involved in teaching or justifying the
employment of the concept of image rotation. There are no natural
behavioural expressions of having an image rotation for "I am having an
image rotation" to be a conventionalized extension of.
Having said this, however, it seems to me that there are concep¬
tual standards which might enable the external observer to judge the
sense, reasonableness and even accuracy of given verbal reports of
image rotation. Consider the following set of reports: A mathemati¬
cian claims that he is rotating mental images in order to solve a prob¬
lem of trigonometry. A small child (of three or four years) claims
that he is mentally rotating images and when questioned about this,
provides a demonstration of what a rotation is like by running his hand
in a continuous direction over the surface of a table. A group of stu¬
dents are observing a physical demonstration of rotation involving
three-dimensional models of Shepard-type objects and they report that
they are seeing mental images of these objects rotating before their
mind's eyes.
What is odd about these image rotation reports? The first report
and the last report of image rotation have been made in inappropriate
contexts. There is no connection of a problem solving kind between
trigonometry and image rotation and so we might reasonably conclude
that the mathematician must believe that image rotation is something
which it is not. And whatever the students may believe, when they are
sitting, eyes open - before a physical demonstration of objects in
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rotation, they are seeing the rotation, not imagining it. The child's
report, on the other hand, is a more straightforward case of misunder¬
standing - considerations of contexts do not lead us to this conclu¬
sion, the child's simulation of rotation does. Image rotation is not
anything like continuous movement in a straight line, and if the child
thinks that it is, he does not know what a rotation is and so cannot
reasonably be construed to be making a report of it.
I would argue, therefore, that the private language argument
cannot really be directed against the sort of theory that Shepard has
been advocating. Talk of Shepard's image rotations is no more mysteri¬
ous, no more ungoverned and random than our companion's talk of the
coins in his pocket. There are standards in place which enable us to
make judgments about reports of image rotation. People cannot just say
anything about image rotation and get away with it. People who demon¬
strate (by the contexts in which they make their reports, or by
attempted simulations) that they do not know what image rotation is,
cannot be reporting it.
5.8 Summary
Let me summarize the argument of this chapter as it has advanced
thus far. The four issues which have been adduced as constituting the
logical behaviourist case against Shepard's theory have been found to
be either indecisive against that theory or, worse, wrongly adduced in
the first place. In the case of the first issue - the representation-
by-resemblance issue - it has been argued that Shepard's theory is less
extreme than the more conventional image theories in that Shepard has
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made no attempt to make imaging the sum and substance of spatial
thought. In particular, Shepard leaves open the possibility for a
dual-coding model of cognition. On such a model, there is, in addi¬
tion to the postulated image system, a linguistic system and these two
systems are presumed to be functionally inter-dependent.
In the case of the second issue - the images-as-proposition issue
- it has been argued that the possibility of 'factual discovery' is not
a test that image systems always must fail (c.f. the 'number of windows
case') and not a definitive test anyway for the existence or non¬
existence of an image-like system of cognitive representation. The
explanation for the alleged fact that people are unable to discover the
number of stripes on an imaginary tiger's back may well point to some
peculiarity in the mechanics of image processing rather than the non¬
existence of image-like or analogue structures in the brain.
In the case of the third issue - the infinite regress issue - it
has been argued that Shepard's image theory provides a genuine causal
explanation for the behavioural phenomenon in question and that, con¬
sequently, no regress of explanation arises. People solve the
similarity/dissimilarity problem in the way that they do because
(causally because) image-like structures in the brain have achieved
mutual congruence or non-congruence. In addition, it has been noted
that no attempt is made by Shepard to provide by way of the postulated
analogue structures and processes, a conceptual account of what spatial
problem solving per se is.
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And finally, it has been argued that the privacy issue, so called,
is (or would be) inappropriately applied to Shepard's theory.
Shepard's mental images and image rotations are experienced states and
processes of a physical organ, specifically the human brain and, as
such, they are public, at least in principle. Additionally, it has
been noted that there are public conventions which establish the sense
and reasonableness of given image rotation reports.
I would argue, therefore, that Shepard's theory does not break any
of the established philosophical rules about cognitive explanation.
Shepard does not propose that spatial cognition should consist -
exclusively - in imaging, nor does he purport to tell us what spatial
cognition essentially is, nor, for that matter, are his image struc¬
tures and processes irrevocably private. They only seem to be so
because of the relatively primitive state of our knowledge of neuro¬
physiology. The truth of the matter is that Shepard is an image
theorist in a new sense and the standards by which it might have been
appropriate to judge and criticize the theories of Locke, Hume or
Bertrand Russell are inappropriate here.
So the guestions with which this chapter began remain. What is
wrong with cognitive explanations couched in terms of image rotation?
And what sense can we make out of the decidedly negative attitude
displayed by Shepard's commentators and critics? If Shepard's theory
provides a causal account of the reaction-time phenomenon, and if there
is nothing in principle wrong with such an account and if, as I have
argued at the outset of this chapter, alternative, linguistic theories
regarding the reaction-time phenomenon seem to be postulated with
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difficulty and at considerable theoretical cost, then there would seem
to be no good reason not to take Shepard seriously and, indeed, to fail
to do so would seem to betoken a deep-seated paranoia regarding the
matter.
H.H. Price in his Thinking and Experience"^ has argued that this
paranoia arises as a consequence of the weak imaging ability of most,
if not all, intellectuals. For them, according to Price, what is
usually called 'imaging' by the lay public simply fails to give rise
(in intellectuals) to anything that could properly be called a 'visual'
or even an incipiently or guasi-visual, experience. Price describes
the situation re image experience in these terms:
It begins to look as if this extreme view about
the total irrelevance of images in thinking were
just academic in the bad sense of that word: a
superstition engendered in the minds of highly
intellectual persons by their ignorance of what
happens in ordinary unintellectual mankind.... Ask
the ordinary man (not a philosopher) what he means
by the word 'butterfly' and he will very likely
have a visual image representing the Cabbage White.
Say to him 'there is an elephant coming down the
street' and he will very likely have a visual image
of this unlikely spectacle, perhaps a vivid and
detailed one.2





5.9 Attitudes to Imagery
There is some empirical support for Price's postulation as to the
likely distribution of image experience across individuals. Evidently,
not everyone has equivalent mind's eye sight. Sir Francis Galton
discovered this to be the case when he conducted his statistical
investigation of visual imagery reports. Galton proceeded by sending
a questionnaire to prominent scientists and thinkers. Among other
things, he asked his subjects to describe the vividness of their men¬
tal imagery as they attempted to recall, as clearly as possible, their
morning's breakfast table with all jts contents. A number of the
would-be respondents to this questionnaire evinced genuine surprise
that anyone would seriously ask questions about the size, shape, faint-
ness or vividness, of given (supposed) image-objects, when, so they
said, they did not now (or indeed ever) experience such objects. They
could recall 'facts' - which is to say, propositions, about the break¬
fast table (that it had a table cloth of such-and-such a colour on it,
that a tea pot was sitting in the middle, etc.) but nothing else."''
G.H. Betts conducted a similar course of investigation with simi-
2
lar results. He found that some of his subjects reported imagery
experience, while some did not. Betts also found that depending on
which 'camp' of imaging ability the individual subjects fell into ('the
Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and Development
(London, 1883).
2
G.H. Betts, "The Distribution and Function of Mental Imagery,"
Columbia University Teachers College Contributions to Education,
1909, No. 26.
218
good visualizers1 or the 'poor imagers' as Betts described them) they
often held a corresponding prejudice. The subjects who reported
visual imagery tended to react with disbelief or even pity when told
that some people think mainly in words. Conversely, the subjects who
claimed to be without the image experience, seemed to be puzzled as to
how it might be possible to form visual images and, once formed, how
any kind of rational thinking is likely to take place.
Anne Roe used interviews to find out the experienced representa¬
tion of thought in various scientists."'" Her results indicated that
about one-third were visualizers, one-third were verbalizers, and about
one-guarter were 'imageless' in that they just knew something was going
on without being able to qualify the nature of their representations.
(The rest were mixed.) Significantly, Roe found more visualizers among
physical scientists and more verbalizers among social scientists.
It could be, then, that the linguistic theorists are like Galton
and Betts' recalcitrant subjects or Roe's social scientists - bereft of
the imagery experience. And when confronted with the necessity of
solving spatial problems, they generally find themselves engaged in an
abbreviated form of private dialectic or, just as likely, they find
themselves having no problem solving experience of any kind. This, at
any rate, appears to be the phenomenology behind Daniel Dennett's
attempt to tell the image introspector participating in Shepard's
experiments what his problem solving experience is really like. He is
"*"Anne Roe, "A Study of Imagery in Research Scientists," Journal
of Personality, Vol. 19, 1951, pp. 459-470.
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not having an experience of images rotating in a mind-space, Dennett
insists, he only thinks he is. The following passage is clearly auto¬
biographical and it betrays (though I am sure Dennett would be shocked
to hear it) a phenomenological predisposition to the linguistic theory.
Dennett writes,
Aren't we directly aware of an image rotating in
phenomenal space in this instance? No. And that
much, I think, you can quickly ascertain to your
own satisfaction. For isn't it the case that if
you attend to your experience more closely when
you say you rotate the image you find that it
moves in discrete jumps - it flicks through a
series of orientations. You cannot gradually
speed up or slow down the rotation, can you? But
now, 'look' again. Isn't it really that these dis¬
crete steps are discrete propositional episodes?-'-
Daniel Dennett, Brainstorms, op. cit., p. 168. Dennett may well
be shocked to hear that a phenomenological prejudice has been ascribed
to him, but it is interesting to note that elsewhere (in "The Nature of
Images and the Introspective Trap," Imagery, N. Block (Ed.), 1981, op.
cit., Dennett has himself had occasion to make a case for the influ¬
ential role that phenomenological considerations can play in the
development of a theory of cognition. In particular, Dennett refers
to the 'introspective trap' so-called, to which, he tells us, non-
philosophers have fallen prey, and he attempts to explain the develop¬
ment of the image theory on this basis. He writes, "Introspection is
often held to tell us that consciousness is filled with a variety of
peculiar objects and qualities that cannot be accounted for by a
purely physical theory of mind." (Dennett, 1981, op. cit., p. 52). I
am simply suggesting that it is not unreasonable to expect that the
introspective trap could cut both ways - that philosophers may like¬
wise be influenced by phenomenological considerations. They experi¬
ence (or make reference to) no images (or precious few) during problem
solving sequences, and so find the suggestion that images have a
significant role to play in cognition quite incredible. Just as the
layman's natural inclination (so Dennett insists) is toward the image
theory, so too the philosopher's natural inclination is likely to be
toward the linguistic theory. This supposition, it seems to me, is
entirely consistent with the strategy of Dennett's own 'introspective
trap' account of things.
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No doubt this will seem a rather harsh judgment of the ultimate
motivation of the linguistic theorists (in particular and most philo¬
sophers and psychologists in general). After all, to say that they
have a phenomenological predisposition to the linguistic theory, or to
put this the other way around, that they have a phenomenological
aversion to the image theory, is to ascribe to them nothing less than
the attitude of the proverbial 'dog in the manger'. Indeed, the opera¬
tive suggestion here seems to be that, motivationally, the linguistic
theorists are not unlike the puritanical Victorian matrons who felt
compelled to describe sexual enjoyment as base, decadent, and even
unnatural, simply because they did not find sex to be enjoyable. And
the evidence for this attitude - the one revealing passage from Dennett
and the fact that some individuals are weak imagers and have a corre¬
sponding prejudice about the nature of cognitive representation - is
not exactly overwhelming.
But there is, I think, more substance to this explanation by
phenomenological predisposition/aversion than might be evident at first
glance. The fact is that there appears to be good reason to suppose
that the linguistic theorists are quite likely to fall into Betts'
category of 'weak imagers'. The evidence for this comes from psycho¬
logical research into the presence, in some individuals, of the
phenomenon known to psychologists as eidetic imagery and more popularly
known as photographic memory.
The individuals possessed of such memory experience visual imagery
which is percept-like in its vividness and are able to read-off from
that imagery, details which, apparently, are lost to normal imagers.
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A particularly striking instance of this phenomenon was recorded in
experiments conducted by Gordon Allport in 1924."'" A group of thirty
eleven-year old childern were asked to examine a picture depicting a
fairly complex European street scene for a period of nine seconds.
Later, looking at an empty white screen, on which they were told to
project their imagery (if they could), all but a few of the children
were able to glean details from the picture as though it were still
present. They could count the number of windows on a house depicted in
the background of the picture, and the number of cans on the milk cart
depicted in the foreground. And, remarkably, three of the children
were able to spell the word 'Gartenwirtschaft' either forward or back¬
ward even though they knew no German and the word was, to say the
least, hardly noteworthy printed above a shop in a scene filled with
people, animals and activities.
Another striking instance of this phenomenon has been recorded
2
by Stromeyer and Psotka in 1970. The Stromeyer and Psotka experiments
involved the use of a computer generated pattern which was cut down the
middle and presented to the subject (in this case a young woman) in
two pieces. The subject was asked to recall the pattern piece which
was presented to her left eye several hours earlier while the matching
pattern piece was simultaneously presented to her right eye. A central
three-dimensional sguare which is evident to people who view both
"*"G.W. Allport, "Eidetic Imagery," British Journal of Psychology,
Vol. 15, 1924, pp. 99-110.
2
C.f. Stromeyer and J. Psotka, "The Detailed Texture of Eidetic
Images," Nature, 1970, pp. 346-349.
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patterns simultaneously, was clearly visible to the subject.
Now the significance of the photographic memory phenomenon in the
context of the present discussion is not so much that it occurs but
the peculiar distribution of its occurrence across subjects. On the
evidence available so far, a pattern is clearly decipherable. Eidetic
experience is correlated with age: The older a given subject is the
less likely he or she is to have the eidetic experience, conversely,
the younger a given subject is the more likely he or she is to have the
1 2
eidetic experience. Both Teasdale (1934) and Morsh and Abbott (1943)
have shown this trend for random samples of subjects between the ages
of ten and nineteen years. Teasdale found 12.5% with eidetic imagery
in their eleventh year, 8.3% in their twelfth year, 5.8% in their
thirteenth year, reducing to only 2.1% among those in their fourteenth
year. Eidetic imagery does occur in adults but is very rare. Purdy
(1936)^ reported an adult subject with eidetic imagery in the modali¬
ties of sound, smell and touch in addition to sight, and more recently,
Peter Sheehan (1968)^ reported an eidetic twenty-one year old male
medical student who also appeared to possess vivid auditory imagery of
an eidetic type. At the other end of the scale, six and seven year old
^H.H. Teasdale, "A Quantitative Study of Eidetic Imagery,"
British Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol. 4, 1934, pp. 56-74.
2
J.E. Morsh and H.D. Abbott, "An Investigation of After-images,"
Journal of Comparative Psychology, Vol. 38, 1945, pp. 47-63.
"^D.M. Purdy, "Eidetic Imagery and Plasticity of Perception,"
Journal of General Psychology, Vol. 15, 1936, pp. 437-453.
4
P.W. Sheehan, "Color Response to the TAT: An Instance of
Eidetic Imagery?" Journal of Psychology, Vol. 68, 1968, pp. 203-209.
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children seem almost always to have the eidetic experience in some
degree. ^
Now what could account for this age-image correlation? Why should
the ability to experience vivid percept-like imagery occur so rarely
among adults? Apparently most, if not all, of us had this ability in
some degree during our childhood. But, somehow, in the gradual transi¬
tion from childhood to adulthood, we have lost it. Could it be that as
we grow older, we get 'out of practice' with images?
2
An impressive list of psychologists have argued that this is pre¬
cisely what happens. The suppression of the eidetic image experience
occurs as a consequence of the fact that as we grow with adulthood in a
modern industrialized society, verbal modes of encoding take precedence
over the image modes of early childhood. We are taught language and
Below this age it is, of course, hard to tell as verbal reports
are bound to become less and less detailed as vocabulary and attention
span gradually diminish. However, E.R. Jaensch (in Eidetic Imagery
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1930) and Alan Richardson (in
Mental Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1969) argue that
very young children, say in the pre-linguistic one to three year old
category, are more than likely to have eidetic imagery. Certainly
this would go some way to providing an explanation for the small
child's frequent confusion of imagined objects and events with
reality - the 'scary monster' in the closet conjured up by the three
year old is so frightening precisely because it looks to be really
present - none of the vividness of the original experience of the
monster on television has been lost.
2
Psychologists George Humphrey (Thinking an Introduction to its
Experimental Psychology, London: Methuen and Co., 1963), Leonard Doob,
("Eidetic Imagery: A Cross-Cultural Will-O-The-Wisp?," Journal of
Psychology, 1966); Alan Richardson (Mental Imagery, London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1969), E.C. Bartlett (Remembering7 Cambridge University
Press, 1932); J. Pi&get (The Construction of Reality in the Child. New
York: Basic Books, 1954); and H. Werner and B. Kaplan (Symbol forma¬
tion: An Organismic Development Approach to the Psychology of Language
and Experience of Thought. New York: Wiley, 1968) have maintained
versions of this hypothesis.
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the structure of language imposes a more abstract form upon the way in
which our experiences are recorded and stored. Psychologist Alan
Richardson states the hypothesis in these terms:
... the trend of these observations provides support
for the traditional view that eidetic imagery is
part of a more general mode of concrete functioning
which in the normally developing Western child dis¬
appears as he enters on his high school education.
During the pre-adolescent period of physical and
cerebral maturation the increased capacity for
abstract thought is stimulated and encouraged in most
school subjects. In accord with this trend, linguis¬
tic skills in oral and written expression take prece¬
dence over the inexpressible image. Though some
personally experienced events may continue to be
registered with something of their original sensory-
affective guality, such events are also categorized
in more abstract terms. Language is used more and
more to compress, to represent and to express our
experience ... under these conditions, it is perhaps
not so surprising that the ability to use imagery in
these who once possessed it begins to wither away
from lack of use. Once lost it is not usually
regained.^
Richardson's hypothesis is highly plausible. Language acguisition
brings with it a habit of abstraction. With the acguisition of the
concept 'red', for instance, we do not acguire a public label for a
purely private experience. Rather, we acguire an ability to identify
an objective property - a colour property as opposed to a size property
or shape property - which is inherent in and characteristic of things
as diverse as fire engines, blood, stop lights, and the Canadian maple
leaf. Similarly, the small child learns that the term 'teddy bear'
^Richardson, ibid., p. 40.
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applies to pictures in books, Paddington bears on television, and
stuffed objects in other children's houses, as well as "Teddy" at the
bottom of the bed. And the acquisition of this concept entails the
child's recognition of the existence of classes. Teddy is j} teddy bear,
a member of a class characterized by certain specifiable physical and/or
practical properties as well as the (one and only) teddy bear at the
bottom of the bed.
In addition to this, the propositional structure of language
imposes an abstract form on the way in which our experiences are repre¬
sented and reported. We are taught to report that we went to the post
office yesterday and that we bought so many stamps rather than retrieve
in a quasi-sensory affective form a re-experience of the sights, sounds,
smells, tastes, pressures and temperatures that were involved in the
original experience. And gradually, by a process of social reinforce¬
ment, we come to recognize that 'propositional remembering' is generally
of more practical use to us than recalling what the sensory-affective
experience of being in the post office, buying the stamps, etc. was
really like. What we need to know in order to get along in the world
and to communicate with other people, are the particular contents of
these experiences abstracted and distilled from the sensory context.
And language - not imagery - provides a vehicle for this abstraction
and distillation.
Assuming, then, that language training has a cumulative effect
(facility with language develops in accordance with degree of exposure
to it that is), and assuming that the aforementioned facility ensures
(or at any rate helps to ensure) the entrenchment of the habit of
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abstraction, then it seems entirely reasonable to expect that adults
will be less likely to experience imagery than children. They will be
likely to recall that such-and-such took place in the morning rather
than the various sensory affective states occasioned by observing or
indeed by undergoing the event(s) in question. Indeed, it seems
reasonable to expect the very gradation in imagery experience among
children which the Teasdale and Morsh and Abbott eidetic imagery experi¬
ments indicate. Plainly stated, imagery experience should be propor¬
tionate to degree of language training and attainment, and the younger
a given child is, the less likely he or she is to have been 'trained
away' from the sensory and affective to the abstract and conventional.
All this means, of course, is that the so-called linguistic theorists -
given that they are fully trained language users - are quite likely to
be weak imagers.
But beyond this, within the category of 'fully trained language
users', there is a further distinction to be made. There are those who
have received extra or special language training in the course of their
pursuit of a particular field of knowledge. They are, to be more
specific, people like the linguistic theorists - philosophers, psycholo¬
gists, political scientists and mathematicians - who in addition to
being conversant in one or more natural language (like English or
German) have to come to develop a facility in what might be described
as a 'second language'. This is a technical language specifically
designed to facilitate discourse in the given academic discipline.
Generally speaking, languages of this sort are replete with abstract or
theoretical concepts and those who regularly work within the confines
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of these languages must be more than usually comfortable with, and
indeed given to, abstraction.
We find, for instance, students of politics speaking freely and
meaningfully about things like democracy and autocracy even though,
strictly speaking, neither of these things can be defined ostensively.
They conduct debates and write essays about the human condition, never
once referring to an individual human being or to a particular set of
circumstances. The focus of the inguiry is an idealized man operating
out of an idealized set of circumstances. For the political scientist
he is the 'average citizen', the 'man on the Clapham omnibus', or for
Marx, the 'exploited worker'. Similarly, the basic objects of concern
for the mathematician are numbers, of which there are various kinds -
natural, real, infinite, etc. And these are objects which cannot be
pointed to. The mathematician working in set theory defines numbers in
terms of classes or sets and he is well-aware of the point (made origin¬
ally by Frege) that having a number (for example, being two), is not a
feature of individual things or heaps of things (as being red is) but
pertains, rather, to concepts or sets. To a pile of boots as such no
number can be attributed. But to the set of boots in the pile or to
the concept 'boot in this pile', a number does belong.
Indeed, it would be true to say that, by and large, images would
get in the way at the practice of these disciplines. Clearly, the
ability to experience vivid visual detail will be of little assistance
to the philosopher writing an essay on pornography and censorship. Nor
will it be of assistance to the democratic theorist engaged in the
process of criticizing the Soviet system of government. The success of
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these enterprises depends on the ability of the respective practitioners
to abstract from the sensory and affective to the stipulation of what,
in principle, constitutes pornography and what constitutes communism
or socialism. Being able to call to mind a vivid visual image of a
particular scene from a pornographic film or being able to picture Red
Sguare in Moscow during a May Day rally will be of little assistance
in this.
My suggestion, then, is this: Given that language training per se
seems to have the effect of eroding the phenomenal experience of
imagery, it seems reasonable to expect that specialized language train¬
ing - language training in disciplines with abstract vocabularies and
concerns - would be likely to increase the image erosion effect. We
should expect, that is, that those who have been trained in the most
abstract languages - people like the linguistic theorists for instance
- will have the least imagery experience.
Indeed, it could be said that through their extensive language
training, the linguistic theorists have been conditioned to represent
the world, both publicly and privately (i.e., silently), in abstract
linguistic terms. And they are likely to display a marked preference
for dealing with the world on a 'hands-off' basis. Since they have
very sophisticated language tools available to them - tools which
enable them to describe the world in minute detail and to place objects
and events in neat conceptual categories - they are likely to attempt
to solve problems, even perhaps spatial problems, descriptively and
analytically rather than by way of concrete interaction or intervention.
Consequently, when they advert to the contents of their so-called
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'silent soliloquies' during a problem solving sequence, they regularly
find themselves engaged in the construction of propositions and the
manipulation of abstract concepts. (See Appendix E.)
Now with specific reference to Shepard's shape assessment problem,
we have only one introspective report of an individual who falls into
the category of specially trained language user. Philosopher Daniel
Dennett reports problem solving without image rotation when he attempts
to solve Shepard's problem. He claims that he talks to himself about
how the test objects would look relative to one another if one of the
objects was to undergo a series of short rotations in the direction of
the other. It seems to me that there are two possible explanations
for Dennett's report. It could be that Dennett is simply deluding him¬
self as to the nature of his phenomenological experience. This, after
all, is what Dennett himself purports to tell other people about their
experience. It is possible that Dennett is simply focusing on one
stage - perhaps the last stage of his problem solving activity where he
registers (linguistically) the outcome of a rotation - such that he
fails to remember the former image rotation stage. So Dennett does,
or would do, what everyone else does, but is just not attuned to this
fact. The second possibility is that Dennett may genuinely not be using
image rotation in order to make the required shape assessment. He
could be using the linguistic strategy I have discussed earlier. This
is a possibility given that Dennett is strongly motivated by his train¬
ing and his expertise with language to use language wherever he can.
If this is the case, then it is a great shame and a sad comment on the
utility of philosophical training relative to certain kinds of problem
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solving in the real world. For a linguistic strategy, in the case of
Shepard's shape assessment problem, is inefficient and, in fact,
systematically militates against achieving the solution to the prob¬
lem.
Between these two possibilities, I favour the former. (There are
no data on Dennett's reaction time, and so I cannot argue this defini¬
tively as I could if Dennett displayed the linear reaction-time effect.)
It may be that philosophers and other specially trained language users
do try to solve most if not all of their spatial problems in language,
but this is one problem where it seems to me their hand/s will be
forced and they are likely to use mental imagery and image rotation -
though focusing most particularly on whatever linguistic activity
precedes or follows the rotation.
Leaving aside the particular issue of how to interpret Dennett's
introspective report, the general point to be taken here is that those
who never or rarely experience image-like phenomena in their so-called
'mental lives' are likely to be surprised and even mystified by the
suggestion that images and image rotation figure significantly in
certain kinds of problem solving. And they are likely to find it diffi¬
cult to give serious attention to a theory of cognition which gives
imagery a central place. As habitual conceptualizers, they are bound
to harbour the suspicion (perhaps tacitly rather than in so many words)
that there must be something radically wrong here and that what 'people'
do - whether they know it or not - is what they do, conduct a kind of
silent dialectic in which objects are described, analyzed and inferences
are made. Plainly stated, the phenomenological intuition of the
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habitual conceptualizer and hence the phenomenological prejudice is
that the image theory is wrong and the linguistic theory is right.
Suffice it to say that this phenomenological prejudice - to the
extent that it is operative in given philosophers and psychologists -
should be resisted. The difference between those who report little
imagery and those who report much may be not so much a difference in
their actual method of problem solving, but, as I have suggested above,
a difference in the habitual modes of reference which the given prob¬
lem solvers have been accustomed to using when registering that
problem solving. In the case of those individuals who have received
extensive and specialized language training, it should not be surpris¬
ing that they are predisposed to reporting and hence predisposed to
defending, linguistic/discursive thought.
I suggest then that this phenomenological predisposition or pre¬
judice cannot be dismissed. It may provide (at least) a partial
explanation for the out of hand rejection of the image theory which is
to be found in the literature. It is perfectly natural that at some
stage in their respective analyses the would-be commentators on
Shepard's theory would judge that theory by the standard of their own
mental lives. And by that standard, the theory is bound to seem
incredible. Ask a philosopher when he is engaged in explaining the
geometry of triangles, whether his is making (mental) use of an egui-
lateral triangle or a scalene triangle and he will probably evince
surprise and state emphatically that he is not using any particular
triangle image at all, but the abstract concept of 'triangularity'.
Ask a student in an elementary geometry class the same guestion and he
might well say that he usually prefers to use an isosceles triangle
image and he may even go so far as to offer to draw a picture of it
(perhaps in its mental colour) for you. From the perspective of the
philosopher, this is just plain nonsense. He cannot fathom just how
person would do this or indeed why.
CHAPTER 6
Conclusion: Introspection, The Form of
Internal Representation, and Philosophical Prejudice
Doubtless no one would disagree that the first step toward theory
construction in any scientific area must be an adequate description of
facts, accomplished by means of terms that do not presuppose the theory
What is not so obvious is that there may be alternative frameworks for
the description of facts, and the decision made at this choice point
may have profound implications for the final theory.
In psychology, it has seemed to many investigators, perhaps a
majority, that an adequate descriptive base can be achieved by means of
an accurate reading of an organism's observed behaviours, that is, the
relationships between stimulus inputs from the environment and the con¬
sequent responses elicited from or emitted by the organism. However,
in the sphere of cognitive activity, difficulties emerge in that nearly
everything that goes on of interest is unobservable. When a person is
reading, the investigator can observe and record the movements of the
reader's eyes, but he can be under no illusion that he obtains from
this record an account of the cognitive activity described as reading.
Similarly, in a problem situation, one can observe the environmental
context and the way in which it is ultimately changed by the individual
solving the problem, but this account provides no information as to what
the individual did in arriving at a solution.
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In order to proceed toward theoretical accounts of activities such
as these, we clearly need factual accounts of what the individual is
doing between the initiation of the observed stimulus context and the
ultimate observable responses indicating that the individual has
obtained information or solved a problem. To be adeguate as a basis
for theory, this account must be as firmly anchored in observation as
descriptions of movements of animals in a maze. How, then, are we to
arrive at this objective?
Plain common sense dictates a direct solution to this by way of
introspection. It seems reasonable, that is, to expect that an indivi¬
dual engaged in the process of solving a given problem knows or, at any
rate, has a good idea of what he is doing. Common sense notwithstanding,
however, professionals in the field - philosophers and psychologists -
will have none of this. According to them, introspection is not to be
trusted. It cannot stand alone as a source of factual data for theories
of cognition, indeed, it cannot stand at all.
The first and, I judge, most significant lesson to be learned
through the study of Roger Shepard's investigations of the phenomenon of
mental image rotation, is that the professional ban on introspection is
unjustified. The rotation experiments demonstrate that people can and
do solve spatial problems of the given type by means of mental imagery
and rotations carried out with that imagery and that they have been
correct all along in their declaration of this. Moreover, if we are
prepared to suppose that mental rotations are not mental as opposed to
physical events but physical events which have a mental dimension in
that people experience them, then we have every reason to take people's
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introspections of mental rotation quite literally and seriously. For,
on such a view, introspective reports of mental rotation amount to
observation reports of the actual problem solving activity undertaken.
Beyond this, Shepard's treatment of mental imagery in general
breaks an old tradition in philosophy and psychology. Hitherto, those
who incorporated imagery into their theories of cognition (people like
E.B. Titchener, or John Locke, or David Hume) sought to make it the
bedrock of cognitive representation. For them, images constitute the
basic elements out of which all thought, not merely memory of things
past, is composed.
Shepard, on the other hand, does not conceive the role of imagery
on such a grandiose scale. Indeed, he has attempted to study imagery
in relation to a single, specific problem task. For Shepard, imagery
is a way of representing information that is especially perspicuous for
performing spatial cognitions, particularly shape assessments. But no
argument is made to justify the claim that all thought processes must
involve imagery, nor does Shepard give imagery a privileged position as
a form of representation. On the contrary, the information represented
in an image is defined vis-a-vis the interpretive procedures that 'read'
it as corresponding to an exemplar of some class of entity or activity.
That is, if there were no final (linguistic) interpretation of a mental
rotation, an image of two objects - one superimposed over the other -
would not serve to represent the information that the objects are the
same shape.
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The lesson to be learned here is that the case for mental imagery
is not to be made out on an 'all or nothing' basis - as if images are
basic elements of thought or they are nothing at all. Imagery, as
Roger Shepard's treatment of it clearly demonstrates, does not have to
carry all of the cognitive load. It can assume a more humble role.
Even if images are not the elements of thought, they are still important
as an 'engineering' feature of the mind-brain, which is not so much
necessary as convenient and efficient.
In particular, imagery can function as a computational tool for
spatial problem solving. Images allow one to transform information, to
mimic dynamic aspects of the environment. Because of the kinds of
transformations we can bring to bear and the kind of representation an
image is, we can use our imagery as a 'simulation' of possible (and,
perhaps, of impossible) transformations in the world. Thus, imagery is
an aid to thinking about the consequences of given actions, is a crutch
to help us devise a plan for achieving some desired state of affairs.
There is one final lesson to be learned here and this is a lesson
for the philosopher of cognition in particular. It is this: The ques¬
tion of the form of cognitive representation is not to be settled, once
and for all, on a priori ground - by way of a general pronouncement
regarding the nature of representation per se. Experimental results
in the field of cognitive psychology require attention and they do
occasionally (perhaps frequently) challenge or make obsolete an accepted
philosophical principle or rule. Shepard's work on image rotation
provides an especially clear demonstration that this can happen. The
linear reaction-time pattern exhibited by Shepard's subjects and
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their introspective reports stands in contradiction to the widespread
philosophical belief that representation can only be linguistic/sym¬
bolic in form.
For too long philosophical discussion of mental imagery has been
focused on issues of principle rather than empirical fact. The philo¬
sopher has been preoccupied with the metaphysical implications of talk
of entities inhabiting a mind space. Accordingly, the issue for the
philosopher (if, indeed, he acknowledged one at all in recent years)
has had to do with whether or not it makes sense to talk (as the
casual introspector does) of mental images or whether as Ryle would
have it, such talk is born of a fundamental category mistake.
But this is no longer the issue. A case, an empirical case for
problem solving by way of images has been made out. Certain behavioural
phenomena - reaction-time phenomena occurring as a result of spatial
problem solving point clearly and directly to the presence and opera¬
tion of image-like structures and processes in the human brain. And
either the inference from reaction-time behaviour to these structures
and processes is reasonable or it is not. In either event, these
behavioural facts cannot be ignored by anyone - philosophers included -
who presumes to tell us about the nature of thought.
APPENDIX A
Further Reflections on the Common Sense View
It may be wondered whether or not these reflections accurately
report the common sense view—so called—on matters of metaphysics. In
this connection, I would offer the following points for consideration.
In the first place, it seems reasonable to assume that in the common
sense context, one of the ways (indeed, perhaps the most significant
way) that people develop their ideas about mental activity in general
and mental imagery in particular, is on the basis of inferences they
might make from their own experience of such phenomena. (Ihey might
reason, for instance, thusly: images seem (phenomenally) to be like
pictures; pictures are entities, therefore, images are entities too.)
Accordingly, I have simply tried to describe, as best I could, my own
experience of image-type phenomena, and to describe the sometime para¬
doxical aspects of this experience, which, in my less reflective, non-
philosophical moments, I am simply content to accept at face value.
Secondly, the language which people regularly employ in connection with
their descriptions of mental imagery—the language of the mind's eye,
mental pictures etc.—clearly supports the dualist analysis I have
offered here. And, finally, on a more empirical note, I can report
that I have gathered some information about the common sense view
through discussions with a number of my students.
Specifically, in a seminar which I regularly conduct with a group
of students in introductory philosophy, I displayed pictures of several
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of Shepard's test object pairs and asked the students to decide
whether the objects in each pair are the same three-dimensional shape.
When they had done this, I asked them to describe how they solved these
problems. Without any prompting from me, they replied without hesita¬
tion that they had rotated images 'in their heads'. When I solicited
their comments on imagery in general, they avoided explicit definition
and concentrated on specific examples describing how and when imagery
occurs. When pressed for a definition, they provided an experiential
definition. Some said, "Images are things we can see in our minds,"
and some said, "we just experience them, that's all." The students also
seem convinced of the causal efficacy of image experiences, especially
in cases like the shape assessment case, where rotations can be carried
out with images. When I asked them about brain activity which might be
correlated with these image experiences, they were prepared to concede
that, of course it is probable that something must happen neurologically
to make imagery in the mind possible, but they were not prepared to
concede that the brain event and the experiential mental event are
identical. One student said (so he apparently believed with signifi¬
cance) that people think with their minds. And some of the students
complained they had considerable difficulty conceiving what possible
identity there could be between, say, the mind's eye experience of a
smooth, continuous expanse of red, as in a vivid sunset, and a brain
process that must, at bottom, involve particulate, discontinuous




So far as I can tell on my reading of the neurophysiological lit¬
erature, the consensus among experts is that the brain is, in a number
of significant respects, very like a computer. A computing machine is
a complex electrical network built up out of a large number of units.
The most basic unit is the transistor. There are also units built out
of the basic units. These include such components as 'Dynamic Pulse
Units'. (A DPU has an input terminal through which it may receive an
electrical pulse, and an output terminal through which it may send
one), 'and' gates, 'or' gates, and inverters. The brain is also a com¬
plex electrical network built up out of a large number of units. The
basic unit in the brain is the nerve cell. The behaviour of many nerve
cells is something like that of a DPU. If they are stimulated by a
nerve impulse from another cell, they send out a nerve impulse of their
own. Some nerve cells will act when stimulated by any one of several
other cells. These cells behave like 'or' gates. Others will act only
when stimulated by all of a group of other cells. These behave like
'and' gates. In these aspects of its behaviour, the brain seems to
work like a digital computer.
However, it is possible, too, (and this has been forcefully argued
by noted neurophysiologist Karl Pribram)"'" that the action of a nerve
"'"Pribram develops his thesis regarding the analogue activity of
the brain in Languages of the Brain (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1971), and
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cell, particularly the duration at the electrical output from the cell,
depends on the spatial arrangement of the cells that are joined to it,
and the position of the cell that sends it an impulse. In other words,
nerve impulses and chemical and physical stimuli to nerve cells seem
to add up to a total stimulus. In this respect, the behaviour of the
brain is like that of an analogue computer. So the brain, to the
extent that it is like a computing machine seems to be one of mixed
type, part digital and part analogue.
This is significant, in terms of the postulation of image rotation
as a strategy for spatial problem solving for two reasons: First, it
tends to support, in a general way, the whole notion of an analogue
problem solving activity—in particular, it seems that there is nothing
about the nature of the brain which would stand in the way of or make
impossible such problem solving. And second, it is very tempting to
suppose we have in this analogue activity between/among nerve cells,
perhaps the beginning of a mental image, and that a fuller understand¬
ing of this will possibly be the key to cashing out Shepard's theory in
terms of the neurophysiologies! hardware of the brain.
more recently, in collaboration with R. Baron and M. Nuwer, in "The
Holographic Hypothesis of Memory in Brain Function and Perception," in
R.C. Atkinson, H.D. Krantz, and R.C. Lutes, and P. Suppes, (Eds.),




Though Shepard does not make the inference as to the automaticity
of the image representation system or the rotation strategy on the
reaction-time basis that I have suggested, he does offer the specula¬
tion that the system and strategy have probably been pre-programmed in
us by a process of biological evolution. Indeed, in the introductory
section of their book, Mental Images and Their Transformation, Shepard
and Cooper begin by telling us of an observation which Shepard made
some years ago: he saw a German Shepherd holding a long stick horizon¬
tally in its mouth, run full-speed toward the opening in a picket fence
which was large enough for the dog only, to pass through. Apparently
just as catastrophe seemed imminent, the dog stopped short, paused for
a (thoughtful?) moment and rotated its head and thus the stick through
90° and proceeded through the opening without mishap. Shepard and
Cooper argue (presumably on the basis of this and other like observa¬
tions) that somehow constraints governing the rigid transformation of
objects in space have become incorporated into our (as they put it)
'genetically transmitted perceptual wisdom' and function at times
automatically. And they offer the a priori justification that surely
this is simply a matter of survival. Shepard and Cooper write:
Biological evolution would seem to have embarked upon
an uncharacteristically profligate course if the
most enduring and pervasive facts about our world—such
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as that it is three-dimensional, locally Euclidean,
isotropic (except for the unique upright direction
conferred by the earth's gravitational field), and
populated with objects that therefore have just six
degrees of freedom of rigid motion—had not been in
any way incorporated into our genetically transmit-
table perceptual wisdom. Without such incorporation
this wisdom, so crucial for survival in such a world,
would have to be learned, laboriously and at appre¬
ciable risk, by each and every newborn individual
de novo. (Mental Images and Their Transformation,
p. 3).
They continue later in the introduction:
... even if the constraints governing the spatial
transformations of objects in the three-dimensional
world were first internalized solely as an aid to the
perceptual interpretation of external events while
those events were actually taking place, the repre¬
sentational machinery embodying these constraints
would subsequently have become to some extent autono¬
mous. Except on those occasions when external events
become so rapid, captivating, or threatening as to
preempt the full resources of the interpretive
machinery, that machinery might well be at least par¬
tially susceptible to activation from within. Perhaps
it is in this way that even in the absence of corre¬
sponding external events, we are able to anticipate
their concrete outcomes. (Mental Images and Their
Transformation, p. 5).
APPENDIX D
The Image Theory of Meaning and Contemporary Empiricism
It is arguable that the modern day empiricist - the sense datum
philosopher, so-called, espouses the image theory of meaning as well.
Certainly passages in H.H. Price's Thinking and Experience, C.D. Broad's
The Mind and Its Place in Nature, and B. Russell's The Analysis of Mind
are indicative of this. Russell, for instance, (once) held that
... "the stuff of our mental life ... consists wholly of sensations and
images." (The Analysis of Mind, New York, 1921, p. 109). "Thoughts,
beliefs, desires, pleasures, pains and emotions are all built up out of
sensations and images alone." (Ibid., p. 121). "I think that observa¬
tion shows us nothing that is not composed of sensations and images."
(Ibid., p. 117). And Price speaks of thinking - specifically, problem
solving - being accomplished in images and of the importance of resem¬
blance for representation. He writes, ..."it is important to insist
that some of us do use images in our thinking. We use visual images
rather as we use maps or sketch-plans to find our way about a piece of
hilly and wooded country; and when someone asks us the way to Little
Puddlecombe, we refer to this mental map and read off the answer, and
we can do this because the mental map looks like what it refers to."
(Op. cit., 1953, p. 235).
I think that it is important to note, that although the empiricist
tradition of images as cognitive representations is certainly carried
forward by the sense datum theorists, Price, at any rate, distinguishes
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himself from his philosophical predecessors (Locke, Hume and company)
by adopting a restrained version of the imagist theory. Price, I take
it, does not wish to say that images are the only vehicles of thought
- that having the concept of 'Doghood' is necessarily having a picture
of a dog in the mind. Rather Price adopts a kind of dual-code theory:
"both words and images are used as symbols. They symbolize in quite
different ways, and neither sort of symbolization is reducible to or
dependent on the other. Images symbolize by resemblance." (Ibid.,
p. 209). Thus, Price would seem to be somewhat less committed to the
privacy implication(s) of the earlier imagist theories.
APPENDIX E
Language Training and Imagery
As far as I know, there are no empirical data which directly
support this speculation about the likely correlation between very
specialized language training and diminished image experience. No one
has undertaken to establish the degree of imagery experience reported
by philosophers, say, relative to that reported by carpenters or auto
mechanics. There is, however, indirect support for it. for one thing,
in the study of imagery experience referred to earlier, Anne Roe found
that, among trained academics, there is a gradation in imagery experi¬
ence. Physical scientists seem to be more given to imagery than social
scientists. Since the vocabularies of the various physical sciences
are not quite so replete with abstract concepts as the vocabularies of
the social sciences (the concept of 'atom', for instance, can be given
some kind of concrete reference by way of X-ray photography), it is
arguable that Roe's findings are entirely consistent with and indeed
predicted by the language training theory.
for another thing, there is evidence which suggests that those
who have received language training in languages which are more or less
impoverished as far as abstract concepts go, are more likely to retain
the image-experience as adults. Leonard Doob (in "Eidetic Imagery:
A Cross-Cultural Will-O'-the Wisp," op. cit., 1966) studied the eidetic
phenomenon among the members of two societies in Africa - The Ibo of
Eastern Nigeria and the Kamba of Central Kenya. These societies pose
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interesting test cases because they make use of languages which might
be described as 'concrete'. By and large, the Africans seemed to deal
with the world on a 'here and now' basis: wherever possible they used
ostensive definition to refer to objects and events around them and
otherwise displayed a preference for the use of proper names, often
times inventing them on the spot, if need be. On testing for eidetic
experience among these people, Doob found the age-image correlation
to be present. Ibo and Kamba adults were less likely to report
imagery than their children. But Doob found one significant discrep¬
ancy between the data arising from the Ibo and Kamba tests and data
arising from tests of subjects from Western industrialized countries.
Notwithstanding the age-image correlation, a goodly proportion of the
African adults seemed to have retained their ability to experience
images. Doob found that a full 20?o of the Ibo adults and 13?d of the
Kamba adults were given to some form of eideticism. Compared to the
less than 1% of non-African adults reporting eidetic experience, this
is remarkable and very likely, the explanation for the discrepancy is
to be found in the language variable. A number of the Ibo and Kamba
adults were able to retain vivid visual imagery because of the rela¬
tive 'concreteness' of their language.
And finally, though on a more anecdotal note, we find neuro-
physiologist D.O. Hebb suggesting a more direct connection between
advanced training in the language and concerns of academic disciplines
and the erosion of image experience. According to Hebb, the informa¬
tional content of one's training and the prevailing climate of opinion
in the given disciplines may affect the ability to experience imagery.
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In the course of his study of the neurological mechanisms operative
during so-called 'image sequences', Hebb was forced to reflect criti¬
cally and philosophically on the notions of introspection and mental
imagery respectively. In particular, he considered what it means
to talk of pictures in the head and of private, internal seeing, and
he came to discover certain conceptual difficulties inherent in this
sort of talk. Ihe result of this critical thinking, so he says, was
the erosion of his ability to experience images. Hebb writes:
A long time ago I could introspect with ease and did
so freely. Becoming more aware that there were theo¬
retical difficulties about introspection, I began to
look at the process critically. Eventually, I dis¬
covered to my astonishment that it included some
imagery of a pair of eyes with the upper part of the
face (my eyes and face) somehow embedded in the back
of a head (my_ head) looking forward into the sort of
gray cavern Ryle (1949) has talked about. Unfortun¬
ately this seemed so ridiculous that I rapidly lost
my ability to introspect and now can no longer report
on the imagery in detail. But such fantasy in one
form or another may be a source of the common convic¬
tion that one's mental processes are open to inspec¬
tion. The imagery is fleeting and unobtrusive and not
likely to be reported even to oneself, being so incon¬
sistent with one's ideas of what imagery is and how
it works, but it may nonetheless be a significant
determinant of thought. (D.O. Hebb, "Concerning
Imagery" in Images, Perception and Knowledge. (John
M. Nicholas (Ed)), Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co.,
1977), p. 152).
If there is any truth in Hebb's speculation about the connection
between his philosophical inquiry into imagery and his ability, sub¬
sequently, to experience imagery, then we might well expect that
philosophers and psychologists would be the last people likely to
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experience imagery. More than any other group of academics, they are
likely to have a priori misgivings about the very idea of mental
imagery, no doubt inspired, as for Hebb, by the reading of philosophers
like G. Ryle.
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